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Abstract 
 
Objectives.   This thesis aimed to examine a series of personality and 
cognitive factors as prospective predictors of suicidal thinking and psychological 
distress.  A secondary objective was to examine any causal relationship between 
rumination and attentional biases.   
Method.  In order to achieve the above objectives, a series of four studies 
were conducted.  Studies one and three were prospective studies, using analogue 
samples, to examine the role of personality and cognitive factors in distress and 
suicidal thinking.  In addition, study one also investigated the effect on attentional 
bias of manipulating rumination.  Study two was an experimental study in which 
two different methods of manipulating attentional bias were piloted.  The final study 
in this thesis employed a clinical sample of general hospital parasuicide patients to 
investigate whether relationships between personality and cognitive factors were 
replicable in a clinical population.   
Results.   The personality and cognitive factors understudy were investigated 
within a research framework to examine their interactive effects.  Hierarchical 
regression analyses revealed a number of moderating and mediating relationships 
between these personality and cognitive factors to prospectively predict both 
suicidal thinking and psychological distress.  In addition, rumination was found to 
have a causal influence on positive attentional bias.   
Conclusions.  Evidence from this thesis links personality and cognitive 
factors to both suicidal thinking and psychological distress in a series of moderating 
and mediating relationships.  These are discussed in relation to the possible 
theoretical and clinical implications.   
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1 Suicide and suicidal behaviour 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter aims to give an introduction to the area of suicide and suicidal 
behaviour research.  To this end, definitional issues associated with research in the 
field of suicide are presented, before the extent of the problem of suicidality is 
outlined.  Risk factors for suicidality are also summarised, followed by details of 
theoretical models which offer an account of suicidal behaviour.   
 
1.2 Definitions 
 Suicidal thinking (or suicidal ideation) can be defined as thoughts about 
self-injurious behaviours, these can range from vague thoughts about hurting 
oneself at some undefined point in time to specific plans to engage in a specific 
behaviour with the intention of ending one’s life (van Heeringen, 2001).  The terms 
deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide refer to self-injurious, non-accidental 
behaviours which do not result in death.  In contrast, completed suicide refers to a 
self-injurious non-accidental behaviour which does result in death.   Throughout this 
thesis, suicidal behaviour is frequently used as an umbrella category to refer to a 
series of thoughts and behaviours which can range from:  suicidal thinking, to 
deliberate self-harm, to attempted suicide, right through to completed suicide.    
There are a number of definitional issues associated with deliberate self-
harm, attempted suicide and completed suicide (e.g. O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000) 
which mainly result from difficulties in establishing whether an individual intended 
to take their own life at the time of engaging in a particular behaviour.  Numerous 
methodological issues make it difficult to accurately retrospectively assess an 
individual’s intentions at the time of engaging in a particular behaviour (e.g. 
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memory biases, lack of evidence, social desirability etc).  Consequently, 
measurements of these behaviours can be difficult to accurately compare.   
In an attempt to remove the problems associated with trying to 
retrospectively infer intentions from an individual’s behaviour, the term parasuicide 
was coined (Kreitman, 1976, 1977).  Parasuicide can be used to refer to any self-
injurious behaviour which is not accidental and does not result in death, including 
both those who do and do not want to die at the time of engaging in a particular 
behaviour.  The terms parasuicide or deliberate self-harm are more commonly used 
in European research (e.g. Schmidtke et al., 1996; O’Connor, Rasmussen & 
Hawton, in press), whilst attempted suicide is the more frequently used term in 
North American research.   In the present thesis the terms parasuicide, attempted 
suicide, deliberate self-harm and self injurious behaviour are used interchangeably 
(as in much of the literature).  However, these terms are used in a purely descriptive 
manner without reference to suicidal intent of an individual.   
 
1.3 The extent of the problem  
Suicide is a large problem in the UK – it is the second most common cause 
of death (following accidental death) for males aged between fifteen and 44 years in 
England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2007).  In Scotland, the problem 
is even greater with suicide being the most common cause of death for young men 
(aged 15-44 years) (General Registrar Office for Scotland, 2007).  Indeed, data from 
1998 to 2004 show that Scotland had the highest suicide rate in the UK:  for males 
the rate was 50% greater than the overall UK rate and for Scottish females the 
suicide rate was double the UK average (Brock, Baker, Griffiths, Jackson, Fegan & 
Marshall, 2006).  Consequently, the reduction of suicide is a public health priority 
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for both the UK and Scottish governments (Dept. of Health, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2003). 
In addition to suicide as a cause of death, parasuicide is also a large problem 
in the UK.  National statistics relating to the prevalence of parasuicide are harder to 
obtain than those for completed suicide, as unlike suicide as a cause of death, they 
are not nationally monitored in the UK.  However, large scale survey research found 
that 4.4% of respondents reported engaging in suicidal behaviour during their 
lifetime, whilst 14.9% of those surveyed reported considering suicide at some point 
in their lives (Meltzer, Lader, Corbin, Singleton, Jenkins & Brugha, 2002).  
Additional research suggests that the UK has one of the highest rates of parasuicide 
in Europe (Schmidtke et al., 1996).   
 
1.4 Risk factors for suicide 
There are many risk factors for suicidal behaviour and these can be broadly 
categorised into clinical, social, genetic and psychological risk factors.  Rather than 
provide an exhaustive list, this section aims to give a brief outline of some of the 
most frequently cited risk factors.   
1.4.1 Clinical risk factors 
The best predictor of completed suicide is past suicidal behaviour (e.g. 
O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000), which falls within the clinical category.  Indeed 
between 40-60% of those who complete suicide will have previously harmed 
themselves (Hawton & Fagg, 1998; Rygnestad, 1988; Suokas & Lonnqvist, 1991; 
Foster, Gillespie & McClelland, 1997). Research in the UK has demonstrated that 
hospitalisation as a result of deliberate self harm is associated with an increased risk 
of death by suicide (Hawton & Fagg, 1998; Hawton, Zahl & Weatherall, 2003; 
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Hawton, Harriss & Zahl, 2006), particularly in the first year following 
hospitalisation.  As previous suicidal behaviour is a large risk factor for completed 
suicide, research aimed at reducing the incidence of suicide often focuses on 
individuals who engage in suicidal ideation or suicidal behaviour to help identify 
predictors of completed suicide (e.g. Hawton, Houston, Haw, Townsend & Harriss, 
2003).  
Another frequently cited clinical risk factor is depression.  It has been 
reported that around fifteen percent of those experiencing unipolar depression will 
eventually complete suicide (Guze & Robins, 1970).   However, more up to date 
research argues that this may be an overestimation as it is based on a review of 
seventeen studies where patients were mainly in secondary care facilities (Davies, 
Naik & Lee, 2001).  A more recent meta-analysis reduced this estimate to six 
percent (Inskip, Harris & Barraclough, 1998), although critics argue this figure may 
still be skewed by the inclusion of recurrent inpatients (Davies et al., 2001).  Simon 
and VonKruff (1998) found that the risk of suicide was over five times greater for 
those receiving inpatient treatment for depression, compared to those receiving anti-
depressants in a primary care setting.  This highlights the necessity of research 
examining suicide risk in depressed patients to consider treatment as well as a 
diagnosis of depression.  Davies and colleagues (2003) go on to argue that a 
diagnosis of depression as a sole risk factor for suicide would require almost 5000 
interventions a year to prevent one suicide.  This illustrates that although depression 
can be a risk factor for suicide, it is also important to consider additional risk 
factors.  Put plainly, the majority of people who are depressed will not go on to 
complete suicide, meaning it is important to examine additional factors which may 
differentiate those people who complete suicide from those who do not.   
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1.4.2 Social risk factors 
One of the most commonly cited social risk factors for suicide is 
interpersonal problems.  In particular, relationship problems are often reported as a 
precipitant to suicidal behaviour (Vlachos, Bouras, Watson & Rosen, 1994; 
Hawton, Haigh, Simkin & Fagg, 1995).  However, similar to depression, although 
interpersonal problems may often be cited as a precipitant to suicidal behaviour, the 
majority of individuals who experience interpersonal problems will not engage in 
suicidal behaviour so it is important to consider those risk factors which 
differentiate between individuals who will and who will not engage in suicidal 
behaviour following relationship difficulties.   
A further commonly cited risk factor for suicide is social deprivation.  In 
Scotland, research has demonstrated an association between suicide rates and 
indices of socio-economic status (e.g. McLoone, 1996, Boyle, Exeter, Feng & 
Flowerdew, 2005).   Although social deprivation is a strong risk factor for suicide, it 
does not in itself explain why people take their own lives and may act as proxy for a 
number of different risk factors.   Thus, it is important for research to understand 
how or why social deprivation impacts on suicide, by examining potential 
mechanisms of this association.  These mechanisms have received less research 
attention than the epidemiologic association between social deprivation and suicide.  
Nonetheless most authors agree that the mechanisms linking social deprivation to 
suicide are complex and interactive (e.g. Watt, 1996; Wilkinson, 1996).     
 
1.4.3 Genetic risk factors 
A number of genetic risk factors have been suggested to explain a 
predisposition to engage in suicidal behaviour.  Evidence indicates that suicide often 
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runs in families – for example suicide risk is increased for persons with a parental 
history of suicide (Agerbo, Nordentoft, Bo Mortenson, 2002) – however it is 
difficult to separate the impact of genetics from that of upbringing in this 
association.  Twin studies have been used in an attempt to disentangle the effects of 
genetics from other social factors and these provide mixed results.  Some research 
indicates higher rates of suicide for monozygotic twins, although this association 
may be accounted for by the increased incidence of mental illnesses associated with 
suicide, as opposed to a direct genetic influence on suicide per se (Roy, Segal, 
Centerwall & Robinette, 1991).    However, more recent evidence produces contrary 
results; a much larger scale Danish study found no difference in the suicide rate 
between monozygotic and dizygotic twins (Tomassini, Juel, Holm, Skytthe & 
Christensen, 2003).   
Studies have also examined the rates of suicide in those who have been 
adopted and both their biological and adoptive relatives.  The evidence for these 
adoptive studies finds higher rates of suicide in biological compared to adoptive 
relatives for adoptees who had completed suicide, compared to matched controls 
(e.g. Schulsinger, Kety, Rosenthal & Wender, 1979; Wender, Kety, Rosenthal, 
Schulsinger, Ortmann & Lunde, 1986), indicating a genetic component to suicidal 
behaviour. 
However, it is unlikely that genetics alone can explain the complex 
phenomenon of suicidal behaviour, instead genetic risk factors may account for a 
predisposition to engage in suicidal behaviour, but whether an individual with a 
predisposition actually engages in suicidal behaviour will be influenced by 
numerous other risk factors – including the clinical, social and psychological risk 
factors highlighted.    Indeed, it may be most useful to consider genetic risk factors 
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within the context of a diathesis-stress model, whereby genetic factors convey 
vulnerability to suicidal behaviour; however this genetic vulnerability (or diathesis) 
is only activated in combination with other risk factors.   
 
1.4.4 Psychological risk factors 
Psychological risk factors for suicidal behaviour aim to explain individual 
differences, which may in turn explain suicide risk.  Identification of psychological 
risk factors for suicidal behaviour may be particularly pertinent (Williams, Van der 
Does, Barnhofer, Crane & Segal, 2008) because, unlike many social or genetic risk 
factors, psychological risk factors can often be modified, which allows for the 
development of treatments for at risk individuals (e.g. Townsend et al., 2001).  
Cognitive vulnerabilities which may predispose an individual to risk of suicide 
under certain circumstances have received increasing research attention in recent 
years.  This has led to the identification of hopelessness as a key predictor of 
suicidal behaviour.  Hopelessness can be defined as pessimism towards the future 
and has been described as the psychological construct most closely related to 
suicidal behaviour (Beck, Steer, Kovacs & Garrison, 1985; O’Connor, Sheehy & 
O’Connor, 2000).  Indeed hopelessness has been shown to mediate the relationship 
between depression and suicidal behaviour (see O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  
Specifically the absence of positive thoughts about the future, as opposed to the 
presence of negative thoughts, is the component of hopelessness more closely 
associated with suicidal behaviour (MacLeod, Rose & Williams, 1993; MacLeod, 
Pankhania & Mitchell, 1997).   
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In addition to hopelessness, a number of other cognitive and personality 
factors have been identified as possible risk factors for suicide – these are discussed 
in Chapter 2.   
 
1.5 Theories of suicidal behaviour 
1.5.1 Biomedical v. Biopsychosocial Approach 
The traditional approach to explain suicidal behaviour has centred on a 
biomedical model (O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  According to this perspective, 
suicide is caused by a biological change in an individual, meaning the suicidal 
individual must be mentally ill.  This approach disregards the impact of 
psychological and social factors on a person’s health – viewing the mind and body 
as distinct entities (O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  The biomedical model contrasts 
with evidence that not all completed suicides are carried out by individuals with a 
mental illness (e.g. O’Connor, Sheehy & O’Connor, 1999) and, as noted above, 
there are a number of social and psychological risk factors for suicide which do not 
fit with this biomedical approach.  Consequently, in recent years there has been an 
increasing tendency to view suicide through a biopsychosocial model where 
biological, psychological and social factors play an interactive role in suicidal 
behaviour.   
 
1.5.2 Diathesis-stress models 
Following on from a biopsychosocial approach to understanding suicide, 
research has begun to explore diathesis-stress conceptualisations of suicidal 
behaviour (e.g. Bonner & Rich, 1988; Dixon, Heppner & Anderson, 1991).  
Diathesis-stress models are founded on the premise that predisposing (cognitive) 
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vulnerabilities, when activated by stress, predict suicidal behaviour.  To this end, a 
number of vulnerabilities have been identified in the psychopathology literature, 
including dichotomous thinking (Litinsky & Haslam, 1998), impaired problem 
solving (Pollock & Williams, 2004), impaired positive future thinking (O’Connor et 
al., 2004) and perceived burdensomeness (Joiner et al., 2002).  However, this thesis 
will focus on the vulnerabilities of rumination and perfectionism – these are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.   The diathesis-stress perspective emphasises the 
importance of the interaction of factors in predicting suicide risk, as crucially the 
combination of the diathesis and the experience of stress is associated with 
increased suicidal behaviour, rather than either the diathesis or stress per se.    
 
1.5.3 Escape Theory 
A further biopsychosocial model which attempts to explain suicidal 
behaviour is Baumeister’s (1990) Escape Theory.  According to this perspective, 
suicidal behaviour is used as a means of escaping from the self and particularly 
from distressing self-awareness.  Within this framework, suicidal behaviour is 
viewed as a consequence of progression through a series of six stages in which the 
individual escapes from unbearable pain both cognitively and physically (see Table 
1.1).   
 Escape theory can also be used to explain deliberate self-harm, as 
Baumeister (1990) argues that deliberate self-harm also serves to allow escape from 
painful self-awareness, albeit on a more temporary basis than suicide.   
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Table 1.1.  Stages of Escape Theory (Baumeister, 1990) (adapted from O'Connor & Sheehy, 
2000) 
Escape Theory Stage Description 
1. Falling below 
expectations 
During stressful times we fall short of our expectations and standards. 
2. Locating blame for 
the situation on oneself 
The blame for this shortfall is attributed internally; leading to the next stage of negative 
self-awareness 
3. Negative self-
awareness 
This negative self-awareness generates negative affect (depression)  
4. Negative affect To escape this painful self-awareness and depression we engage in cognitive 
deconstruction.  This helps to compartmentalise our failings and attributions for failure. 
5. Cognitive 
deconstruction 
This cognitive deconstruction leads to disinhibition 
6. Reduction of 
inhibitions 
Because we are disinhibited we view suicide as more acceptable.  
    
1.5.4  Differential Activation Theory 
Differential Activation Theory (Williams et al., 2008) offers another 
biopsychosocial theoretical account of suicidal behaviour, based on the phenomena 
of cognitive reactivity.  Cognitive reactivity can be thought of as the sensitivity to 
particular patterns of thinking which can be triggered by small changes in negative 
mood.   This notion fits with the evidence that previously suicidal individuals, show 
significant decreases in interpersonal problem solving following a sad mood 
induction, compared to never suicidal controls (Williams, Barnhofer, Crane & Beck, 
2005).   Thus, small changes in mood can trigger thought processes which have 
previously heightened suicidal ideation.   According to differential activation 
theory, hopelessness and suicidal thinking are initially experienced during an 
episode of depressed mood.  At this point, depression, hopelessness and suicidal 
thinking become associated such that during future depressed mood, hopelessness 
and suicidal thinking will also be experienced (Joiner, 2002; Joiner & Rudd, 2000).   
From a Differential Activation perspective, rather than focussing on baseline levels 
of hopelessness or suicidal thinking, the ease in which hopelessness and suicidal 
thinking can be reactivated through small changes in mood, is the more crucial 
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factor (Williams et al., 2008).  There are parallels between Differential Activation 
Theory and diathesis-stress accounts of suicidal behaviour, as both argue that 
suicide risk is increased when cognitive vulnerabilities interact with (or are 
activated by) other risk factors (either negative mood or life stress).   
 
1.5.5 Interpersonal Psychological Model 
Thomas Joiner recently proposed the Interpersonal Psychological Model 
(Joiner, 2005) which identified three factors necessary for an individual to die by 
suicide: (i) ‘Acquired capability’ to engage in lethal behaviour; (ii) ‘perceived 
burdensomeness’ to loved ones or society and; (iii) a feeling of ‘thwarted 
belongingness’.  Joiner argues that the first stage of ‘acquired capability’ is said to 
occur by a process of habituation to the process of self injury by repeatedly 
engaging in non-fatal suicidal behaviour.  However, it is also acknowledged that 
this ‘acquired capability’ may also be achieved through a more indirect route 
through repeated exposure to pain or provocation (Stellrecht et al, 2006).  The 
second necessary stage of ‘perceived burdensomeness’ refers to an individual’s 
belief that a significant other or society in general, would be better off if they were 
dead.  The final component in this model is ‘thwarted belongingness’, which refers 
to an individual feeling socially isolated and disconnected from other people or 
groups in society.  According to the interpersonal psychological model, an 
individual will only die by suicide when they have achieved each of the components 
of the model.  Thus, there is scope for intervention at any of the stages.   According 
to this perspective, it is the interaction between an individual’s prior experiences 
(‘acquired capability’) and their perception of themselves and their place within 
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society (‘perceived burdensomeness’ and ‘thwarted belongingness’) which results in 
death by suicide.    
 
1.5.6 Cry of Pain hypothesis 
A final theoretical model based on an interactive biopsychosocial approach 
to predict suicide is the Cry of Pain hypothesis (Williams, 1997).   This theory was 
proposed in an attempt to place the role of psychological research in the context of 
existing literature in biological and social fields.  The Cry of Pain hypothesis views 
suicidal behaviour as a response to a situation which comprises of three 
components:  defeat, inescapability and no prospect of rescue (see Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  The Cry of Pain hypothesis (adapted from Williams & Pollock, 2001) 
   
According to the Cry of Pain hypothesis, when an individual encounters a 
situation which they perceive to be defeating or rejecting they make a judgement 
about the escapability of the situation before assessing the potential for rescue from 
the situation.  In circumstances where the defeating situation is perceived as 
Stress: 
particularly 
defeat/ rejection 
Escape potential Psychobiological 
“helplessness 
script” 
Individual Judgement:  
How stressful? 
How escapable? 
What social support is 
available? 
 
Influenced by 
cognitive biases  
Social 
Support 
(Rescue) 
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inescapable with no prospect of rescue, a psychobiological helplessness script is 
activated.  This script results in the impulse to escape the situation through suicidal 
behaviour.  However, whether an individual acts on this impulse will depend on a 
number of factors (e.g. knowledge and availability of means to do so).  As can be 
seen from the model, perceptions regarding whether a situation is defeating, 
inescapable or has the potential for rescue are all individual judgements which will 
be influenced by psychological factors (such as cognitive biases).  Again the model 
emphasises the interactive nature of risk factors for suicidal behaviour and also 
accounts for individual differences in response to the same set of stressful 
circumstances.  The utility of the Cry of Pain hypothesis is supported by empirical 
research (O’Connor, 2003).   
  
1.6 Summary 
Suicidal behaviour is a large problem in the UK and particularly in Scotland.  
There are numerous interactive risk factors for suicide which can be broadly divided 
into clinical, social, genetic and psychological factors.  Theoretical models, 
including diathesis-stress models, Escape Theory, Differential Activation Theory, 
the Interpersonal Psychological Model and the Cry of Pain hypothesis, aim to 
explain the interactions between risk factors to further our understanding of suicidal 
behaviour.    
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2 Cognitive and Personality Variables 
2.1 Overview 
The role of cognitive and personality factors in suicidality has been 
increasingly acknowledged in recent years.   This chapter aims to outline the 
cognitive and personality variables examined in this thesis before detailing how 
these variables have previously been related to suicidality and distress.  In addition, 
any relationships between these cognitive and personality variables will also be 
discussed.   
 
2.2 Rumination 
2.2.1 Definitions 
Rumination can be broadly defined as enduring, repetitive, self-focused 
thinking which is a frequent reaction to depressed mood (Rippere, 1977).  However, 
over the last two decades several more detailed definitions of rumination have been 
proposed (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).  Of these, a prominent theory has been put 
forward by Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues: The Response Styles Theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991).   
 
2.2.1.1 Response Styles Theory 
Nolen-Hoeksema argues that rumination or a ruminative response style1 is 
repetitive thinking, occurring in response to sad or depressed mood, where an 
individual focuses on their symptoms and the causes and consequences of these 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).   These repetitive thoughts prevent an 
                                                 
1
 The terms ruminative response style and rumination are used interchangeably throughout. 
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individual from moving into active problem solving where the issues identified 
through rumination could be resolved.  Instead, the individual becomes trapped in a 
cyclical process which serves to maintain their low mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).   
This tendency to ruminate in response to distress has been demonstrated to be a 
stable trait (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999).    
The Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ: Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991) has been developed to measure ruminative response style.  When the scale 
was first devised, the ruminative component was usually operationalised on its own 
as a 22-item measure.  However, in recent years, there have been concerns that the 
RSQ may be contaminated by items which are, in effect, assessing depressive 
symptoms rather than rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  
This led to re-analysis of the RSQ and (i) the subsequent removal of those items 
most closely associated with depression and (ii) the proposal that two components 
of rumination can be distinguished: reflection and brooding (Treynor et al., 2003).  
Reflection refers to self-focus aimed at problem solving in response to depressed 
mood.  In contrast, brooding refers to ruminations comparing one’s present situation 
with another unachieved benchmark.   Brooding has been demonstrated to be 
predictive of increased depression both concurrently and prospectively, whilst 
reflection has been shown to be associated with depression concurrently, but not 
prospectively (Treynor et al., 2003).   One interpretation of these findings is that 
although both brooding and reflection appear to be triggered by depressed mood 
(hence the cross-sectional associations), as reflection is not prospectively associated 
with depression it appears to be ultimately adaptive, perhaps through improving 
problem solving.  In contrast, the concurrent and prospective associations between 
brooding and depression indicate its maladaptive properties.  Thus, these two 
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components of rumination may illustrate the potentially adaptive and maladaptive 
aspects of rumination.   
 
2.2.1.2 Alternative definitions of rumination 
Aside from Nolen-Hoeksema’s work, a number of other definitions of 
rumination have emerged.  For example, Conway and colleagues (2000) proposed a 
definition of rumination which describes sadness focused rumination.  According to 
this perspective, rumination reflects repetitive thinking about one’s current feelings 
of sadness and the situation(s) which led these feelings to arise.   These ruminative 
thoughts do not stimulate individuals to change their present circumstances and, 
unlike Nolen-Hoeksema’s theory, these ruminations are not disclosed to others 
(Conway, Csank, Holm & Blake, 2000).  However Treynor and colleagues (2003) 
argue that Conway’s measure of rumination on sadness is likely to be confounded 
with measures of depression as over half of the items on the scale contain the words 
‘sad’ or ‘sadness’.   
Another definition of rumination focuses on stress-reactive rumination 
(Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  Stress-reactive rumination refers to ruminations 
following a stressful event, as opposed to rumination in response to depressed 
mood, as proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema.  The content of stress-reactive ruminations 
focuses on negative inferences about a stressful event (Spasojević, Alloy, 
Abramson, Maccoon & Robinson, 2004).  Stress-reactive rumination is highly 
correlated with Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles rumination (or depressive 
rumination); however, despite this overlap, there are a number of distinctions 
between the two conceptualizations (Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  The main point of 
contention is that Nolen-Hoeksema posits that depressive rumination contributes to 
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the maintenance of depressive symptoms after onset, whilst Robinson and Alloy 
argue that stress-reactive rumination influences the onset of depressive symptoms.  
The notion of stress-reactive rumination fits with diathesis-stress conceptualizations 
of the relationship between rumination and distress (e.g. Morrison & O’Connor, 
2005, Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).   
Other authors have proposed definitions of rumination which focus on its 
adaptive qualities.  Martin and Tesser (1996) conceptualise rumination within a 
control theory perspective as “a manifestation of people’s tendency to persist in 
goal-directed action until they have either attained their goal or given up the desire 
for it” (p.11).  Control theory attempts to explain all behaviour, (including 
cognition) through the notion of feedback control, where individuals compare their 
current state with a desired outcome or goal and if they detect a discrepancy 
between the two then their behaviour is adjusted in an attempt to reduce this 
discrepancy (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 
1998).  Thus, from this perspective, rumination is a problem solving process used in 
an attempt to achieve particular goals.  Despite these adaptive properties, some 
control theorists acknowledge that when goals become unattainable, ruminative 
processes may become maladaptive (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1981).  Martin & 
Tesser’s (1996) notion of rumination is not necessarily incompatible with Nolen-
Hoeksema’s view that rumination is maladaptive.  Given Treynor et al.’s recent 
reanalysis of the RSQ indicates brooding and reflection as the two components of 
rumination:  it seems that brooding may be the maladaptive component mainly 
focussed on by Nolen-Hoeksema, whilst reflection is analogous to the adaptive 
component proposed by Martin and Tesser.     
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2.2.2 Differentiating rumination from other constructs 
Rumination has been linked with a number of similar constructs.  For 
example rumination is often compared with worry.  However, although there are 
similarities between these two constructs, there are key differences which arguably 
distinguish them from each other.  First, the temporal focus differs, although both 
rumination and worry can involve thoughts regarding the past, present and future 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell 
& Berg, 1999),  rumination is more frequently associated with thoughts about the 
past (Wells & Matthew, 1994), whilst worry is more often associated with thoughts 
regarding the future (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983; Watkins, 
2008).  Second, worry is frequently conceptualised as an attempt to problem solve 
(Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998), which contrasts with the passive nature of a 
ruminative response style, although arguably the reflective component of 
rumination may represent a more problem solving oriented aspect of a ruminative 
response style. 
Despite the distinctions between rumination and other related constructs 
argued by theorists, there has been a recent call to shift away from these distinctions 
and to refocus on examining the commonalities shared by these related constructs in 
an attempt to further understanding (Watkins, 2008).  Watkins argues that as the 
process of repetitive thought underpins many different cognitive concepts, it may be 
more useful for research to focus on examining when repetitive thought is adaptive 
and when it is maladaptive, rather than looking for theoretical distinctions between 
related constructs.   
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2.2.3 Ruminative Response Style and Distress 
Much of the work on rumination focuses on the relationship between a 
ruminative response style and the maintenance of depression:  Initial levels of 
rumination have been associated with the maintenance of depressive symptoms after 
one year (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride & Larson, 1997).  However, research is 
increasingly finding relationships between a ruminative response style and other 
types of distress.  A recent systematic review highlighted ten out of eleven 
identified studies found a relationship between rumination and suicidality (Morrison 
& O’Connor, 2008b, Appendix 1).  Within this systematic review, each of the 
studies which conceptualised rumination in accordance with response styles theory 
found an association between rumination and suicidality, despite a variety of 
methodologies, populations and measures of suicidality.  Research has examined the 
relationship between the subcomponents of rumination and suicidality with 
equivocal results.  Brooding was demonstrated to be associated with suicidality in a 
number of prospective studies (O’Connor, O’Connor & Marshall, 2007; Miranda & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; O’Connor & Noyce, 2008).  However the only case-
control study identified by the systematic review (Crane, Barnhofer & Williams, 
2007) found no differences in brooding between their three groups: (i) those had 
never been suicidal (ii) those who had previously experienced suicidal ideation and; 
(iii) those who had previously engaged in suicidal behaviour.  However, Crane and 
colleagues also examined the balance of brooding compared to reflection scores 
within each group and found that suicide attempters had significantly higher scores 
for brooding items compared to reflective items.  In contrast there was a trend 
approaching significance for the never suicidal group to have higher scores for 
reflective as opposed to brooding items.   
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With regards to reflection the evidence is even more equivocal as Miranda 
and colleagues (2007) found that after controlling for demographic variables and 
distress, reflection was predictive of suicidal ideation one year later in their general 
population sample.  In contrast, O’Connor & Noyce (2008), again after controlling 
for demographic variables and initial suicide ideation, found no such relationship in 
a mixed general population/college student sample.  However, the difference in 
sample size may go some way to explaining the differences in findings between 
these two studies, as Miranda and colleagues had a substantially larger sample 
(n=1134 versus n=153), which would have afforded greater statistical power to 
detect smaller effects (O’Connor & Noyce, 2008).   
The case-control evidence in relation to reflection has found higher levels of 
reflection for never suicidal individuals compared with those who had previously 
engaged in suicidal behaviour, suggesting a protective effect of reflection (Crane et 
al., 2007).  To the author’s knowledge, no other studies have examined reflection in 
individuals who have specifically engaged in suicidal behaviour (as opposed to 
suicidal ideation), so the extent to which this protective effect of reflection is 
replicable remains unknown.   
In addition to the relationship with suicidality, rumination has also been 
linked with anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and cross-sectionally linked with 
hopelessness (Lam, Schuck, Smith, Farmer & Checkley, 2003).  Furthermore, 
rumination has been shown to interact with perceived stress to predict change in 
hopelessness prospectively (Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).     
Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles theory views rumination as a response to 
a sad or negative mood.  This contrasts with other cognitive theories of depression 
(e.g. Beck et al, 1979) which focus on negative cognitions activated by stressful life 
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events (using diathesis-stress models).  A current debate in the literature pertains to 
a proposed extension of Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles theory to include 
Robinson and Alloy’s (2003) notion of ‘stress-reactive rumination’.  Although 
interactions between rumination and stress are not reported in Nolen-Hoeksema’s 
research (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), there is 
evidence to suggest that a ruminative response style interacts with levels of stress to 
predict distress prospectively (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005; Morrison & O’Connor, 
2008a).  Thus, any examination of rumination must also consider levels of stress. 
 
2.3 Attentional Bias  
2.3.1 Definitions 
Attentional bias can be thought of as a change in the orientation of an 
individual’s attention resulting in the awareness of a specific feature of their 
environment (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988).  This change may be 
conscious, but is more commonly unconscious (Williams et al., 1988).  Attentional 
bias can be measured in a number of ways, including the dot-probe task (MacLeod, 
Mathews & Tata, 1986) and the emotional Stroop (Stroop, 1935) (see section 4.2.4).  
Importantly, the definition of attentional bias is dependent on the methodology used 
to measure it, as the different techniques employed often capture different 
components of the attentional process.  For example whilst the emotional Stroop 
provides a measure of attentional interference, the dot-probe task provides a 
measure of selective attention (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed explanation).   
Attentional biases are usually defined with regards to a specific class of features.  
For example, attentional biases towards positive, negative or neutral information 
may all be examined. 
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2.3.2 Attentional bias and distress  
Attentional bias has been linked with a number of measures of distress; 
however the evidence is not always consistent.  There are a number of 
methodological issues, outlined below, which may explain this lack of consistency.  
Attentional bias towards negative stimuli has been associated with depression in 
some research (e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003); however other studies have failed to 
demonstrate this relationship (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986).  Bradley, Mogg and Lee 
(1997) suggest that negative attentional biases are more frequently associated with 
depression in studies where negative stimuli are presented for longer durations 
(500-100 ms).  Attentional biases may impact on distress at different stages in the 
attentional process (Bradley et al., 1997): (i) capturing attention – that is increasing 
the likelihood that an individual will initially attend to a particular class of 
information or: (ii) the maintenance of attention – meaning once individuals have 
attended to a particular class of information they experience difficulties in 
disengaging from it.  Thus, the finding that attentional bias is more frequently 
associated with depression when stimuli are presented for longer periods of time 
suggests that the biases are resulting from a difficulty in disengaging from negative 
information, as opposed to a propensity to initially orient towards negative 
information.  Recent research tracking eye movements is consistent with this as 
dysphoric individuals were found to spend longer gazing at negative scenes for than 
a non-dysphoric group, but there was no difference in initial orientation between the 
groups (Caseras, Garner, Bradley & Mogg, 2007).     
With regards positive attentional biases in depression, the evidence is mixed.  
There is some evidence to indicate that depressed individuals lack the positive 
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attentional biases observed in non-depressed matched controls (McCabe & Gotlib, 
1995; Suslow, Junghanns & Arolt, 2001).  However, contrasting evidence from an 
eye tracker task shows that both dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups share a 
general tendency to initially orient towards positive compared to negative scenes 
and to maintain attention on positive as opposed to neutral scenes (Caseras et al., 
2007).   
Attentional biases have also been implicated in suicidal behaviour (Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986; Becker, Strohbach & Rinck, 1999).  However, findings in this 
area are limited as the few existing studies use the emotional Stroop, a modified 
version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), to measure attentional bias (e.g. Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986; Becker et al., 1999) (see Chapter 4 for more details).  One of 
the few studies to examine attentional bias in relation to hopelessness found no 
association (Becker et al., 1999).  However, as Becker and colleagues used an 
emotional Stroop measure of attentional bias, replication of this research using a 
more robust measure of attentional bias is required.   
 
2.3.3 Relationship between rumination and attentional bias 
Response styles theory posits that a mechanism by which rumination affects 
distress is through its impact on cognitive biases (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998).  Research has demonstrated that rumination is associated with 
memory biases and biases in interpreting ambiguous situations (Lyubomirsky et al., 
1998).   A relationship between rumination and attentional bias, another form of 
cognitive bias, has been suggested by some authors (e.g. Bradley et al, 1997; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005).   If attentional biases toward negative stimuli reflect difficulty in 
disengaging from negative information, then a relationship between rumination and 
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attentional bias would seem likely.  However, a paucity of experimental research 
has examined the nature of the relationship between these two variables.  The 
authors are aware of only two studies, Williams and Broadbent (1986) and Joorman, 
Dkane and Gotlib (2006) which have examined correlations between rumination 
and attentional biases.  Williams and Broadbent (1986) reported a significant 
positive correlation between rumination and attentional bias for negative stimuli.  
However, rumination was measured using one item where participants indicated 
“how ruminating they felt themselves to be (ruminating was defined as thoughts 
churning over and over in your mind)” (Williams & Broadbent, 1986 p.103) and 
attentional bias was measured using an emotional Stroop task.  Joorman and 
colleagues (2006) found in a sample of depressed patients, that brooding rumination 
was correlated with attentional biases towards sad faces (in a dot-probe task), even 
after controlling for depression.   
However, in order to examine any causal relationship between rumination 
and attentional bias it is necessary to use experimental manipulations.  Two 
additional studies have used experimental methods to examine the relationship 
between attentional bias and rumination (Donaldson, Lam & Mathews, 2007; 
Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  Donaldson and colleagues induced rumination and 
distraction in both patients with major depression and healthy controls, but found no 
difference in attentional biases between the rumination and distraction conditions in 
either the patient or the control groups.  Nonetheless, they did find that trait levels 
of rumination were predictive of negative attentional bias (when stimuli were 
presented for 1000ms), in their patient sample, even after controlling for levels of 
depression.   
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Donaldson and colleagues suggest that their null findings for differences in 
attentional biases following rumination/distraction manipulations may have been a 
result of the lack of effect of the rumination and distraction induction procedures.  
They argue that their eight minute manipulation may not have been powerful 
enough to override the ingrained attentional responses in their sample of depressed 
individuals.    
Morrison and O’Connor also utilised an experimental paradigm where 
participants were given either a positive or a negative mood induction followed by 
either a distraction or rumination manipulation.  They found that for participants 
who received a negative mood induction, inducing rumination decreased positive 
attentional bias, whilst inducing distraction increased positive attentional bias.  The 
difference between Morrison and O’Connor’s and Donaldson and colleagues 
findings may result from the differing samples.  As Morrison and O’Connor used 
healthy young adults, it may be that their attentional pathways are less deep-rooted 
and therefore more susceptible to the manipulation effects.  However, further 
methodological variations may also account for the differences.  First, the measures 
of attentional bias vary.  Although both studies use dot-probe measure of attentional 
bias, Morrison & O’Connor present positive-negative word pairings, whilst 
Donaldson and colleagues present positive-neutral and negative-neutral word 
pairings.  This is a crucial difference, as in Morrison and O’Connor’s study it is 
unclear whether their reported decrease in positive attentional bias, following a 
rumination induction, was the result of decreasing attention toward positive words, 
or increasing attention toward negative words. 
A second methodological variation may also contribute to the differences 
between the two studies.  Donaldson and colleagues measured responses in the dot-
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probe task via a response box, whilst Morrison and O’Connor measured responses 
via a computer keyboard.  Research indicates that using a response box to measure 
reaction times provides a more accurate result as there is minimal lag time between 
a response being made and the computer recognising and recording this response.  
The potential variation in lag time for a response box is consistently around 1 
millisecond, whilst for a standard keyboard it varies between around 24 to 33 
milliseconds (Plant, Hammond & Whitehouse, 2003), creating a larger margin for 
error.    Thus there is a need for future research using a robust measure of attentional 
bias to further examine the causal relationship between rumination and attentional 
bias.  In addition, there is also a need for research to examine the possibility of 
causation in the opposite direction, using an experimental manipulation of 
attentional bias to examine the impact on rumination.   
 
2.4 Perfectionism  
2.4.1 Definitions  
Perfectionism is a well established predictor of psychological distress (e.g. 
Chang, 1998, 2000; Change & Rand, 2000; Flett, Hewitt & Dyck, 1989; Hunter & 
O’Connor, 2003).  However, before examining how perfectionism has previously 
been linked with distress it is important to provide an operational definition of what 
we are referring to by perfectionism (Frost, Heimberg, Holt, Mattia & Neubauer, 
1993).   There is a general consensus that perfectionism is best viewed as a multi-
dimensional construct (Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 
1990), however agreement over the definitions of these dimensions is less 
established.  The present thesis focuses on a tripartite definition of perfectionism put 
forward by Hewitt and Flett (1991) which has received a great deal of research 
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attention in recent years.   Hewitt and Flett (1991) distinguish three dimensions of 
perfectionism which they argue are enduring, deep-seated personality traits (Hewitt 
& Flett, 2002):  (i) self-oriented perfectionism – self-imposed standards and 
expectations; (ii) other-oriented perfectionism – standards and expectations one 
holds for others; (iii) socially prescribed perfectionism – an individual’s beliefs 
about the standards which others expect from them.   
According to Hewitt and Flett (2002), self-oriented perfectionism refers to 
standards which are set by the self and apply to the self.  The key characteristics 
associated with self-oriented perfectionism will be maintained across range of 
behavioural domains and include high motivation to be perfect, upholding 
unachievable standards even following failure and harsh self critique which focuses 
on personal inadequacies and mistakes.      
Other-oriented perfectionism refers to standards which are set by the self, 
but are applied to others (Hewitt & Flett, 2002).  Key characteristics of other-
oriented perfectionism include a staunch desire for others to be perfect, setting high 
(sometimes unattainable) standards for others and engaging in harsh critiques of 
others.  Similar to self-oriented perfectionism these characteristics should be applied 
across of range of behavioural domains.  Consequently, other-oriented 
perfectionism may result in interpersonal and relationship difficulties for the 
perfectionist.   
Unlike self and other oriented perfectionism, socially prescribed 
perfectionism refers to standards that are perceived to be held by others, but are 
aimed towards the self (Hewitt & Flett, 2002).  The key characteristics of socially 
prescribed perfectionism include the notion that others hold unachievable, high 
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standards for the perfectionist and that these demands must be met in order to 
satisfy others.   
 
2.4.2 Relations between perfectionism and psychological distress 
There has been considerable debate in the literature regarding whether 
perfectionism is consistently maladaptive.  The evidence appears to vary depending 
on the dimension of perfectionism under study as self-oriented, socially prescribed 
and other oriented perfectionism have been differentially associated with 
psychological distress.  Socially prescribed perfectionism has been consistently 
implicated in psychological distress (e.g. Hewitt & Flett, 1991; O’Connor & 
Forgan, 2007; O’Connor & O’Connor, 2003; O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  Lack of 
control has been proposed as an explanation for these findings, as individuals high 
in social perfectionism, feel that the external pressures on them to succeed are out 
with their influence, which increases their levels of distress (Hewitt & Flett, 1991).   
However, the evidence for a link between self and other oriented 
perfectionism and distress varies.  Self-oriented perfectionism has been 
demonstrated to interact with stress to predict depression, hopelessness and suicidal 
threat in clinical patients (e.g. Hewitt, Flett & Weber, 1994; Hewitt, Newton, Flett 
& Callander, 1997).  However, other studies have failed to find this association 
(Hewitt, Flett, Turnbull-Donovan, 1992; O’Connor & Forgan, 2007).  These 
conflicting findings may reflect the distinction between maladaptive and adaptive 
perfectionism.  For example self-oriented perfectionism may lead to feelings of 
failure and self criticism when individuals fail to realise strict self imposed targets 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991).  However, it is also possible that self-oriented perfectionism 
may motivate some individuals to succeed (Hunter & O’Connor, 2003).   Thus, 
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although self-oriented perfectionism may be maladaptive in some contexts, for 
some individuals, it may also be adaptive for others.   
The evidence for other-orientated perfectionism is even more mixed, with 
some studies suggesting it is linked with increased paranoia and phobic symptoms 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991), whilst others suggest it is associated with a reduction in 
depression (Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein & Mosher, 1995) and suicidality (Hewitt, 
Norton, Flett, Callander & Cowan, 1998, Hunter & O’Connor, 2003).   Although 
initial conceptualised as being detrimental (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), more recent 
research has suggested that other oriented perfectionism may reduce distress by 
reducing focus on the self and moving attention towards others (e.g. Hunter & 
O’Connor, 2003).  This conceptualisation would fit with Baumeister’s (1990) 
escape from the self model of suicidal behaviour, which posits that in some 
instances, focus away from the self can be constructive.   
 
2.4.3 Relationship between perfectionism and stress 
The relationship between perfectionism and stress may take a number of 
forms.  It is possible that the relationship is a moderating one, in which the 
experience of stress increases the negative impact of perfectionism.  Alternatively, 
perfectionism in itself may produce increased levels of stress, thereby indicating a 
mediating relationship.   
Two competing theories have been proposed to explain the moderating 
relationship between perfectionism and stress to predict distress.  The first is the 
specific vulnerability hypothesis (Hewitt & Flett, 1993) which posits that specific 
types of stressors have differential impacts on the individual dimensions of 
perfectionism.  According to this perspective, socially oriented perfectionism should 
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interact with interpersonal stressors to predict increased distress, whilst self-oriented 
perfectionism should interact with attainment related stressors to increase distress.  
Empirical tests of this hypothesis have produced mixed results, with some providing 
support (or partial support) for the model (Hewitt & Flett, 1993; Hewitt, Flett & 
Ediger, 1996; Enns & Cox, 2006), whilst others did not (Hewitt, Caelian, Flett, 
Sherry, Collins & Flynn, 2002; Joiner & Schmidt, 1995; Enns, Cox & Clara, 2005). 
A second hypothesis to account for the moderating relationship between 
perfectionism and stress to predict distress is the diathesis-stress hypothesis.  
According to this perspective, perfectionism will act as a diathesis, interacting with 
general stress to predict increased levels of distress.  This model has received 
support from both cross-sectional (Hewitt & Dyck, 1986) and prospective studies 
(Flett et al., 1995; Chang & Rand, 2000) of university students.  Thus, whilst the 
evidence for the specific vulnerability hypothesis is fairly mixed, there has been 
consistent support for the diathesis-stress hypothesis.   
A mediating relationship between perfectionism and stress has received far 
less research attention than the moderating relationship (Hewitt & Flett, 2002).  
However, the limited evidence available indicates that stress mediates the 
relationship between perfectionism and both negative outcome and depression 
(Chang, 2000; Hewitt, Flynn, Mikail & Flett, 2001).   
 
2.4.4 Relationship between perfectionism and rumination 
Recent research has examined whether rumination may be a mechanism by 
which perfectionism affects distress.  It seems highly likely that perfectionists who 
ruminate about their mistakes or failings will consequently experience increased 
psychological distress.  Research by Flett, Madorsky, Hewitt, and Heisel (2002) 
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found that after controlling for rumination, the relationship between both self-
oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and distress was rendered non-
significant.  This suggests that rumination may mediate the perfectionism-distress 
link; however no formal mediation analyses were conducted by Flett and 
colleagues.  O’Connor, O’Connor & Marshall (2007), provide both cross-sectional 
and prospective evidence to support the rumination as a mediator hypothesis.  
Specifically, they found brooding rumination to either fully or partially mediate the 
effects of both socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism on a range of 
measures including depression, hopelessness, suicidal thinking and psychological 
distress (as measured by the General Health Questionnaire).  However, O’Connor 
and colleagues did not include a measure of reflective rumination in their research, 
so were unable to assess the extent to which these mediating relationships were 
specific to brooding, as opposed to reflective, rumination.  Harris, Pepper & Maack 
(2008), examined the mediating role of both brooding and reflection in the 
perfectionism-distress relationship.  Their cross-sectional study measured 
perfectionism in accordance with Frost and colleagues (1990) Multi-Dimensional 
Perfectionism Scale and found that rumination fully mediated the effect of 
maladaptive perfectionism on depressive symptoms.  Further analyses examining 
the components of rumination established that brooding rumination fully mediated 
the maladaptive perfectionism-depression relationship, whilst reflection partially 
mediated this relationship.  However, the measure of rumination used in Harris et 
al’s study measured specific ruminations about failure in a test, as opposed to the 
more general tendency to ruminate in response to negative mood, normally 
measured by Response Styles theory.   
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2.4.5 Relationship between perfectionism and attentional bias 
There has been little empirical research examining the role of attentional 
biases in perfectionism.  However, given that perfectionists are excessively 
concerned with failure and achieving unrealistic standards, it seems possible that 
biases in attention towards negatively valenced stimuli, may exacerbate the levels of 
distress associated with perfectionism.  In addition, as rumination has been shown to 
mediate the perfectionism-distress relationship and given the similarities between 
rumination and attentional biases, it seems appropriate that research should also 
consider the role of attentional biases in the perfectionism-distress relationship.    
 
2.5 Goal Adjustment 
2.5.1 Definitions 
Persistence is generally thought to be adaptive characteristic which helps 
individuals to attain goals and is associated with enhanced wellbeing (Bandura, 
1997).  However, there are circumstances in which persistence may be maladaptive 
– such as instances where a goal is unlikely to be attained and persistence will only 
serve to increase the experience of failure.   
Derived from self-regulation theory, goal adjustment focuses on situations 
where persistence may be maladaptive, by considering how individuals respond to 
situations in which they are unable to attain their personal goals (Wrosch, Scheier, 
Miller, Schulz & Carver, 2003).  Two components of goal adjustment have been 
identified: goal disengagement and goal reengagement.  Goal disengagement refers 
to an individual’s ability to relinquish unobtainable goals by discontinuing their 
effort and commitment towards a particular goal in response to a threat to goal 
pursuit.  Goal reengagement, on the other hand, reflects an aptitude to discover and 
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attempt to achieve alternative goals, following a threat to existing goal pursuit.   
Thus goal adjustment can be viewed as an adaptive process by which individuals 
give up on unachievable goals and move the focus of their goal pursuit to 
alternatives.   These goal adjustment tendencies have been demonstrated to remain 
stable across a range of different pursuits (Wrosch et al., 2003).   
 
2.5.2 Goal adjustment and distress 
Previous cross-sectional research has indicated that poorer goal adjustment 
is associated with reduced wellbeing (Wrosch et al., 2003).  Wrosch and colleagues 
(2007) argue that goal disengagement and goal reengagement have differential 
relationships with distress.  According to this viewpoint goal disengagement is 
associated with negative aspects of wellbeing, whilst goal reengagement is 
associated with the positive aspects of wellbeing.  This appears to be supported by 
research to date.  Goal disengagement has been cross-sectionally associated with 
reporting fewer depressive symptoms (Wrosch, Miller, Scheier & Brun de Pontet, 
2007).  Prospectively, poor goal disengagement has been associated with increased 
levels of C-reactive protein (a prognostic marker of immune function) (Miller & 
Wrosch, 2007), which in turn, has been show to contribute to the development of 
depressive symptoms (Miller & Blackwell, 2006).   In contrast, goal reengagement, 
but not goal disengagement, has been cross-sectionally linked with purpose in life 
(Wrosch et al., 2003) and suicidal thinking (O’Connor & Forgan, 2007).  Although 
suicidal thinking may not initially appear to be a positive aspect of wellbeing, this 
relationship may be a reflection of the impact of failing to reengage on reasons for 
living, which would be considered a positive outcome.  Nonetheless the majority of 
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research examining goal adjustment has been cross-sectional in nature indicating 
that further prospective research is required.   
 
2.5.3 The relationship between goal adjustment and perfectionism 
Goal adjustment has also been demonstrated to influence the effects of 
perfectionism on distress.  As perfectionism often involves setting unrealistic, 
unachievable goals, it is perhaps unsurprising that, in combination with poor goal 
adjustment, perfectionism would lead to increased levels of distress.  O’Connor and 
Forgan (2007) found goal reengagement moderated and mediated the effects of 
socially prescribed perfectionism on suicidal thinking.  This suggests that an 
individual’s perception that significant others hold high standards and ideals for 
them, combined with a deficit in engaging with new goals when initial goal pursuit 
is threatened, was predictive of increased suicidal thinking.   
 
2.5.4 The relationship between goal adjustment and rumination 
As rumination can be thought of as a difficulty in disengaging from 
particular thoughts and behaviours, a relationship between rumination and goal 
adjustment may be expected.  Wrosch et al. (2003) reported that both goal 
disengagement and goal reengagement were associated with fewer intrusive 
thoughts in their student sample.  Whilst Miller and Wrosch (2007) suggest 
ruminations relating to goal pursuit may disrupt sleep and this may be an 
explanation for the increased levels of C-reactive protein (a prognostic marker of 
immune function) in individuals who were poorer at goal disengagement.   It would 
therefore seem possible that goal adjustment may influence the established 
relationship between rumination and distress.  However, to date, the relationship 
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between goal adjustment and rumination has received little attention (Watkins, 
2008).   
 
2.6 Summary 
Research has highlighted a number of cognitive and personality variables 
which have been implicated in suicidality and psychological distress including: 
rumination, attentional biases, perfectionism and goal adjustment.  In addition to 
being associated with distress these variables are often inter-related and this may 
influence their association with distress.  By measuring these items concurrently the 
present thesis will be able to examine these possibilities across a series of studies.     
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3 Rationale and General Aims 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter aims to outline the overarching aims of the research conducted 
in this thesis.  To this end, the general rationale behind the research will be 
summarised, before the general aims are discussed.   
 
3.2 Rationale 
The rationale behind each specific study is outlined separately at the start of 
each study.  However, each individual study falls within the general rationale which 
underpins this thesis.   
 
3.2.1 MRC Framework for interventions 
In light of the increasing desire for evidence-based practice, the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) has produced a five phase framework for the development 
and evaluation of randomised controlled trials for complex interventions to improve 
health (MRC, 2000).  A complex intervention is one which contains a number of 
components which may interact with each other.  Theoretical models of suicidal 
behaviour (see section 1.5 for details) and previous empirical research (see Chapter 
2) indicates that individual risk factors interact with each other to increase suicidal 
behaviour.  This suggests that any attempt to intervene with at risk individuals will 
require a complex intervention tackling a number of elements.  To this end, the 
current thesis has been designed to provide evidence to inform the first phase 
identified by the MRC – the pre-clinical or theoretical phase.   This thesis aims to 
build the evidence base with experimental and prospective research using both 
clinical and analogue studies to help understand the nature of the relationships 
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between key variables.   This, in turn, will inform future phases of the MRC 
framework in which interventions are developed and tested.   
 
3.2.2 Psychological distress and suicidal thinking 
Previous research has highlighted the association between suicidality and 
elevated levels of psychological distress (e.g. Rosario, Schrimshaw & Hunter, 2005; 
Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  Consequently, in this thesis, in addition to suicidal 
thinking, we also examined how the individual difference variables under study 
affected measures of psychological distress.  Psychological distress was used as an 
umbrella term to include measures of depression, anxiety, hopelessness and 
dysphoria.    This method fits with the increasing use of a transdiagnostic approach, 
focussing on commonalities in the processes which may underpin varying 
psychological disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004).     
 
3.3 General Aims 
Although each of the studies in this thesis has a number of specific aims, 
there are a number of general overarching aims which apply across studies.  These 
general aims are outlined below.   
 
3.3.1 Testing relationships between individual difference variables 
As can be seen in Chapter 2, a number of personality and cognitive variables have 
been implicated in suicidal behaviour and psychological distress.  In addition,  as 
noted above, both theoretical models of suicidal behaviour and empirical research 
highlight that risk factors for suicide can be numerous and interactive.  
Consequently, this thesis aims to examine the interactive nature of a series of 
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cognitive and personality risk factors.  Perfectionism (particularly socially 
prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism) and rumination have both been 
persistently linked with suicidality in addition to psychological distress, as 
highlighted in two recent systematic reviews of the literature (O’Connor, 2007; 
Morrison & O’Connor, 2008b).  To this end, the overarching aim of this thesis is to 
examine the role of specified cognitive variables (stress, goal adjustment and 
attentional bias) in the relationships between both perfectionism and distress and 
rumination and distress.  In addition, we also examined the role of rumination in the 
perfectionism-distress relationship.  Thus, we aim to test the models illustrated in 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.  In each instance, we aim to consider the potential 
mediating and moderating influences.   
 
 
Figure 3.1.   Influences on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Influences on the rumination-distress relationship 
 
 
3.3.2 Testing relationships in different samples 
A further aim of this thesis was test the relationships under study in both 
analogue and clinical samples.  Through this methodology we aimed to increase the 
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external validity of the findings and improve the relevance of any findings for future 
research aimed at developing intervention strategies in either population. 
 
3.3.3 Testing new relationships 
The personality and cognitive variables understudy within this thesis were 
selected as they bear a number of theoretical similarities and there appears to be 
potential for many of these variables to influence each other (as noted above).  
However, to date, a number of these relationships have yet to be empirically 
examined.  This thesis will therefore test a number of relationships for the first time 
including: (i) the impact of goal adjustment as a mediator or moderator in the 
relationship between rumination and distress; (ii) the role of attentional bias as a 
mediator or moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship; (iii) the role of 
goal adjustment as a mediator or moderator in the prospective relationship between 
perfectionism and distress; (iv) the role of stressful life events as a mediator or 
moderator of the relationship between rumination and distress and; (v) formal 
analysis of stress as a mediator of the relationship between rumination and distress.   
   
3.3.4 Relationship between rumination and attentional bias 
An additional aim was to empirically examine the relationship between 
rumination and attentional bias.  To this end, we aimed to examine any causal 
relationship between rumination and attentional bias.  Thus, study one (Chapter 5) 
aims to examine the impact of manipulating rumination on attentional bias and 
study two (Chapter 6) aims to explore the impact of manipulating attentional bias on 
rumination.   
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3.4 Summary 
In order to provide evidence to inform the first, theoretical phase of the 
MRC framework for complex interventions, this thesis aims to examine the role of a 
series of cognitive variables in the relationship between both perfectionism and 
rumination with measures of suicidal thinking and psychological distress in both 
analogue and clinical samples.  An additional aim was to examine any causal 
relations between rumination and attentional bias.   
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4 General Methodology 
4.1 Overview 
The following chapter outlines the measures employed throughout this 
thesis.  As there is overlap between many of the measures throughout studies one, 
three and four, this outline aims to avoid unnecessary repetition.  Nonetheless, each 
individual study contains a brief summary of the measures used alongside the 
procedure employed.   Cronbach’s alpha levels are reported individually for each 
study.   Table 4.1 provides a summary of the measures used within each individual 
study; this is followed by a detailed description of each of the measures in turn. To 
aid comprehension, measures are subdivided into three categories:  (i) predictor 
variables; (ii) outcome variables and (iii) manipulation procedures.  As the 
methodology in study two does not overlap with other studies in this thesis, this will 
be discussed in detail within Chapter 6. 
 
Table 4.1.  Summary of measures used in each study 
 Measures at Time One Measures at Time Two 
Study One Rumination (Short RSQ) 
Attentional Bias 
Perfectionism (45-item MPS)  
Goal Adjustment (GAS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Dysphoria (CESD) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
Mood (VAS & POMS) 
Mood Manipulation 
Rumination/Distraction Manipulation 
Perceived Stress (14-item PSS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Dysphoria (CESD) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
Study Two Attentional Bias Attentional Bias 
 
Study Three Rumination (22-item RSQ) 
Perfectionism (45-item MPS)  
Goal Adjustment (GAS) 
Perceived Stress (14-item PSS) 
Stressful Life Events (LESS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Dysphoria (CESD) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
Rumination (22-item RSQ) 
Perceived Stress (14-item PSS) 
Stressful Life Events (LESS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Dysphoria (CESD) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
Study Four Attentional Bias Perceived Stress (4-item PSS) 
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Rumination (22-item RSQ) 
Perfectionism (15-item MPS)  
Goal Adjustment (GAS) 
Perceived Stress (4-item PSS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
Depression and anxiety (HADS) 
Hopelessness (BHS) 
Suicidal Thinking (SPS) 
 
4.2 Predictor variables 
4.2.1 Rumination 
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) of the Response Styles 
Questionnaire (RSQ) (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) provided a measure of 
participants’ ruminative tendencies in negative situations (see Appendix 2).  
Participants were asked rate each of the 22 items on a 4-point scale according to the 
frequency with which they react in this manner when ‘sad, down or depressed’.  
Higher scores reflect a greater ruminative response style in negative situations.  The 
scale has demonstrated significant test-retest reliability over one year (r = .47, 
p<.01) and construct validity (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991).   
The RRS scale is also available as a 10-item measure known as the 
Ruminative Response Scale (Short Form) (Short RRS: Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000) (items 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19).  Initially, the short form of the scale 
was argued as preferable to the original measure, as it omits a number of items 
which may reflect “automatic negative thoughts” (Nolen-Hoeksema, personal 
communication).  However, recent research has highlighted the overlap between 
items on the RRS and measures of depression.  This led Treynor and colleagues 
(2003) to reanalyse the RRS, removing the items most associated with depressive 
symptoms and differentiating two components of rumination: brooding and 
reflection.  Brooding (items 5, 10, 13, 15, 16) and reflection (items 7, 11, 12, 20, 21) 
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scores can each be calculated by summing five items from the original 22-item 
RRS.  Example items include ‘Think about a recent situation wishing it had gone 
better’ (brooding) and ‘Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way’ 
(reflection).  Test-retest reliability of the brooding and reflective components of 
rumination over one year has been demonstrated (r=.60 and r=.62 respectively) 
(Treynor et al., 2003).   
 
4.2.2 Perfectionism 
The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) 
provided a 45-item measure of perfectionism (see Appendix 3).  This can be 
subdivided into three subscales, each with fifteen items, measuring three dimensions 
of perfectionism:  (i) Self-oriented perfectionism (items 1, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 
23, 28, 32, 34, 36, 40 and 42), the extent to which an individual has a desire to be 
perfect and has high expectations for their own achievements (e.g. “One of my goals 
is to be perfect in everything I do”); (ii) Socially prescribed perfectionism (items 5, 
9, 11, 13, 18, 21, 25, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 and 44), the extent to which 
individuals believe that others have unrealistic expectations of them (e.g. “The 
people around me expect me to succeed at everything I do”); (iii) Other-oriented 
perfectionism (items 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 43 and 45), the 
extent to which an individual has high expectations of others (e.g. “If I ask someone 
to do something, I expect it to be done flawlessly”).  Higher scores on each subscale 
are indicative of increased levels of that particular dimension of perfectionism 
(items 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 19, 21, 24, 30, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, and 45 are reverse 
scored).  The test-retest reliability over a three month period has been established 
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for the self, other and social subscales (r = .88, .85, .75 respectively), in addition to 
construct validity with other perfectionism measures (Hewitt & Flett, 1991).   
A shorter version of the MPS containing only fifteen items has been 
developed through factor analysis of the original scale (Cox, Enns & Clara, 2002) 
(items 6, 10, 13, 14, 19, 24, 28, 31, 33, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45).  In this shorter 
version, each of the three dimensions of perfectionism is measured by five items.   
The original MPS and the shorter version have been shown to be highly correlated 
and Cox and colleagues (2002) argue that the shorter version provides a better fit for 
the hypothesised three factor model of perfectionism.   
 
4.2.3 Goal Adjustment 
The Goal Adjustment Scale (GAS: Wrosch, et al, 2003) provided a 10-item 
measure of both goal disengagement (an individual’s ability to give up unattainable 
goals) and goal reengagement (an individual’s ability to engage with other new 
goals, if existing goal pursuit is threatened) (see Appendix 4).  Participants were 
asked to think about how they would usually react when forced to stop pursuing an 
important goal and to indicate the extent of their agreement with each statement 
using a five-point scale.  Example items include ‘It's easy for me to reduce my effort 
towards the goal’ (goal disengagement) and ‘I start working on other new goals’ 
(goal reengagement).  Goal disengagement is calculated by computing the mean of 
four items (items 1, 3, 6 and 8 – items 3 and 6 are reverse coded), whilst goal 
reengagement is calculated by computing the mean of the remaining six items 
(items 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10).  Higher scores on the scale are indicative of an increased 
ability to disengage from existing goals or reengage with new goals, following a 
threat to goal pursuit.   
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4.2.4 Attentional Bias 
Two main paradigms have been used as experimental measures of 
attentional bias: (i) emotional Stroop and; (ii) the dot-probe task.  The emotional 
Stroop is a modified version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935).  This requires 
participants to read aloud the colour of the ink that emotional words are printed in.  
Participants are timed on this task and longer timings are thought to represent 
increased attentional bias.  Although this task measures attentional bias in relation 
to interference in colour naming, it is unable to provide any information on the 
mechanisms of these attentional biases, for example, is interference in the colour 
naming of words a result of participants attending to negative words, or is it due to 
cognitive efforts to suppress negative words – both situations would produce the 
same results (e.g. increased trial lengths) on the emotional Stroop test.  Moreover, 
MacLeod (2005) questions whether the Stroop even necessarily measures selective 
attention as ‘The fact that colour information receives inadequate attention does not 
require the conclusion that attention is diverted instead to the processing of word 
content’ (p. 52).   Another criticism of the emotional Stroop is that it does not allow 
a direct comparison of patterns of attentional bias for different stimuli.  For 
example, larger attentional biases towards negative words, in comparison to positive 
words, may be a result of a bias to attend to negative as opposed to positive words, 
or a preference to attempt to suppress negative as opposed to positive words.  This 
is an often cited weakness of the emotional Stroop test (e.g. de Ruiter & Brosschot, 
1994; Bradley et al, 1997) and can be overcome through the use of the dot-probe 
task (MacLeod et al, 1986) in research.  Unlike the Stroop, the dot-probe task is a 
measure of selective attention, where participants are presented with two different 
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types of stimuli simultaneously (e.g. negative and neutral words) and differing 
patterns of attention to these stimuli can be calculated.   
Consequently, we adopted a dot-probe measure of attentional bias.  This 
consisted of 8 baseline trials and 60 experimental trials.  Each trial in this task began 
with a fixation cross presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms.  This was 
followed by the simultaneous presentation of two words, one above and one below 
centre (in the baseline trials strings of the letter X were used instead of words).    
The words were 3.5cm apart and remained on the screen for 750 ms.  Immediately 
following the word pair presentation, a dot-probe appeared in the location of one of 
the previous words and participants used a response box to indicate the spatial 
position of the probe.  The participants’ response concluded each trial, and after a 
1000 ms rest, the next trial began.  Participants’ reaction times were measured and 
quicker reaction times were taken to indicate that participants were attending to the 
word previously in the same location as the probe.   
The words used in this task were selected from a standardised list created by 
John (1988) and consisted of both positive and negative words, each paired with a 
neutral word matched for length and frequency of usage (see Appendix 5).  Of the 
60 experimental trials, 30 consisted of positive-neutral word pairings and 30 
consisted of negative-neutral word pairings.  The probe followed the neutral word in 
half of the trials, and followed the negative/positive word in the remainder of the 
trials.  The presentation order of the word-pairings was randomised.     
Following Mogg, Bradley and Williams (1995) attentional bias scores were 
calculated by subtracting the mean response times from trials where the probe was 
in the same location as the valenced word from the mean response times in those 
trials where the probe was in a different location from the valenced word.  
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Attentional bias scores were calculated separately for positive and negative stimuli.  
This can be calculated in using the following equation: 
 
[(Valenced word upper, probe lower + Valenced word lower, probe upper) – 
(Valenced word upper, probe upper + Valenced word lower, probe lower)] / 2 
 
Positive attentional bias values indicate increased attention towards the 
valenced stimuli in comparison to the neutral stimuli, whilst negative values reflect 
“avoidance” of the valenced stimuli. 
 
4.2.5 Perceived Stress 
Despite a plethora of research, there is still no single measure of stress which 
has emerged from the stress literature.  Nonetheless, there is increasing consensus 
over a cognitive conceptualisation of stress (Lazarus, 1999), meaning measures of 
stress which focus on the cognitive aspects are becoming increasingly popular.  
Consequently, the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 
1983) was developed to provide a measure of stress appraisal - specifically, the 
extent to which an individual perceives life as out with their control, unpredictable 
and demanding.  The PSS provided a 14-item measure of global self appraised 
stress (e.g. ‘How often have you felt nervous and stressed?’) (see Appendix 6).  
Participants indicated how they had been feeling over a specified period of time on 
a four-point scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of perceived global stress.  
Test-retest validity of the PSS over a six week period has been reported as r = .55 
(Cohen et al., 1983).  A shorter, 4-item, version of the PSS (Cohen et al., 1983) is 
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also available and was used in study four with our clinical sample to reduce the 
burden of questions on participants (items 2, 6, 7 and 14).   
The focus of the PSS on self-appraised life stress avoids the numerous 
problems associated with life event checklist measures of stress.   One of the largest 
criticisms of checklist measures of stress is that they attempt to provide an objective 
measure of stress – implying that the event in itself is the cause of stress (Cohen et 
al., 1983).  This is in contrast to the notion that individuals interact with their 
environment and events will be appraised as stressful depending on individual 
factors such as perception of coping resources or support available (e.g. Lazarus, 
1966).  Further difficulties with checklist measures of stress include problems with 
ensuring the checklist is comprehensive, for example research has highlighted that 
life events checklists often omit events particularly salient for women (Makosky, 
1980) or minority ethic groups (Rabkin & Struening, 1976).  An additional problem 
is that some life events measured by checklists may confound with symptoms of the 
disorders they are trying to predict, such as difficulties in sleeping or reduced 
appetite (Herbert & Cohen, 1996) and this may account for any observed 
relationship.  A further criticism of life events checklists relates to the onset of 
stress following a life event.  Most checklist measures use a one year period, based 
on the assumption that this is the timeframe in which a stressful event will have an 
impact, however the evidence to support this is limited (Munroe, 1982).  This raises 
the supplementary problem of the accuracy of retrospective reporting of life events, 
as obviously the dates of some types of life events will be more memorable than 
others (Herbert & Cohen, 1996).   
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4.2.6 Stressful Life Events 
Despite the limitations of life event checklist measures of stress noted above, 
in study three we employed a checklist measure of stress to allow comparison 
between this and our measure of perceived stress.  The Life Events Scale for 
Students (LESS; Linden, 1984) was adopted as it provided a measure appropriate to 
our participant population (see Appendix 7).  Participants were asked to indicate 
whether they had experienced a particular life event within a specified time period.  
In total, 36 life events were measured, including ‘death of a parent’ and ‘losing a 
part-time job’.  Each of these life events has been weighted according to severity 
and these weighted responses were totalled to provide a stressful life events score.  
Although originally developed in Canada the LESS has been validated for use in a 
British sample (Clements & Turpin, 1996) and the British weightings were used in 
our research.  Reliability of the LESS (i.e. the correlation between two sets of scores 
taken on two different occasions, but each referring to the same time period) has 
been shown as .66 for one month and .61 for six months (Clements & Turpin, 
1996).  The consistency of the LESS (i.e. the extent to which the same events are 
reported for two sets of scores taken on two separate occasions, but each referring to 
the same time period) has been demonstrated as 61% over one month and 54% over 
six months (Clements & Turpin, 1996).   
 
4.3 Measures of distress 
4.3.1 Hopelessness 
The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester & Trexler, 
1974) measures pessimism towards the future (e.g. ‘It’s very unlikely that I will get 
any real satisfaction in the future’) and has been shown to be predictive of 
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completed suicide (Beck, Steer, Kovacs & Garrison, 1985).  This 20-item scale 
asked participants to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each item (items 
1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15, and 19 were reverse scored) with regard to their current state 
of mind (see Appendix 8).  Higher scores indicate greater levels of hopelessness.  
The reliability and validity of the BHS has previously been demonstrated (Beck et 
al., 1974).   
 
4.3.2 Anxiety and Depression 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) is 14-item scale which divides into two subscales, each with seven items, 
measuring depression (even numbered items) and anxiety (odd numbered items) 
(see Appendix 9).  Participants were asked to rate the how often they felt a 
particular way over the past few weeks on a four-point scale.  Sample items include 
‘I feel as if I am slowed down’ and ‘Worrying thoughts go through my mind’.  
Higher scores in each subscale indicate greater levels of anxiety and depression 
respectively (items 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13 are reverse scored).  The HADS was 
initially developed as tool to screen for anxiety and depression in non-psychiatric 
hospital patients, consequently there are no items referring to symptoms of a 
somatic nature which may be confounded with the physical difficulties often found 
in general hospital patients.  Reviews papers have concluded that the HADS is a 
reliable and valid measure in both clinical and general population samples 
(Hermann, 1997; Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & Neckelmann, 2002).   
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4.3.3 Dysphoria 
The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) provided a 20-item measure of dysphoria (e.g. ‘I felt that I was just as good as 
other people’) (see Appendix 10).  This measured the frequency with which 
participants experienced depressive symptoms over the past week on a four point 
scale.  Higher scores on this measure are indicative of increased dysphoria (items 4, 
8, 12 and 16 are reverse scored).    The CES-D has been established as a reliable and 
valid measure in a student population (Radloff, 1989).   
 
4.3.4 Suicidal Thinking  
The Suicide Probability Scale (SPS; Cull & Gill, 1988) is a 36-item tool 
used to assess suicide risk in both clinical and non-clinical populations.  The scale 
consists of four subscales measuring hopelessness, suicidal ideation, negative self-
assessment and hostility.  In the present research we employed the Suicide Ideation 
subscale only, which provided an eight item measure of suicide ideation (e.g. ‘In 
order to punish others, I think of suicide’) (see Appendix 11).   Participants were 
asked to rate how frequently they experienced particular thoughts or feelings in the 
past week on four point scale.  Higher scores were indicative of increased suicide 
ideation.  This measure of suicide ideation was selected because as well as being 
predictive of suicide risk (e.g. Larzelere, Smith, Batenhorst & Kelly, 1996; Witte, 
Fitzpatrick, Joiner, Bradley & Schmidt, 2005) it has demonstrated sensitivity to 
changes in suicidality (e.g. Rudd, Rajab, Orman, Stulman, Joiner & Dixon, 1996).  
The reliability and validity of the SPS has previously been demonstrated (Cull & 
Gill, 1988).   
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4.3.5 Mood  
A ten centimetre visual analogue scale (Aitken, 1969), anchored at sad and 
happy, provided a measure of participants’ mood.  An additional measure of mood 
was provided by the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr and Droppleman, 
1971).  The POMS required participants to rate a series of 65 adjectives on a five 
point scale in accordance with their current feelings (items 22 and 54 are reverse 
coded) (see Appendix 12).  The POMS subdivides into 6 subscales: tension, 
depression, anger, vigour, fatigue and confusion.   The sum of the items in each 
subscale provides a total score for the subscale.   A total mood disturbance score can 
be calculated by summing the tension, depression, anger, fatigue and confusion 
subscales and subtracting vigour.  Greater scores are indicative of increased mood 
disturbance.  The POMS has previously been demonstrated to be reliable and valid 
(McNair et al., 1971).   
 
4.4 Manipulation Procedures 
4.4.1 Rumination and Distraction Manipulations  
Both the rumination and distraction manipulations were based on procedures 
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), adapted by Lavender and 
Watkins (2004) for use with British participants.  Participants were asked to 
visualise, focus and concentrate on a series of 45-items in an eight minute self-
paced task (see Appendix 13 and Appendix 14).  In the rumination condition, these 
items related to either symptoms, emotions, or the self, however they were not 
specifically directed to think about negative emotions or traits.  For example, 
participants were requested to think about ‘the physical sensations you feel in your 
body’, ‘how awake or tired you feel now’, ‘what your feelings might mean’ and ‘the 
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degree of relaxation or agitation you feel’.  In the distraction condition each item 
was focussed externally away from the self and was unconnected to feelings or 
symptoms.  Example items included think about ‘raindrops sliding down a window 
pane’, ‘the layout of a typical classroom’, ‘a double-decker bus driving down a 
street’ and ‘two birds sitting on a tree branch’.   Previous research using this method 
has found that, for individuals in a negative mood, the rumination manipulation 
increases depressed mood, whilst the distraction manipulation alleviates depressed 
mood (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). 
 
4.4.2 Positive and Negative Mood Manipulations  
The mood induction task followed Moore and Oaksford’s (2002) procedure 
where an adaptation of the Velten mood induction procedure (Velten, 1968) was 
combined with music and a specific request to participants to try to alter their mood 
state.   Negative mood was induced using a series of statements presented on a 
computer screen which participants were asked to read aloud.  Statements included 
‘Just when I think things are going to get better, something else goes wrong’ and 
‘People annoy me; I wish I could be by myself’ and were accompanied by Barber’s 
Adagio for Strings and Mahler’s 5th Symphony Adagietto.  The positive mood 
induction followed the same procedure with a series of statements including ‘I have 
complete confidence in myself’ and ‘I feel light hearted’, accompanied by Mozart’s 
Einekleine Nachtmusik 1st, 3rd and 4th movement.  The use of a combination of 
methods to induce a particular mood has been shown to be most effective 
methodology (Martin, 1990). 
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5 Study One: A self-report and experimental study to examine 
moderating and mediating influences in the relationships between 
rumination and perfectionism and distress. 
5.1 Abstract 
Objectives.  This study aimed to examine the role of individual difference 
variables, in the relationships between both perfectionism and distress and 
rumination and distress.  A further aim was to test the causal role of rumination in 
attentional bias.   
Design.  A test-retest design was utilised.  The prospective nature of this 
study allowed for predictions of distress over time, controlling for initial levels of 
distress. 
Method.  Ninety nine student participants completed initial measures of 
rumination, perfectionism, goal adjustment and psychological distress and 
attentional bias.  Participants then completed experimental manipulations of mood 
and rumination before re-completing a measure of attentional bias.   Approximately 
five weeks later, 83 participants re-completed self report measures of psychological 
distress.   
Results.  The effect of manipulating rumination on attentional bias was 
examined by analysis of variance.  Moderating and mediating influences on the 
relationship between both perfectionism and rumination and distress were examined 
through a series of multiple hierarchical regression analyses.   
Conclusions.  We found evidence of a causal relationship between 
rumination and positive attentional bias where inducing rumination showed a trend 
to increase positive attentional bias, whilst the opposite effect occurred following 
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the induction of distraction.  Stress, rumination and goal adjustment and positive 
attentional bias were found to moderate and / or mediate the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress.  In addition, stress both mediated and moderated the 
relationship between rumination and distress, whilst goal disengagement also 
moderated this relationship.   These findings are discussed in relation to previous 
research.   
 
5.2 Introduction 
5.2.1 The relationship between attentional biases and rumination 
As outlined in section 2.3.3, there are a number of theoretical similarities 
between rumination and attentional bias.  However, in order to examine the 
possibility of causation between rumination and attentional bias, there is a need for 
an experimental manipulation of rumination.  Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) 
have developed a rumination manipulation procedure which will allow for causation 
between rumination and attentional bias to be examined in the present research.   In 
addition, as the effects of rumination/distraction inductions appear to vary by mood 
(e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), an experimental negative mood 
manipulation will also be employed.   
 
5.2.2 Influences on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
As summarised in section 2.4.2, perfectionism has consistently been linked 
with psychological distress (although this relationship varies as a function of the 
dimension of perfectionism under study).  A number of variables have been outlined 
as having a possible impact on the perfectionism-distress relationship including 
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stress, rumination, goal adjustment and attentional bias (see sections 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 
2.5.3 and 2.4.5 for full details).   
 
5.2.2.1 Stress 
Stress has previously been shown to moderate the relationship between self-
oriented perfectionism and depressive symptoms (Flett et al, 1995).  However, other 
research failed to find this association, instead reporting that socially prescribed 
perfectionism interacted with stress to predict hopelessness and psychological 
symptoms (Chang & Rand, 2000).  Thus, the specific nature of any diathesis-stress 
relationships between the different dimensions of perfectionism and different 
measures of distress remains unclear, indicating a need for prospective research to 
examine this further.     
Stress may also impact on the perfectionism-distress relationship through a 
mediating relationship.  From this perspective the experience of perfectionism, 
through setting unattainable goals and targets, actually generates stress which, in 
turn, increases the levels of distress experienced.  Previous research using Frost and 
colleagues Multi-dimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost, Marten, Lahart & 
Rosenblate, 1990) found that stress partially mediated the relationship between 
perfectionism and negative psychological outcome (Chang, 2000).  One cross-
sectional study found that interpersonal problems mediated the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and depression (Hewitt, Flynn, Mikail & Flett, 
2001).  However, there is a need for further research to examine this area.   
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5.2.2.2 Rumination 
Recent research has indicated a role for rumination to mediate the impact of 
perfectionism on distress (Flett et al., 2002; O’Connor et al., 2007; O’Connor & 
Noyce, 2008; Harris et al., 2008) (see section 2.4.4 for details).  It is also possible 
that rumination may moderate the impact of perfectionism on distress, such that the 
adverse consequences of perfectionism are amplified by perseverative ruminative 
thinking.   However, this possibility has to date received little research attention, an 
issue which will be addressed in the current study.   
 
5.2.2.3 Goal adjustment 
Perfectionism often involves setting unrealistic and unachievable goals, 
therefore it is perhaps little surprise that it should be related to goal adjustment (see 
section 2.5.3 for more details).  However, this is a much under-researched area.  
One study examining this relationship cross-sectionally found that goal 
reengagement both moderated and mediated the effects of socially prescribed 
perfectionism on suicidal thinking (O’Connor & Forgan, 2007).  However, the 
nature of this relationship over time remains unexplored.   
 
5.2.2.4 Attentional Bias 
There has been little empirical research examining the role of attentional 
biases in the perfectionism-distress relationship.  However, given that perfectionists 
are excessively concerned with failure and achieving unrealistic standards, it seems 
possible that biases in attention towards negatively valenced stimuli, may 
exacerbate the levels of distress associated with perfectionism (e.g. attentional 
biases may moderate the perfectionism-distress relationship).  However, it is also 
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possible that perfectionism alters an individual’s pattern of attention such that they 
increasingly attend towards negative stimuli and/or away from positive stimuli (e.g. 
attentional biases may mediate the perfectionism-distress relationship).   The current 
study will investigate both of these possibilities.   
 
5.2.3 Influences on the rumination-distress relationship 
Similar to perfectionism, rumination has also been persistently linked with 
measures of distress (see section 2.2.3 for full details).  A number of variables may 
impact on the rumination-distress relationship including stress, goal adjustment and 
attentional biases.  The present study examines these possibilities through a 
prospective design.   
 
5.2.3.1 Stress 
Recent theorists have proposed the concept of stress-reactive rumination, 
where ruminations occur in response to a stressful life event (Robinson & Alloy, 
2003) (see section 2.2.1.2 for more details).  However, the moderating effects of 
stress on the rumination-distress relationship are not routinely reported.  
Nonetheless, there is some evidence to suggest that a ruminative response style 
interacts with levels of stress to predict social dysfunction, dysphoria, hopelessness 
and suicidal thinking (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005, Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).   
In contrast, the possible mediating effects of stress on the rumination-distress 
relationship have yet to be empirically examined (i.e. the extent to which rumination 
results in increased stress, which in turn increases distress).   
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5.2.3.2 Goal adjustment 
There is some indirect evidence to link goal adjustment with rumination.   
Both goal disengagement and goal reengagement have both been associated with 
lower levels of intrusive thoughts (Wrosch et al., 2003).  In addition, ruminations 
relating to goal pursuit have been suggested to disrupt sleep and provide a 
mechanism for goal adjustment to affect immune functioning (Miller and Wrosch, 
2007).  However, the extent to which goal adjustment directly impacts on the 
rumination-distress relationship has yet to be explored, something which is 
addressed in the present study.   
 
5.2.3.3 Attentional bias 
As highlighted in section 2.3.3, there has been little research examining the 
relationship between rumination and attentional bias.  If attentional biases towards 
negative stimuli reflect a difficulty in disengaging from negative information then it 
would seem likely that attentional bias may moderate the rumination-distress 
relationship.   It is also possible that ruminative tendencies increase the likelihood of 
attending to more negative stimuli and less to positive stimuli, which indicates the 
possibility of attentional biases mediating the impact of rumination on distress.    
 
5.2.4 Aims 
The current study had two main aims: (i) to examine the effect of 
manipulating rumination on attentional bias and; (ii) to test the 
moderating/mediating roles of a series of cognitive and personality variables on the 
established relationships between both perfectionism and distress and rumination 
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and distress (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).  To this end, a series of research 
questions and specific hypotheses are outlined in section 5.2.5.   
 
5.2.5 Research questions and hypotheses 
1) Does manipulating rumination affect positive or negative attentional 
bias?  Given the theoretical similarities between rumination and attentional bias and 
previous research in this area, we hypothesised that inducing rumination would 
decrease positive attentional bias and increase negative attentional bias.    
2) Does stress moderate and/or mediate the perfectionism-distress 
relationship?  Based on previous research findings, we hypothesised that stress 
would moderate the both the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship and 
the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship, consistent with a 
diathesis-stress paradigm, such that increased self or social perfectionism in 
combination with increased stress would be predictive of greater distress.  We also 
hypothesised that stress would mediate the socially prescribed perfectionism-
distress link, consistent with previous findings.   
3) Does rumination moderate and/or mediate the perfectionism-distress 
relationship?  Following previous research findings we hypothesised that 
rumination would mediate both the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress 
relationship and the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship, such that 
increased rumination combined with increased socially prescribed or self-oriented 
perfectionism would be predictive of increased distress.   We made no specific 
predictions regarding the possible moderating effect of rumination on the 
perfectionism-distress relationship due to a lack of previous research in this area.   
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4) Does goal adjustment moderate and/or mediate the perfectionism-distress 
relationship?  Following previous research, we hypothesised that goal 
reengagement would both moderate and mediate the socially prescribed 
perfectionism-distress relationship, whereby low goal reengagement, in conjunction 
with high socially prescribed perfectionism, would be predictive of increased 
distress.   
5) Does attentional bias moderate and/or mediate the perfectionism-distress 
relationship?  Given the lack of previous research in this area we made no specific 
hypothesis about the impact of attentional bias on the perfectionism-distress 
relationship.   
6) Does stress moderate and/or mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship?  Following previous research evidence, we hypothesised that stress 
would moderate the relationship between rumination and hopelessness and suicidal 
thinking, such that high stress combined with high rumination would be predictive 
of increased hopelessness and suicidal thinking.  A lack of research evidence meant 
we made no specific predictions about the nature of any mediating effect of stress 
on the rumination-distress relationship.   
7) Does goal adjustment moderate and/or mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship?  There is a lack of empirical research in this area on which to base our 
hypothesis, however given the anecdotal evidence from discussions of previous 
research we hypothesised that both goal disengagement and goal reengagement 
would moderate the rumination-distress relationship, where lower levels of either 
goal disengagement or goal reengagement when combined with high stress, would 
be predictive of increased distress.   
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8) Does attentional bias moderate and/or mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship?  We did not make a specific hypothesis regarding the impact of 
attentional bias on the rumination-distress relationship due to a lack of previous 
research in this area.   
 
Figure 5.1.  Mediating relationships explored in study one. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Moderating relationships explored in study one 
 
 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
Ninety-nine students were recruited from a Scottish University.  Participants 
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were offered course credit in return for participation.  All participants were first 
informed that participation was voluntary and confidential and even after giving 
initial consent, they were free to withdraw at any stage.  Participants were aged 
between 17 and 68 years with a mean age of 22.47 years (SD=7.58).  Thirty-five 
males and 64 females participated in the study.  The majority of participants were 
not married (94.9%).   
Eighty-three of the original participants went on to complete self-report 
measures at time two (T2), between eighteen and ninety days after T1 (mean gap = 
35.82 days), representing an 83.8% response rate at T2.  Participants who did not 
complete T2 measures did not significantly differ in age or marital status from those 
who did.  However, proportionately more males (n = 10) than females (n = 6) did 
not complete T2 measures (χ2 = 6.15 (1), p<.05).     
 
5.3.2 Measures 
Rumination.  The Response Styles Questionnaire (Short Form) (Short RSQ: 
Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) provided a measure of participants’ ruminative 
tendencies in negative situations (e.g. ‘I think about a recent situation, wishing it 
had gone better’) (see section 4.2.1 for more a more detailed description).  Internal 
consistency in this sample was good (Cronbach’s α = .84-.90). 
Hopelessness.  The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester 
& Trexler, 1974) measured pessimism towards the future (e.g. ‘It’s very unlikely 
that I will get any real satisfaction in the future’) (see section 4.3.1 for more a more 
detailed description).  Satisfactory internal consistency was achieved in this sample 
(α > .84 at both administrations).    
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Anxiety and Depression.  The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) measured both depression and anxiety (e.g. ‘I 
feel as if I am slowed down’ and ‘Worrying thoughts go through my mind’) (see 
section 4.3.2 for more a more detailed description).  Cronbach’s alpha in this sample 
ranged from .71 - .82 across administrations, indicating adequate internal 
consistency. 
Dysphoria.  The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-
D; Radloff, 1977) provided a measure of dysphoria (e.g. ‘I felt that I was just as 
good as other people’) (see section 4.3.3 for more a more detailed description).  
Internal consistency in this sample was good across each time point (range of α = 
.89 - .93). 
Suicidal Thinking.  The Suicide Ideation Subscale of the Suicide Probability 
Scale (SPS; Cull & Gill, 1988) provided a measure of suicide ideation (e.g. ‘In 
order to punish others, I think of suicide’) (see section 4.3.4 for more a more 
detailed description).     Internal consistency in this sample was acceptable (range α 
= .86 - .87).   
Perfectionism.  The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) (Hewitt & 
Flett, 1991) provided a measure of perfectionism (see section 4.2.2 for more a more 
detailed description).    Cronbach’s alpha in this sample was good (range α = .77-
.93). 
Goal Adjustment.  The Goal Adjustment Scale (Wrosch, et al, 2003) 
provided a measure of both goal disengagement and goal reengagement (see section 
4.2.3 for more a more detailed description).  Internal consistency in this sample was 
confirmed (Cronbach’s α range = .84-.88).    
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Stress.  The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 
1983) measured global stress in the weeks between time one and time two (e.g. 
‘How often have you felt nervous and stressed?’) (see section 4.2.5 for more a more 
detailed description).  Internal consistency in this sample was satisfactory 
(Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Mood.  A ten centimetre visual analogue scale, anchored at sad and happy, 
provided a measure of participants’ mood (Aitken, 1969).  An additional measure of 
mood was provided by the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr and 
Droppleman, 1971).  The POMS required participants to rate a series of 65 
adjectives on a five point scale in accordance with their current feelings (see section 
4.3.5 for more a more detailed description).  Greater scores are indicative of 
increased mood disturbance.  Internal consistency was confirmed in this sample 
(range of α = .79 - .95) 
Attentional Bias.  A dot-probe task (MacLeod et al, 1986) was used to 
provide a measure of attentional bias.  This consisted of 8 baseline trials and 60 
experimental trials.  Each trial in this task began with a fixation cross presented in 
the centre of the screen for 500 ms.  This was followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of two words, one above and one below centre (in the baseline trials 
strings of the letter X were used instead of words).    The words were 3.5cm apart 
and remained on the screen for 750 ms. Immediately following the word pair 
presentation, a dot-probe appeared in the location of one of the previous words and 
participants used a response box to indicate the spatial position of the probe.  The 
participants’ response concluded each trial, and after a 1000 ms rest, the next trial 
began.  Participants’ reaction times were measured and quicker reaction times were 
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taken to indicate that participants were attending to the word previously in the same 
location as the probe.   
The words used in this task were selected from a standardised list created by 
John (1988).  Each positive and negative word was paired with a neutral word 
matched for length and frequency of usage.  Of the 60 experimental trials, 30 
consisted of positive-neutral word pairings and 30 consisted of negative-neutral 
word pairings.  The probe followed the neutral word in half of the trials, and 
followed the negative/positive word in the remainder of the trials.  The presentation 
order of the word-pairings was randomised.     
Rumination and Distraction Manipulations.  Both the rumination and 
distraction manipulations were based on procedures developed by Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow (1993), adapted by Lavender and Watkins (2004) for use with British 
participants.  Participants were asked to visualise, focus and concentrate on a series 
of 45-items in an eight minute self-paced task (see section 4.4.1 for a more detailed 
description).   
Positive and Negative Mood Manipulations.  The mood induction task 
followed Moore and Oaksford’s (2002) procedure where an adaptation of the Velten 
mood induction procedure (Velten, 1968) was combined with music and a specific 
request to participants to try to alter their mood state.   Negative mood was induced 
using statements including ‘Just when I think things are going to get better, 
something else goes wrong’ and was accompanied by Barber’s Adagio for Strings 
(see section 4.4.2 for a more detailed description) 
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5.3.3 Procedure 
Prior to the collection of any data, ethical approval was obtained from the 
University Psychology Department’s ethics committee.  At time one (T1), 
participants first completed the dot-probe task to provide a baseline measure of 
attentional bias.  This was followed by a series of self-report measures tapping 
rumination, dysphoria, depression, anxiety, hopelessness, suicidal thinking, 
perfectionism, goal adjustment and mood.   Participants then completed a negative 
mood induction, followed by the appropriate rumination or distraction 
manipulation.   Participants then re-rated their mood and re-completed the dot-probe 
task.  Finally, participants completed a positive mood induction to restore their 
mood prior to leaving the experiment. 
At time two (T2), approximately five weeks later, participants were asked to 
re-complete self-report measures of rumination, dysphoria, depression, anxiety, 
hopelessness and suicidal thinking in addition to a measure of perceived stress.  A 
flow chart of the procedure for study one can be seen in Figure 5.3.   
 69 
 
Figure 5.3.  Flow chart of study one procedure 
 
5.3.4 Power, sample and analytic strategy 
The impact of the manipulation of rumination on attentional bias was 
examined through repeated measures analysis of variance.  Our sample of 99 
participants allowed for the detection of a small to medium sized effect (f = 0.20) 
between groups with 95% power and a 5% significance level.  The relationships 
between other study variables were examined through a series of multiple 
hierarchical regression analyses.  The follow up sample of 83 participants provided 
these regression analyses with up to 95% power to detect a medium to large sized 
effect (f2 = 0.30) with a 2.5% significance level in an analysis with five predictors.   
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Manipulation Check 
In order to examine whether the mood and rumination/distraction 
manipulations had the anticipated effects, repeated measures ANOVA were 
conducted.  These analyses examined any change in both the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS) and visual analogue measures of mood from pre-to-post manipulations, 
between groups.  There were no significant differences on POMS scores between 
groups prior to manipulations (F (1, 98) = .26, n.s.).  Analysis of POMS total mood 
disturbance scores pre- and post-manipulations showed the group x time interaction 
just failed to reach conventional levels of significance (F (1, 97) = 3.34, p=.071).  
Table 5.1 illustrates that although both groups increase in mood disturbance from 
pre to post manipulations, this increase was larger for the rumination group, as 
expected.   
There was no significant difference in visual analogue mood scores between 
groups prior to manipulations (F (1, 98) = .35, N.S).  Analysis of visual analogue 
mood scores from pre-to-post manipulations showed a significant manipulation 
group x time interaction (F (1, 97) = 9.47, p<.01).  Table 5.1 illustrates that although 
both groups decrease in happiness following manipulations, this decrease is larger 
for the rumination group, as expected.  A t-test confirmed that the rumination group 
had significantly lower happiness scores post manipulations (t (97) = -1.99, p <.05).  
 
Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations for POMS total mood disturbance and Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) pre and post manipulations, split by group. 
 
Manipulation  
Group 
POMS  
Pre-Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
POMS  
Post- Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
VAS  
Pre-manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
VAS  
Post-Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
Rumination 17.70    (32.10) 37.00    (36.59) 69.60    (18.65) 49.54    (20.47) 
 
Distraction 14.44    (31.06) 26.04    (32.40) 67.27    (20.51) 57.24    (18.51) 
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5.4.2 Attentional Bias 
Prior to calculating attentional bias, consistent with other studies in the field 
(e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003; Bradley et al., 1997), all incorrect responses along 
with very fast (less than 200 ms) and very slow (over 2000 ms) responses were 
identified and along with outlying responses (more than 2 standard deviations above 
an individual’s mean score) were excluded from all analyses, to minimise the 
impact of outliers on results.  This excluded data accounted for 4.5% of total 
responses. 
Following Mogg, Bradley and Williams (1995) attentional bias scores were 
calculated by subtracting the mean response times from trials where the probe was 
in the same location as the valenced word from the mean response times in those 
trials where the probe was in a different location from the valenced word.  
Attentional bias scores were calculated separately for positive and negative stimuli.  
This can be calculated using the following equation: 
 
[(Valenced word upper, probe lower + Valenced word lower, probe upper) – 
(Valenced word upper, probe upper + Valenced word lower, probe lower)] / 2 
 
Positive attentional bias values indicate increased attention towards the 
valenced stimuli in comparison to the neutral stimuli, whilst negative values reflect 
“avoidance” of the valenced stimuli. 
In order to control for changes in reaction time, a standardised change score 
(Judd & Kenny, 1981) for baseline reaction time was calculated using the following 
equation (Beevers & Carver, 2003): 
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Change in baseline reaction time = Mean Baseline Reaction T2 – (Mean 
Baseline Reaction T1 x Standard Deviation Baseline Reaction T2 / Standard 
Deviation Baseline Reaction T1) 
 
5.4.3 Correlations between variables 
Table 5.2 illustrates the correlations between all variables.  Initial negative 
attentional bias was significantly negatively correlated with self-oriented 
perfectionism (r = -.182, p<.05) and suicidal thinking at T2 (r = -.188, p<.05) and 
positively correlated with HADS Anxiety at T2 (r = .182, p <.05).  Initial positive 
attentional bias did not significantly correlate with any other variable.  Negative 
attentional bias following manipulations negatively correlated with initial 
rumination, self-oriented perfectionism, anxiety at T1, dysphoria at T1, stress and 
rumination at T2 (range of r = -.185- -.235).  Positive attentional bias following 
manipulations was significantly positively correlated with depression at T1 (r = 
.266, p<.01).  Initial rumination was positively correlated with self-oriented (r = 
.240, p <.01) and socially prescribed perfectionism (r = .383, p<.01) in addition to 
stress (r = .511, p<.01), rumination at T2 (r = .697, p<.01) and each measure of 
distress at both time points (range of r = .330-.527).  All dimensions of 
perfectionism were intercorrelated (range of r = .186-.492).  In addition, self-
oriented perfectionism positively correlated with anxiety at T1 (r = .280, p <.05) and 
suicidal thinking at T1 (r = .168, p<.05) and T2 (r = .234, p<.05) and negatively 
correlated with goal disengagement (r = -.384, p<.01).  Other oriented perfectionism 
was negatively correlated with hopelessness at T1 (r = -.190, p<.05).  Socially 
prescribed perfectionism significantly positively correlated with each measure of 
distress and stress (range of r = .283-.494) as well as negatively correlating with 
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goal reengagement (r = - .208, p<.05).   Goal disengagement positively correlated 
with goal reengagement (r = .209, p<.05) and negatively correlated with 
hopelessness (r = -.248, p<.05) and suicidal thinking at T2 (r = -.205, p<.05).  Goal 
reengagement negatively correlated with hopelessness, depression, dysphoria and 
suicidal thinking all at T1 and hopelessness at T2 (range of r = -171 – -.367).  
Finally, each measure of distress was positively intercorrelated and also 
significantly positively correlated with stress (range of r =.363-.801).   
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Table 5.2.  Correlations, means and standard deviations of all variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. -ve Bias T1 -                     
2. +ve Bias T1 -.078 -                    
3. -ve Bias T2 .099 .058 -                   
4. +ve Bias T2 -.006 -.016 .112 -                  
5. RSQ T1 .020 -.041 -.219* .043 -                 
6. Goal Dis .140 .056 .125 -.045 .048 -                
7. Goal Re .002 .056 -.003 -.003 .012 .209* -               
8. Self -.182* .023 -.205* -.032 .240** -.384** -.026 -              
9. Other -.091 .097 -.162 -.106 -.012 -.146 .073 .492** -             
10. Social -.007 .112 -.159 .000 .383** -.126 -.208* .454** .186* -            
11. BHS T1 -.012 .064 -.090 .015 .364** -.014 -.322** -.024 -.190* .422** -           
12. Anx T1 .079 .022 -.185* .111 .506** -.134 -.128 .208* -.050 .438** .363** -          
13. Dep T1 -.043 .020 -.047 .266** .402** -.072 -.225* .102 -.074 .478** .486** .561** -         
14. CESD T1 -.092 .108 -.197* .076 .527** .084 -.171* .072 -.034 .444** .515** .609** .590** -        
15. SPS T1 -.088 .028 -.014 .031 .446** -.080 -.243** .168* -.070 .410** .519** .499** .512** .533** -       
16. BHS T2 -.026 .115 -.154 .151 .393** -.248* -.367** .144 -.170 .436** .844** .484** .605** .565** .652** -      
17. Anx T2 .189* .124 -.170 .128 .392** -.168 -.140 .137 -.037 .332** .379** .699** .465** .545** .368** .603** -     
18. Dep T2 -.065 .032 -.165 .114 .330** -.177 -.157 .148 -.026 .420** .467** .588** .680** .583** .409** .639** .733** -    
19. CESD T2 -.139 .073 -.063 -.029 .391** -.146 -.120 .161 -.008 .412** .445** .664** .552** .666** .497** .637** .733** .801** -   
20. SPS T2 -.188* -.013 -.139 .031 .434** -.205* -.165 .234* -.047 .283** .399** .505** .426** .562** .786** .572** .385** .433** .541** -  
21. PSS T2 -.017 .070 -.235* -.027 .511** -.049 -.176 .129 -.084 .494** .453** .590** .555** .726** .401** .575** .600** .626** .654** .446** - 
22. RSQ T2 .007 -.037 -.197* -.013 .697** .046 .091 .279** .044 .400** .266** .406** .421** .495** .374** .450** .395** .427** .528** .483** .651** 
Mean Score 6.02 1.50 6.31 2.47 20.90 2.80 3.82 62.62 54.35 50.22 3.97 7.38 3.18 13.25 1.14 3.80 7.12 3.29 12.66 1.20 23.56 
SD 28.38 20.54 27.93 25.55 5.56 0.95 0.55 18.41 11.81 13.32 3.63 3.44 2.81 9.90 2.50 3.87 4.04 3.08 10.74 2.57 8.83 
Note:  -ve Bias T1=Negative attentional bias pre-manipulations; +ve Bias T1=Positive attentional bias pre-manipulations; -ve Bias T2= Negative attentional bias post manipulations; +ve Bias T2=Positive attentional 
bias post manipulations; Goal Dis=Goal Disengagement; Goal Re=Goal Reengagement; Self=Self-oriented perfectionism; Other = Other oriented perfectionism; Social=Socially prescribed perfectionism; Anx T1= 
HADS Anxiety T1; Dep T1= HADS Depression T1; Anx T2=HADS Anxiety T2; Dep T2=HADS Depression T2 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one-tailed)
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5.4.4 Change in attentional bias 
To investigate change in attentional bias from pre to post manipulations, 
between groups analysis of variance was conducted, using change in response to 
baseline stimuli as a covariate, to control for differences in baseline reaction time.  
Table 5.3 shows the means scores and standard deviations for negative and positive 
attentional bias pre and post manipulations, split by group.  There was no significant 
difference in negative attentional bias between groups, prior to manipulations (F (1, 
98) = .20, n.s.).  Following manipulations, as can be seen in Table 5.3, there was 
almost no change in negative attentional bias for the rumination or distraction 
groups (F (1, 96) = .03, n.s.).   
Prior to manipulations there was no significant difference in positive 
attentional bias between groups (F (1, 98) = 2.11, n.s.) (see Table 5.3).  Following 
manipulations, the rumination group showed an increase in positive attentional bias, 
whilst the distraction group showed a decrease in positive attentional bias, this 
group x time interaction showed a trend towards significance (F (1, 96) = 3.11, p = 
.08).    Thus, after the mood and rumination manipulations, participants completing 
a rumination induction increased in positive attentional bias and those completing a 
distraction manipulation decreased in positive attentional bias.  However there was 
no change in the negative attentional bias scores of either group.   
 
Table 5.3.  Means and standard deviations of attentional bias pre and post manipulations 
Manipulation  
Group 
Negative 
Attentional Bias 
Pre-Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
Negative 
Attentional Bias  
Post-Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
Positive 
Attentional Bias  
Pre-manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
Positive  
Attentional Bias  
Post-Manipulation 
Mean (SD) 
Rumination 7.30    (29.84) 7.75    (25.80) 1.45    (18.58) 5.03    (24.97) 
 
Distraction 4.71    (27.04) 4.83    (30.14) 4.51     (22.15) -0.13    (26.13) 
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5.4.5 Differences in distress between T1 and T2 
As can be seen in Table 5.2, hopelessness (t (82) = .89, n.s.), anxiety (t (82) 
= .97, n.s.) and dysphoria (t (82) = .64, n.s) all decreased from T1 to T2, whilst 
depression (t (82) = .05, n.s.) and suicidal thinking (t (82) = -.19, n.s.) increased 
between T1 and T2, however paired t-tests revealed that none of these changes in 
distress were significant.  Table 5.4 illustrates effect sizes for these differences in 
distress between T1 and T2.   
 
Table 5.4.  Effect size r for the differences in distress between T1 and T2 
Measure of distress Effect size r for change 
between T1 and T2 
Hopelessness  0.02 
Depression -0.02 
Anxiety  0.04 
Dysphoria  0.03 
Suicidal Thinking -0.02 
 
5.4.6 Moderation Analyses 
A series of regression analyses were used to test the moderating 
relationships between variables, as outlined in the research questions for this study.  
As there was a lack of variance between the measures of distress at time one (T1) 
and time two (T2), we conducted the analyses in two different ways, to minimise 
the risk of failing to detect salient findings.  Specifically, analyses were conducted 
separately to examine: (i) the prediction of distress prospectively (i.e. whether our 
predictors measured at T1 were associated with distress at T2) and; (ii) the 
prediction of change in distress from T1 to T2 (i.e. whether our predictors measured 
at T1 were associated with distress at T2, after controlling for initial levels of 
distress).  In the interest of brevity, and to limit the risk of Type I errors associated 
with multiple analyses, analyses were not conducted to examine the role of 
moderation in the cross-sectional data only.  In addition, as we conducted two sets 
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of analyses, following Donaldson and colleagues (2007) we set the level of 
statistical significance at .025 (i.e. .05/2).  Analyses were conducted separately to 
examine: (i) the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship; (ii) the socially 
prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship and; (iii) the rumination-distress 
relationship.   
Prior to analysis, predictor variables were centred, as recommended by 
Aiken and West (1991).  In each regression analysis the dependant variable was the 
measure of distress at time two.  As a gender bias is frequently associated with 
rumination, the effect of gender was controlled for in the first step of each analysis 
involving rumination, along with time one distress, where appropriate.  The second 
step of the analysis contained the main effect variables (for example: self-oriented 
perfectionism, and stress), whilst the final step contained the appropriate 
multiplicative terms for these main effect variables (for example: self-oriented 
perfectionism x stress).   
Significant interactions were plotted at high and low levels of each of the 
interaction terms, consonant with Aiken & West (1991).  These interactions were 
then probed post-hoc using simple slope analysis to determine whether either slope 
significantly differed from zero, again consonant with Aiken and West (1991).   
 
5.4.7 The effect of moderation in the perfectionism-distress relationship in the 
prospective data  
5.4.7.1 Stress as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.7.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was significantly predictive of hopelessness (β = .55, 
t (82) = 5.90, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .60, t (82) = 6.60, p <.0001), depression (β = 
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.61, t (82) = 6.93, p <.0001), dysphoria (β = .65, t (82) = .7.56, p <.0001) and 
suicidal thinking (β = .373, t (82) = 3.88, p <.0001).  The interaction between self-
oriented perfectionism and stress was predictive of suicidal thinking at T2 (β = .29, t 
(82) = 2.96, p <.01).  A plot of the lines of best fit for this interaction can be seen in 
Figure 5.4.  Post hoc analyses revealed that the high slope significantly differed 
from zero (β = .42, t (82) = 3.39, p <.001).  In other words, there was a general trend 
for high stress to be associated with higher levels of suicidal thinking; however 
these negative consequences were amplified further by self-oriented perfectionism.   
 
Figure 5.4.  Self-oriented perfectionism x stress to predict suicidal thinking T2 (without 
controlling for T1 distress) 
 
5.4.7.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect stress was significantly predictive of hopelessness (β = .46, 
t (82) = 4.62, p <.0001), anxiety, (β = .58, t (82) = 5.65, p <.0001), depression (β = 
.54, t (82) = 5.75, p <.0001), dysphoria (β = .59, t (82) = 6.19, p <.0001) and 
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suicidal thinking (β = .39, t (82) = 3.48, p <.001).  The interaction between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and stress was predictive of depression (β = .22, t (82) = 
2.64, p <.01) and showed a trend towards significance to predict hopelessness (β = 
.20, t (82) = 2.20, p =.031) and suicidal thinking (β = .22, t (82) = 2.21, p = .030).  A 
plot of the lines of best fit for the interaction between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and stress to predict depression can be seen in Figure 5.5.  Post hoc 
analyses of this interaction revealed that the high slope significantly differed from 
zero (β = .33, t (82) = 2.82, p <.01).   In other words, there was a general trend for 
high stress to be associated with higher levels of depression; however these negative 
consequences were amplified further by social perfectionism.  Similar (non-
significant) trends were observed for hopelessness and suicidal thinking.   
 
 
Figure 5.5.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x stress to predict depression at T2 (without 
controlling for T1 distress) 
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5.4.7.2 Goal adjustment as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
5.4.7.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
The interaction between self-oriented perfection and goal disengagement 
was predictive of hopelessness (β = -.26, t (82) = -2.49, p <.025), dysphoria (β = -
.28, t (82) = -2.49, p <.025) and suicidal thinking (β = -.470, t (82) = -4.65, p < 
.0001).  Plots of the lines of best fit for these interactions can be seen in Figure 5.6, 
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, respectively.  Post hoc analyses revealed that for the 
interactions to predict hopelessness (β = .36, t (82) = 2.59, p <.025), dysphoria (β = 
.37, t (82) = 2.55, p <.025) and suicidal thinking (β = .58, t (82) = 4.40, p <.0001) 
the low slope significantly differed from zero.  Thus low goal disengagement 
combined with high self-oriented perfectionism was predictive of increased 
hopelessness, dysphoria and suicidal thinking.   
 
Figure 5.6.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict hopelessness T2 
(without controlling for T1 distress) 
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Figure 5.7.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict dysphoria at T2 (not 
controlling for T1 distress) 
 
 
Figure 5.8.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict suicidal thinking at T2 
(without controlling for T1 distress) 
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5.4.7.2.2  Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of 
hopelessness (β = .36, t (82) = 3.73, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .30, t (82) = 2.75, p 
<.01), depression (β = .39, t (82) = 3.68, p <.0001) and dysphoria (β = .39, t (82) = 
3.65, p <.0001).  The interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and goal 
disengagement was predictive of suicidal thinking (β = -.40, t (82) = -3.45, p <.001).  
A plot of the lines of best fit for this interaction can be seen in Figure 5.9.  Post hoc 
analysis of this interaction revealed that the low slope significantly differed from 
zero (β = .54, t (82) = 4.15, p < .0001).  Thus, high socially prescribed perfectionism 
combined with low goal disengagement was predictive of increased suicidal 
thinking.  The interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and goal 
reengagement also showed a trend towards significance to predict hopelessness (β = 
-.23, t (82) = -2.03, p =.046).   
 
Figure 5.9.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict suicidal thinking 
T2 (not controlling for T1 distress) 
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5.4.7.3 Rumination as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.7.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, rumination was predictive of hopelessness (β = .37, t (82) 
= 3.42, p <.001), anxiety (β = .38, t (82) = 3.52, p < .001), depression (β = .30, t (82) 
= 2.68, p <.01), dysphoria (β = .382, t (82) = 3.52, p <.001) and suicidal thinking (β 
= .362, t (82) = 3.50, p <.001).  However, no significant interactions were observed 
between rumination and self-oriented perfectionism to predict any measure of 
distress.   
 
5.4.7.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, rumination was predictive of anxiety (β = .29, t (82) = 
2.64, p <.01), dysphoria (β = .25, t (82) = 2.34, p <.025) and suicidal thinking (β = 
.33, t (82) = 3.11, p <.01).  Also as a main effect socially prescribed perfectionism 
was predictive of hopelessness (β = .36, t (82) = 3.45, p <.001), depression (β = .37, 
t (82) = 3.61, p <.001) and dysphoria (β = 327, t (82) = 3.12, p < .01).  The 
interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and rumination was predictive 
of suicidal thinking (β = .26, t (82) = 2.54, p <.025) and showed a trend towards 
significance to predict depression (β = .22, t (82) = 2.19, p = .031).   A plot of the 
lines of best fit for the significant interaction to predict suicidal thinking can be seen 
in Figure 5.10.  Post hoc examination of this interaction revealed that the high slope 
significantly differed from zero (β = .45, t (82) = 2.85, p < .01).  In other words, for 
low rumination there was no difference in suicidal thinking between low and high 
social perfectionists, however for high rumination high social perfectionists reported 
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higher levels of suicidal thinking than low social perfectionists.  A similar (non-
significant) trend was observed for depression.   
 
 
Figure 5.10.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x rumination to predict suicidal thinking T2 
(not controlling for T1 distress) 
 
 
5.4.7.4 Attentional bias as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship  
5.4.7.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, negative attentional bias showed a trend towards 
significance to predict anxiety (β = .25, t (82) = 2.13, p =.036).  However, no other 
significant main effects or interactions were observed to predict any other measure 
of distress.   
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5.4.7.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of 
hopelessness (β = .41, t (82) = 4.08, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .32, t (82) = 3.06, p 
<.01), depression (β = .41, t (82) = 3.99, p <.0001), dysphoria (β = .40, t (82) = 3.88, 
p <.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .28, t (82) = 2.56, p <.025).  The interaction 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and positive attentional bias showed a 
trend towards significance (β = .22, t (82) = 2.05, p = .044) to predict hopelessness 
at T2.   
 
 
Figure 5.11.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x positive attentional bias to predict 
hopelessness T2 (not controlling for T1 distress) 
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5.4.8 The effect of moderation in the perfectionism-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
5.4.8.1 Stress as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.8.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of hopelessness (β = .22, t (82) = 
3.51, p <.001), anxiety (β = .30, t (82) = 3.11, p <.01), depression (β = .36, t (82) = 
3.94, p <.0001) and dysphoria (β = .38, t (82) = 3.22, p <.01).  The interaction 
between self-oriented perfectionism and stress was predictive of change in suicidal 
thinking (β = .19, t (82) = 2.79, p <.01).   A plot of the lines of best fit can be seen in 
Figure 5.12.  Post hoc examination of this interaction revealed that the high slope 
significantly differed from zero (β = .23, t (82) = 2.66, p <.01).  Thus, high social 
perfectionism combined with high stress was predictive of increased suicidal 
thinking.   
 
Figure 5.12.  Self-oriented perfectionism x stress to predict change in suicidal thinking 
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5.4.8.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of hopelessness (β = .24, t (82) = 
3.59, p <.001), anxiety (β = .31, t (82) = 3.09, p <.01), depression (β = .37, t (82) = 
3.89, p <.0001), dysphoria (β = .35, t (82) = 2.91, p <.005) and suicidal thinking (β 
= .21, t (82) = 2.58, p <.025).  However, no interaction effects were observed 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and stress to predict change in any 
measure of distress at T2.   
 
5.4.8.2 Goal adjustment as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
5.4.8.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
Self-oriented perfectionism interacted with both goal disengagement (β = -
.24, t (82) = -3.47, p <.001) and goal reengagement (β = .18, t (82) = 2.36, p < .025) 
to predict change in suicidal thinking.  Plots of the lines of best fit for these 
interactions can be seen in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14.  Post hoc analyses revealed 
that for the interaction between self-oriented perfection and goal disengagement the 
low slope significantly differed from zero (β = .24, t (82) = 2.51, p <.025).  In 
contrast, for the interaction between self-oriented perfectionism and goal 
reengagement the high slope showed a trend towards significantly differing from 
zero (β = .18, t (82) = 1.93, p =.057).  Thus, high self-oriented perfectionism when 
combined with low goal disengagement was predictive of increased suicidal 
thinking and when combined with high goal reengagement showed a trend towards 
predicting increased suicidal thinking.    
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Figure 5.13.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in suicidal 
thinking. 
 
 
Figure 5.14.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal reengagement to predict change in suicidal 
thinking 
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5.4.8.2.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, goal disengagement was predictive of change in 
hopelessness (β = -.14, t (82) = -2.37, p <.025).  Socially prescribed perfectionism 
interacted with both goal disengagement (β = -.33, t (82) = -4.77, p <.0001) and 
goal reengagement (β = .313, t (82) = 4.30, p <.0001) to predict change in suicidal 
thinking.  Plots of the lines of best fit for these interactions can be seen in Figure 
5.15 and Figure 5.16.  Post hoc examination of these interactions revealed that for 
the interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and goal disengagement 
the high slope significantly differed from zero (β = -.24, t (82) = -2.47, p <.025).   
For the interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and goal 
reengagement neither the high nor the low slope significantly differed from zero.  
Thus high social perfectionism combined with high goal disengagement was 
predictive of decreased suicidal thinking.   
 
Figure 5.15.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in 
suicidal thinking. 
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Figure 5.16.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal reengagement to predict change in 
suicidal thinking 
 
5.4.8.3 Rumination as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.8.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
No main or interaction effects of rumination or self-oriented perfectionism 
were significantly predictive of change in distress.   
 
5.4.8.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
No main or interaction effects of rumination or socially prescribed 
perfectionism were significantly predictive of change in distress.   
 
5.4.8.4 Attentional bias as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship   
5.4.8.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
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As a main effect, negative attentional bias just failed to meet statistical 
significance to predict change in anxiety (β = .19, t (82) = 2.26, p =.027).   No 
interaction effects were significantly predictive of change in distress.   
 
5.4.8.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, negative attentional bias just failed to meet statistical 
significance to predict change in anxiety (β = .17, t (82) = 2.12, p = .037).  No 
interaction effects were significantly predictive of change in distress.   
 
5.4.9 Effect of moderation in the rumination-distress relationship in the 
prospective data  
5.4.9.1 Stress as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of hopelessness (β = .49, t (82) = 
4.55, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .55, t (82) = 5.20, p <.0001), depression (β = .60, t (82) 
= 5.94, p <.0001) and dysphoria (β = .63, t (82) = 6.30, p <.0001).  Also as a main 
effect, rumination was predictive of suicidal thinking at T2 (β = .27, t (82) = 2.49, p 
<.025).  The interaction between rumination and stress was predictive of suicidal 
thinking (β = .30, t (82) = 3.16, p <.01) and showed a trend towards significance to 
predict depression (β = .16, t (82) = 1.78, p = .08).  Plots of the lines of best fit for 
the interaction between rumination and stress to predict suicidal thinking at T2 can 
be seen in Figure 5.17.  Post-hoc examination revealed that the high slope 
significantly differed from zero (β = .51, t (82) = 3.92, p <.001).  This illustrates that 
there was a trend for the negative consequences of rumination in relation to suicidal 
thinking, to be amplified by high stress levels.  A similar (albeit non-significant) 
trend was also observed for depression. 
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Figure 5.17.  Rumination x stress to predict suicidal thinking at T2 (not controlling for T1 
distress) 
 
 
5.4.9.2 Goal adjustment as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
As a main effect, rumination was predictive of each type of distress.  Also as 
a main effect goal reengagement was predictive of hopelessness (β = -.29, t (82) = -
3.02, p <.01) and showed a trend towards significance to predict suicidal thinking (β 
= -.19, t (82) = -1.20, p = .053).   
The interaction between rumination and goal disengagement was predictive 
of hopelessness (β = -.23, t (82) = -2.41, p <.025) and suicidal thinking (β = -.42, t 
(82) = -4.38, p <.001) and showed a trend towards significance to predict anxiety (β 
= -.19, t (82) = -1.86, p = .067).  Graphs of the lines of best fit for these interactions 
can be seen in Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 respectively.  Post hoc analyses of these 
interactions revealed: (i) for hopelessness the low slope significantly differed from 
zero (β = .63, t (82) = 5.33, p <.001) whilst the high slope showed a trend towards 
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significance (β = .23, t (82) = 1.89, p = .063) and; (ii) for suicidal thinking the low 
slope significantly differed from zero (β = .83, t (82) = 6.92, p <.001).  Overall, low 
goal disengagement was predictive of increased hopelessness and suicidal thinking 
when combined with high, as opposed to low, rumination.   
 
Figure 5.18.  Rumination x goal disengagement to predict hopelessness at T2 (not controlling 
for T1 distress) 
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Figure 5.19.  Rumination x goal disengagement to predict suicidal thinking (not controlling for 
T1 distress) 
 
 
5.4.9.3 Attentional bias as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
As a main effect, rumination was predictive of hopelessness (β = .41, t (82) 
= 3.85, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .39, t (82) = 3.70, p <.0001), depression (β = .33, t 
(82) = 2.97, p <.01), dysphoria (β = .36, t (82) = 3.39, p <.0001) and suicidal 
thinking (β = .41, t (82) = 4.00, p <.0001).   Also as a main effect, negative 
attentional bias showed a trend towards significance to predict both suicidal 
thinking (β = -.22, t (82) = -2.12, p = .037) and anxiety at T2 (β = .20, t (82) = 1.88, 
p = .064).   However, no interaction effects were observed to predict any measure of 
distress at T2.   
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5.4.10 The effect of moderation in the rumination-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
5.4.10.1 Stress as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
The interaction between rumination and stress showed a trend towards 
significance to predict change in suicidal thinking (β = .14, t (82) = 2.03, p = .045).   
However, no significant interactions were observed.   
 
5.4.10.2  Goal adjustment as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
As a main effect, rumination was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = 
.18, t (82) = 3.21, p <.01), whilst goal disengagement showed a similar trend (β = -
.12, t (82) = -2.01, p = .048).  The interaction between rumination and goal 
disengagement was predictive of change in both hopelessness (β = -.20, t (82) = -
3.66, p <.001) and suicidal thinking (β = -.22, t (82) = -2.98, p < .01).  Plots of the 
lines of best fit for these interactions can be seen in Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21.  
Post hoc analysis of this interaction revealed:  (i) for hopelessness only the low 
slope significantly differed from zero (β = .36, t (82) = 4.87, p <.001); (ii) similarly, 
for suicidal thinking the low slope also significantly differed from zero (β = .33, t 
(82) = 3.13, p <.01).  This shows that, whilst for high goal disengagement there was 
no difference in hopelessness or suicidal thinking between low and high ruminators, 
low disengagement combined with high rumination was predictive of increased 
hopelessness and suicidal thinking.   
 The interaction between rumination and goal reengagement showed a trend 
towards significance to predict change in suicidal thinking (β = .15, t (82) = 2.11, p 
= .038).  However, no other significant interactions were observed.   
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Figure 5.20.  Rumination x goal disengagement to predict change in hopelessness 
 
 
Figure 5.21.  Rumination x goal disengagement to predict change in suicidal thinking 
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5.4.10.3 Attentional bias as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
As a main effect rumination showed a trend towards significance to predict 
change in hopelessness (β = .12, t (82) = 1.85, p = .068).  Also as main effect, 
negative attentional bias showed a trend towards significance to predict change in 
both anxiety (β = .16, t (82) = 2.00, p = .049) and suicidal thinking at T2 (β = -.14, t 
(82) = -1.88, p = .064).  However, no interaction effects were observed to predict 
change in distress.   
 
5.4.11 Moderation Summary 
In the prospective data, self-oriented perfectionism interacted with stress to 
predict suicidal thinking and interacted with goal disengagement to predict 
hopelessness, dysphoria and suicidal thinking.   Socially prescribed perfectionism 
interacted with stress to predict depression.  In addition, socially prescribed 
perfectionism interacted with goal disengagement to predict suicidal thinking and 
showed a trend towards significance to interact with goal reengagement to predict 
hopelessness.  Socially prescribed perfectionism also interacted with rumination to 
predict suicidal thinking and showed a trend towards significance to predict 
depression.  Finally, socially prescribed perfectionism demonstrated a trend towards 
significance to interact with positive attentional bias to predict hopelessness.   
With regards predicting change in distress between T1 and T2, self-oriented 
perfectionism again interacted with stress to predict change in suicidal thinking and 
interacted with both goal disengagement and goal reengagement to predict change 
in suicidal thinking.  Socially prescribed perfectionism interacted with both goal 
disengagement and goal reengagement to predict change in suicidal thinking.  
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Neither rumination nor positive attentional bias were found to interact with 
perfectionism to predict change in distress.   
In the prospective data, rumination interacted with stress to predict suicidal 
thinking at T2.  The interaction between rumination and goal disengagement was 
predictive of hopelessness and suicidal thinking.    A similar pattern was observed 
when predicting change in distress, as rumination again interacted with goal 
disengagement to predict change in both hopelessness and suicidal thinking.   
 
5.4.12 Mediation Analyses 
Mediation effects were examined through a series of regression analyses 
following the procedure outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986) and Kenny, Kashy and 
Bolger (1998).  Kenny et al. (1998) define four conditions which must be met for 
mediation: (1) the independent variable must affect the mediator; (2) the 
independent variable must affect the dependant variable; (3) the mediator must 
affect the dependant variable when the independent variable is controlled for; (4) for 
full mediation to occur, the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable must be reduced to non-significance after the effect of the 
mediator is controlled for.  Partial mediation occurs when conditions 1-3 are met 
without condition 4.   
Similar to the analyses examining moderation, we conducted two separate 
sets of analyses to examine: (i) the prediction of distress prospectively (i.e. whether 
our predictors measured at time one were associated with distress at time two) and; 
(ii) the prediction of change in distress from T1 to T2 (i.e. whether our predictors 
measured at T1 were associated with distress at T2, after controlling for initial 
levels of distress).  Again, we also set the level of statistical significance at .025 (i.e. 
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.05/2).  In the interests of brevity, diagrams illustrating significant mediating 
relationships are only presented for a sample of results.   
 
5.4.13 The effect of mediation in the perfectionism-distress relationship in the 
prospective data.  
5.4.13.1 Stress as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.13.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As stress was not predictive of self-oriented perfectionism (condition 1), 
stress not mediate the self-oriented perfectionism distress relationship for any 
measure of distress. 
 
5.4.13.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
Socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of hopelessness at T2 (β = 
.44, t (82) = 4.38, p <.0001).  The addition of stress in the next step of the model 
explained an additional 16.8% of variance (β = .48, t (82) = 4.65, p <.0001) and 
reduced beta weight of socially prescribed perfectionism to non-significance (β = 
.20, t (82) = 1.98, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed that the reduction in beta weight 
was significant (Z = 3.43, p<.001), indicating full mediation. 
Socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of anxiety at T2 (β =.34, t 
(82) = 3.20, p <.01).  The addition of stress in the third step accounted for an 
additional 25.1% of variance (β = .58, t (82) = 5.67, p <.0001) and reduced the beta 
weight of socially prescribed perfectionism to non-significance (β = .05, t (82) = 
.48, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed that the reduction in beta weight was significant 
(Z = 3.77, p<.001), indicating full mediation.     
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Socially prescribed perfectionism was also predictive of depression at T2 (β 
=.42, t (82) = 4.24, p <.0001).  The addition of stress in the third step accounted for 
an additional 23.2% of variance (β = .55, t (82) = 5.70, p < .0001) and reduced the 
beta weight of socially prescribed perfectionism to non-significance (β = .15, t (82) 
= 1.55, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed that the reduction in beta weight was 
significant (Z = 3.79, p<.001), indicating full mediation.   
In addition, socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of dysphoria at 
T2 (β =.42, t (82) = 4.11, p <.0001).  The addition of stress in the third step 
accounted for an additional 26.9% of variance (β = .60, t (82) = 6.24, p <.0001) and 
reduced the beta weight of socially prescribed perfectionism to non-significance (β 
= .12, t (82) = 1.26, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed that the reduction in beta weight 
was significant (Z = 3.95, p <.0001), indicating full mediation.    
Finally, socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of suicidal thinking 
at T2 (β =.28, t (82) = 2.65, p <.01).  The addition of stress in the third step 
accounted for an additional 11.8% of variance (β = .41, t (82) = 3.52, p <.001) and 
reduced the beta weight of socially prescribed perfectionism to non-significance (β 
= .08, t (82) = .72, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed that the reduction in beta weight 
was significant (Z = 2.87, p<.01), indicating full mediation (see Figure 5.22).   
This illustrates that stress fully mediated the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and each measure of distress at T2.   
 101 
 
Figure 5.22.  The mediating effect of stress on the relationship between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and suicidal thinking  
 
5.4.13.2 Goal adjustment as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.13.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
Goal adjustment did not mediate the self-oriented perfectionism-distress 
relationship at T2, for any measure of distress. 
 
5.4.13.2.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
Socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of hopelessness at T2 (β = 
.44, t (82) = 4.38, p <.0001).  The addition of goal reengagement in the third step of 
the analysis explained an additional 6.8% of variance (β = -.28, t (82) = -2.87, p 
<.005) and reduced the beta weight of social perfectionism (β = .37, t (82) = 3.78, p 
<.0001).  However, a Sobel test illustrated that this reduction in beta weight was 
non-significant (Z=1.68, p = .093), indicating partial mediation had not occurred.   
 
5.4.13.3 Rumination as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.13.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
No mediating relationships were observed for rumination and self-oriented 
perfectionism to predict any measure of distress.   
5.4.13.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
Socially 
Prescribed 
Perfectionism 
 
 
Stress 
 
Suicidal 
Thinking 
 
.28** 
.41*** .50*** 
*p<.025, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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After controlling for gender, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
predictive of hopelessness at T2 (β = .44, t (82) = 4.38, p <.0001).  The addition of 
rumination in the next step of the analysis explained a further 5.3% of variance (β = 
.27, t (82) = 2.56, p <.025) and reduced the beta weight of socially prescribed 
perfectionism (β = .34, t (82) = 3.32, p <.001).  A Sobel test indicated that this 
reduction in beta weight just failed to reach levels of significance (Z = 2.16, p = 
.028).   
After controlling for gender, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
predictive of anxiety (β = .34, t (82) = 3.20, p <.01).  The inclusion of rumination in 
the next step of the analysis accounted for an additional 7.2% of variance (β = .31, t 
(82) = 2.83, p <.01) and reduced the beta weight of social perfectionism to non-
significance (β = .23, t (82) = 2.11, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed this reduction in 
beta weight was significant (Z = 2.33, p <.025), indicating full mediation.   
After controlling for gender, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
predictive of dysphoria at T2 (β = .42, t (82) = 4.11, p <.0001).  The addition of 
rumination in the next step of the analysis accounted for a further 5.5% of variance 
(β = .27, t (82) = 2.58, p <.025) and reduced the beta weight of social perfectionism 
(β = .32, t (82) = 3.02, p <.01).  A Sobel test indicated that this reduction in beta 
weight just failed to reach significance (Z = 2.18, p = .027).   
After controlling for gender, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
predictive of suicidal thinking at T2 (β = .28, t (82) = 2.65, p <.01).  The inclusion 
of rumination in the final step of the analysis accounted for an additional 11.9% of 
variance (β = .38, t (82) = 3.55, p <.001) and reduced the beta weight of social 
perfectionism to non-significance (β = .15, t (82) = 1.38, n.s.).  A Sobel test 
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confirmed this reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 2.68, p<.01), indicating 
full mediation (see Figure 5.23). 
  
 
Figure 5.23.  The mediating effect of rumination in the relationship between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and suicidal thinking 
 
 
5.4.13.4 Attentional bias as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
5.4.13.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
No mediation relationships were observed with regards to positive or 
negative attentional bias and the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship.   
 
5.4.13.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
No mediation relationships were observed with regards to positive or 
negative attentional bias and the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress 
relationship.   
 
5.4.14 The effect of mediation in the perfectionism-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
5.4.14.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for T1 distress, no mediators were observed in the self-
oriented perfectionism-distress relationship.   
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5.4.14.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for T1 distress, no mediators were observed in the socially 
prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship.   
 
5.4.15 The effect of mediation in the rumination-distress relationship in the 
prospective data  
5.4.15.1 Stress as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for gender, rumination was a significant predictor of 
hopelessness at T2 (β = .39, t (82) = 3.78. p <.0001).  The addition of stress in the 
final step accounted for an extra 19% of variance (β = .51, t (82) = 4.86, p <.0001) 
and reduced the beta weight of rumination to non-significance (β = .12, t (82) = 
1.17, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed this reduction in beta weight was significant (Z 
= 3.61, p <.001), indicating full mediation.   
After controlling for gender, rumination was a significant predictor of 
anxiety at T2 (β = .39, t (82) = 3.76, p <.0001).  The inclusion of stress in the final 
step of the analysis accounted for an additional 22.1% of variance (β = .55, t (82) = 
5.34, p < .0001) and reduced the beta weight of rumination to non-significance (β = 
.101, t (82) = .981, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed this reduction in beta weight was 
significant (Z = 3.79, p <.001), indicating full mediation.   
After controlling for gender, rumination was a significant predictor of 
depression at T2 (β = .32, t (82) = 3.05, p <.01).  The addition of stress in the final 
step of the analysis accounted for a further 29.4% of variance (β = .63, t (82) = 6.31, 
p <.0001) and reduced the beta weight of rumination to non-significance (β = -.01, t 
 105 
(79) = -.06, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed this reduction in beta weight was 
significant (Z = 4.08, p <.0001), indicating full mediation. 
After controlling for gender, rumination was a significant predictor of 
dysphoria at T2 (β = .39, t (82) = 3.74, p <.0001).  The addition of stress in the final 
step of the analysis accounted for a further 28.7% of the variance (β = .63, t (82) = 
6.39, p <.0001) and reduced the beta weight of rumination to non-significance (β = 
.06, t (82) = .63, n.s.).  A Sobel test (Z = 4.10, p <.0001) confirmed this reduction in 
beta weight was significant, indicating full mediation.   
After controlling for gender, rumination was a significant predictor of 
suicidal thinking at T2 (β = .43, t (82) = 4.30, p <.0001).  The addition of stress at 
the final step of the analyses accounted for a further 6.1% of the variance (β = .31, t 
(82) = 2.70, p <.01) and reduced the beta weight of rumination, although not to a 
non-significant level (β = .28, t (82) = 2.44, p <.025).  A Sobel test confirmed this 
reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 2.41, p = .02), indicating partial 
mediation.   
 
Figure 5.24.  The mediating effect of stress on the relationship between rumination and suicidal 
thinking 
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5.4.15.2 Goal adjustment as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
Goal adjustment was not found to mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship.   
 
5.4.15.3 Attentional bias as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
Attentional bias was not found to mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship 
 
5.4.16 The effect of mediation in the rumination-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
5.4.16.1 Stress as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for gender and initial distress stress did not mediate the 
effects of rumination on any measure of distress at T2.   
 
5.4.16.2 Goal adjustment as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
Goal adjustment was not found to mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship. 
 
5.4.16.3 Attentional bias as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
Attentional bias was not found to mediate the rumination-distress 
relationship. 
 
5.4.17 Mediation Summary 
In the prospective data, stress fully mediated the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and each measure of distress at T2.  Rumination 
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was found to fully mediate the relationship between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and both anxiety and suicidal thinking.  However, a similar pattern 
was not observed in the analyses examining change in distress between time one 
and time two, as no mediating relationships were found between perfectionism and 
change in any measure of distress.   
In the prospective data, stress fully mediated the relationship between 
rumination and hopelessness, anxiety, depression and dysphoria, in addition to 
partially mediating the relationship with suicidal thinking.  However, these 
relationships did not hold to predict change in any measure of distress.   
 
5.5 Discussion 
The two main aims of this study were: (i) to examine the effect of 
manipulating rumination on levels of both positive and negative attentional bias 
and; (ii) to examine the moderating and mediating effects of a series of cognitive 
and personality variable on both the established perfectionism-distress and 
rumination-distress relationships.  The extent to which our hypothesis are supported, 
and how our results fit with previous work in this area, are discussed below.   
 
5.5.1 Effect of manipulating rumination on attentional bias 
We hypothesised that inducing rumination would decrease positive 
attentional bias and increase negative attentional bias.  Our findings do not support 
this hypothesis; indeed our results indicate almost the exact opposite, as inducing 
rumination had no impact on negative attentional bias and appeared to increase 
positive attentional bias.  Inducing distraction again made no impact on negative 
attentional bias, but appeared to decrease positive attentional bias.   
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There are a number of possible explanations for our findings.  First, although 
previous research has suggested a possible relationship between rumination and 
negative attentional bias, the two previous studies (Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a; 
Donaldson et al., 2007) which have attempted to alter negative attentional bias, 
through manipulating rumination, have both failed.  Donaldson et al. (2007) argued 
that the failure of the rumination induction to influence negative attentional bias 
may have resulted from difficulties inherent to induction procedures, such as the 
impact an induction can make in only eight minutes, or difficulties in overriding 
trait ruminative tendencies.  In the current study we attempted to address these 
issues by employing a larger sample than Donaldson et al., resulting in increased 
power to detect any effects and through the use of general population, as opposed to 
a clinical sample, who should have less intense ruminative pathways to override.  
Despite this, and although we observed differential impacts on mood for the 
rumination versus the distraction inductions, it is possible that the impact of the 
manipulations was not sufficient to produce a change in negative attentional bias.  
Future research attempting to increase the effect of a rumination induction is 
warranted.   
Second, our research suggested that inducing rumination increased positive 
attentional bias, whilst inducing distraction decreased positive attentional bias.  This 
is contrary to the findings of Morrison & O’Connor (2008a) who found the opposite 
– that inducing rumination in decreased positive attentional bias and inducing 
distraction decreased positive attentional bias.   Methodological differences between 
Morrison & O’Connor (2008a) may partly explain the differences in findings.  In 
particular the differences in word pairing may have impacted on the findings, as 
Morrison & O’Connor use positive-negative word pairings, compared to the 
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negative-neutral and positive-neutral word pairing adopted in the current study (see 
section 2.3.3 for a more detailed explanation).  There is some evidence to support 
the present findings, from the future thinking literature on suicidality (e.g. 
MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; O’Connor et al., 2007, 2008) where it 
is apparent that the absence of positive thoughts about the future is most associated 
with suicidal thinking, as opposed to the presence of negative thoughts about the 
future.  It is possible that in our findings the increased attention towards positive 
stimuli, by those induced to ruminate, represents increased focus on something 
which an individual is currently lacking (e.g. an individual selectively attends to the 
word happy, because they currently do not feel happy).   Unfortunately one of the 
weaknesses of the dot-probe methodology is that although it can identify patterns in 
an individual’s attention, it cannot explain why individuals selectively attend in a 
particular manner.   Future research could examine this issue further, possibly 
through the use of qualitative interviews with participants.   
A further possible explanation for our findings relates to the use of positive 
attentional biases as an emotional regulation strategy.  Gross (1998) argued that the 
selective allocation of attentional resources provides a mechanism for emotional 
regulation.  Evidence from an emotional Stroop task (Segerstrom, 2001) supports 
this assertion, where optimistic individuals took longer to process positive words, 
than pessimists (and vice versa for negative words), indicating increased positive 
attentional bias in optimists.   Further evidence to support this position comes from 
Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren and Wilson (2006a, 2006b) who found that older 
adults, who tend to regulate their emotions better than younger adults (Gross et al., 
1997), have a tendency to direct their gaze toward positive stimuli and away from 
negative stimuli.   In the present research, the increase in positive attentional bias 
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observed in the rumination induction group may represent a self-regulatory strategy 
to reduce negative mood, in our general population sample.  Whilst the opposite 
trend observed in the distraction group, may reflect the utility of distraction to 
reduce negative mood, resulting in less need to use positive attentional bias as self-
regulatory strategy.   This explanation of our findings could account for the 
differences between our research and Donaldson et al. (2007) – as positive 
attentional bias as a self-regulatory strategy in response to mood challenge, may not 
be as evident in a clinically depressed sample.  Although Donaldson et al (2007) 
also examined a control sample, they did not administer a mood induction 
procedure prior to the rumination/distraction manipulations, which may explain 
why, unlike the present study, no increase in positive attentional bias of the 
ruminators was observed.   
Finally, it is important to note that in the present study, we only observed a 
trend approaching significance therefore it is possible that this trend was spurious.  
There is a need for more research to fully establish the causal nature of the 
relationship between rumination and attentional bias.     
 
5.5.2 The effect of stress in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that stress would moderate the relationship between both 
self and social perfectionism and distress, in addition to mediating the effects of 
socially prescribed perfectionism on distress.  Consistent with this, we found that 
socially prescribed perfectionism interacted with stress to predict depression at T2, 
whilst self-oriented perfectionism interacted with stress to predict change in suicidal 
thinking at T2.  In each instance, higher levels of perfectionism, combined with 
higher stress were predictive of increased distress.  Thus, consistent with previous 
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research, we found further prospective evidence to support a diathesis-stress 
conceptualisation of the relationship between both self-oriented and socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress.  By examining diathesis-stress models to 
predict suicidal thinking, our results extend previous findings.  Chang & Rand 
(2000) found evidence that stress mediated the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and both hopelessness and psychological symptoms, 
however Chang & Rand did not examine whether their proposed diathesis-stress 
models were predictive of change in distress, nor whether they were specifically 
predictive of suicidal thinking.   
With regards mediation, stress was found to mediate the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and each measure of distress at T2.  
However, stress was not found to mediate any of these relationships to predict 
change in distress between T1 and T2.  This indicates that socially prescribed 
perfectionism may in itself generate stress, which in turn increases levels of distress.  
This extends work by Chang (2000) and Hewitt and colleagues (2001), indicating 
that the mediating impact of stress on the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress 
relationship can be observed prospectively for a range of measures of distress.   
 
5.5.3 The effect of rumination on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
Our third hypothesis related to the role of rumination on the perfectionism-
distress relationship.  We hypothesised that rumination would mediate the effects of 
both social and self perfectionism on distress.  As predicted, rumination fully 
mediated the effect of socially prescribed perfectionism on both anxiety and suicidal 
thinking at T2. However neither of these mediating relationships held to predict 
change in distress between T1 and T2.  In addition, we found no mediating effect of 
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rumination on the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship.  These findings 
are in line with previous research which has identified the mediating effects of 
rumination on the perfectionism-distress relationship (e.g. Flett et al., 2002; 
O’Connor et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008) and illustrated that socially prescribed 
perfectionism is more consistently associated with distress (e.g. Flett et al., 2002; 
O’Connor et al., 2007).   
The failure of rumination to mediate the effect of perfectionism on change in 
distress between time one and time two, contrasts with existing research findings.  
This may have been due to a number of factors.  First, previous research, which has 
found rumination mediated the effects of perfectionism on change in distress, has 
focussed specifically on brooding rumination (O’Connor et al., 2007).  In the 
present study, however, we focus on the mediating effects of rumination as a whole.  
Unfortunately the brief measure of rumination used in the present study does not 
allow the components of rumination (brooding and reflection) be considered 
separately.  To examine this possibility further, we conducted a separate study 
which is presented in Chapter 7.    
A further explanation relates to the lack of change in distress between T1 
and T2 in our study.  We selected a five week follow up as this has previously been 
shown to provide enough time to provide variability in distress (e.g. Morrison & 
O’Connor, 2008a).  However, in the present study we found no significant 
differences in distress between T1 and T2, meaning there was little variance in the 
data for our analyses examining change in distress to predict.  Within the confines 
of a multi-study PhD it was difficult to expand the follow up period.   
In the present research, rumination also moderated the impact of socially 
prescribed perfectionism on suicidal thinking at T2 (in addition to showing a trend 
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towards significance to predict depression), such that high rumination combined 
with high social perfectionism was predictive of increased distress at T1.  However, 
again the effect did not hold to predict change in depression from T1 to T2.  Thus, 
in addition to the mediating effects noted above, a tendency to ruminate amplified 
the negative consequences of socially prescribed perfectionism such that it was 
associated with increased suicidal thinking.  This further highlights the links 
between rumination and perfectionism and the tendency for socially prescribed 
perfectionism to have stronger links with distress.   
 
5.5.4 The effect of goal adjustment in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
Our fourth hypothesis predicted that goal reengagement would both 
moderate and mediate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism 
and distress.  Our results partially supported this hypothesis, as goal reengagement 
moderated the effects of social perfectionism on change in suicidal thinking from 
T1 to T2, whilst no mediating relationships were observed.   Our failure to find any 
mediating effects of goal adjustment on the perfectionism-distress relationship, 
unlike O’Connor and Forgan (2007), may have been a result of our prospective 
design – suggesting that goal reengagement does not mediate the impact of socially 
prescribed perfectionism on distress over time.   
Goal disengagement was also found to interact with self-oriented 
perfectionism to predict suicidal thinking at T2, such that for self-oriented 
perfectionists, high goal disengagement was predictive of lower levels of suicidal 
thinking compared to low levels of goal disengagement.  As self-oriented 
perfectionism is characterised by setting high (sometimes unachievable) goals it is 
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perhaps unsurprising that those self-oriented perfectionists who are better able to 
disengage from these unattainable goals experience less suicidal thinking.   
Similarly, goal disengagement also interacted with socially prescribed 
perfectionism to predict change in suicidal thinking, such that for high social 
perfectionists the ability to disengage from goals was associated with less suicidal 
thinking.  This again highlights the beneficial effects of goal disengagement in the 
presence of unattainable high standards and suggests that goal disengagement is 
beneficial for perfectionists whether or not the goal pursuit relates to a self imposed 
target or a target which is perceived to be externally imposed on an individual.   
It is possible to reconcile our findings with Wrosch and colleagues’ assertion 
that goal disengagement is associated with positive aspects of wellbeing and goal 
reengagement is associated with negative aspects of wellbeing.  It may be that our 
measure of suicidal thinking was tapping into both positive and negative aspects of 
wellbeing.  Although negative aspects are captured though the majority of items 
(e.g. ‘I think of things too bad to share with others’ or ‘I feel the need to punish 
myself for things that I have done and thought’), some items could be considered to 
reflect positive aspects of suicidal thinking (e.g. ‘I feel it would be less painful to 
die than to keep on living the way that things are’ or ‘I feel people would be better 
off if I were dead’).  If our measure of suicidal thinking tapped into both positive 
and negative aspects of wellbeing then this could explain why both goal 
disengagement and goal reengagement were associated with suicidal thinking.   
 
5.5.5 The effect of attentional bias on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
Socially prescribed perfectionism interacted with positive attentional bias to 
predict hopelessness, such that high levels of soci
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high positive attentional bias, was predictive of increased hopelessness.  This 
indicates that social perfectionists who selectively attended to positive over neutral 
words had increased levels of hopelessness five weeks later.  This finding was 
somewhat surprising, as previous research has suggested the beneficial nature of 
positive attentional biases (e.g. McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Suslow, Junghanns & 
Arolt, 2001).  The present findings suggest it may be something inherent to social 
perfectionism which results in positive attentional bias being associated with 
hopelessness.  Possibly this relates to the general tendency of social perfectionists to 
evaluate themselves as constant under achievers with regards to standards set by 
others, meaning they interpret positive words as something which they are also 
lacking or failing to achieve (e.g. the word ‘happy’ is interpreted as something 
which they have failed to achieve).  However, this explanation is purely speculative 
and more research is required to attempt to replicate and explain this finding to 
ensure it is not an anomaly.   
 
5.5.6 The impact of stress on the rumination-distress relationship 
Our sixth hypothesis focussed on the role of stress in the rumination-distress 
relationship.  As hypothesised, we found that stress interacted with rumination to 
predict suicidal thinking at T2, as well as showing a trend towards significance to 
predict change in suicidal thinking from T1 to T2, such that under high stress, 
rumination was associated with increased suicidal thinking.  This confirms the role 
of stress as a moderator in the rumination-suicidality relationship, indicating a 
diathesis-stress relationship, in line with previous findings (Morrison & O’Connor, 
2005; Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  However, the interaction between rumination 
and stress was not predictive of any other measure of distress.  Previous research 
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had found that stress prospectively moderated the relationship between rumination 
and suicidal thinking, hopelessness, dysphoria and social dysfunction (Morrison & 
O’Connor, 2005; Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  However, this relationship only 
held for suicidal thinking in our study.   
Stress was also found to fully mediate the relationship between rumination 
and hopelessness, anxiety, depression and dysphoria (all at T2), in addition to 
partially mediating the relationship with suicidal thinking at T2.  However, these 
effects did not hold to predict change in distress from T1 to T2.  To our knowledge, 
this is the first time that the mediating effect of stress on the rumination-distress 
relationship has been examined.  These results highlight that the process of 
ruminating can increase the experience of stress, which in turn increases levels of 
each measure of distress.  As our measure of stress recorded levels of perceived 
stress, it is perhaps unsurprising that individuals who ruminated reported higher 
levels of stress, as repetitive thinking about negative thoughts and feelings is likely 
to amplify one’s perceptions regarding experience of life stress.  Nonetheless, this 
illustrates an important pathway by which rumination may take effect on distress 
and highlights an opportunity for intervention with high risk individuals.   
 
5.5.7 The impact of goal adjustment on the rumination-distress relationship 
Rumination interacted with goal disengagement to predict both hopelessness 
and suicidal thinking at T2 in addition to change in hopelessness and suicidal 
thinking from T1 to T2.  In each instance, ruminators who were poorer at goal 
disengagement reported higher hopelessness and suicidal thinking than those better 
at goal disengagement.   This is perhaps unsurprising as failing to disengage from 
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an unattainable goal would seem likely to be amplified by a ruminative response 
style.   
No mediating relationships involving goal adjustment were observed.  To 
our knowledge, this is the first empirical examination of the relationship between 
rumination and goal adjustment.   
 
5.5.8 The impact of attentional bias on the rumination-distress relationship 
Attentional bias was not found to mediate or moderate the impact of 
rumination on any measure of distress at T2 or change in distress from T1 to T2.  
Thus, initial levels of attentional bias, in our sample of healthy young adults, did not 
impact on the rumination-distress relationship.    
 
5.5.9 Limitations 
Four main limitations in the current study should be noted.  First, as 
participants in this study were healthy young adults, the extent to which the findings 
can be generalised to a clinical population is unknown.  However, the high levels of 
distress reported by university students  in recent years (Furr, Westefeld, McConnell 
& Jenkins, 2001) suggests a need for research specifically focusing on this 
population in order to examine the relationship between distress and potentially 
modifiable cognitive variables to facilitate the development of methods for 
intervention.  In addition, study four in this thesis aims to address this potential 
limitation through the use of a clinical sample of parasuicide patients.   
Second, we rely on a series of self-report measures of stress and distress 
which may have been subject to response biases.  However, given that interaction 
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effects emerged from the data, it is unlikely that social desirability confounded our 
results.   
Third, as noted above, despite setting the five week time gap between T1 
and T2 in accordance with previous research, there was little variance in our data 
between T1 and T2.  Obviously this limited the ability of our analyses predicting 
change in distress, however we attempted to deal with this limitation by conducting 
two sets of analyses predicting both distress at T2 and change in distress from T1 to 
T2 and adjusting our level of statistical significance accordingly.   
Finally, the measurement of attentional bias may also be a limitation in the 
current research.  As the dot-probe task comprised a measure of reaction time, 
attentional bias was measured on a different scale to the other self-report measures 
used in the study.  These differences in scaling reduced the likelihood of finding 
statistical associations between attentional bias and any of the other measures in the 
study and this may contribute to the many null results associated with attentional 
bias.  However, this is a difficulty inherent to all attentional bias measures and 
despite this limitation, some significant relationships still emerged from the data.   
 
5.5.10 Implications and future directions 
Despite the limitations noted above this research has a number of 
implications.  First, we provide evidence of a link between rumination and 
attentional bias, albeit in the opposite direction to that previously reported.  This 
highlights the need for more research in this area using the same measures of 
attentional bias, to further clarify the causal role of rumination in positive 
attentional bias.  Second, we highlight a number of variables which may impact on 
the relationships between both perfectionism and distress and rumination and 
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distress.  By focussing on potentially modifiable cognitive variables, we highlight 
opportunities to identify and intervene with individuals at risk of distress.    
Future research should aim to test whether there is a causal relationship 
between attentional bias and rumination, through the manipulation of attentional 
bias.  Hence study two of this thesis aims to manipulate attentional bias to test this 
possibility.  Research should also aim to clarify whether the impact of stress and 
goal adjustment on the rumination-distress relationship, observed in the current 
research, applies to the different components of rumination:  brooding and 
reflection.  Thus, study three of this thesis goes on to examine whether stress and 
goal adjustment differentially impact on brooding and reflection.  In addition, 
subsequent research should aim to test the relationships observed here in a clinical 
population, consequently study four in this thesis employs the same measures in a 
clinical sample of parasuicide patients 
 120 
6 Study 2: Modifying attentional bias 
6.1 Abstract 
Objectives.  This study aimed to examine the effect of manipulating 
attentional bias on rumination.   
Design.  An experimental design was used, where we attempted to 
manipulate attentional bias.   
Method.  Two tasks aimed at manipulating attentional biases were piloted.  
In the first pilot, 44 students were randomly allocated to either an attend positive or 
an attend negative manipulation group.  Participants completed baseline measures 
of attentional bias followed by the manipulation procedure and a final measure of 
attentional bias.  In the second pilot, 72 students were randomly allocated to one of 
four manipulation groups (attend negative, attend neutral (not negative), attend 
positive, attend neutral (not positive)).  Similar to the first pilot, participants 
completed baseline measures of attentional bias before completing the manipulation 
procedure and re-completing a measure of attentional bias.   
Results.  Differences between groups in attentional bias from pre to post 
manipulations were examined using repeated measures analysis of variance.  No 
significant group x time interaction was found in either of the tasks piloted.   
Conclusions.  Neither of the tasks piloted in this study were able to 
successfully manipulate attentional bias.  Possible reasons for this failure are 
discussed.   
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6.2 Introduction 
As noted in section 2.3.3, there are a number of theoretical similarities 
between attentional bias and rumination.  Previous research has found a 
correlational relationship between rumination and attentional bias (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986; Joorman et al., 2006).  However, in order to examine the 
possibility of a causal relationship between attentional bias and rumination it is 
necessary to manipulate either rumination or attentional bias and examine the effect 
that this has on the other variable.  Previous research (Donaldson et al., 2007; 
Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a) and study one in this thesis (Chapter 3) has 
examined the impact of manipulating rumination on attentional bias.  However, it is 
possible that a causal relationship between attentional bias and rumination may 
work in the opposite direction; therefore it is necessary to manipulate attentional 
bias to observe the impact this has on rumination.   
In recent years, researchers have developed an attentional training technique 
based on the dot-probe task, which can induce attentional biases (MacLeod 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002; MacLeod, Soong, Rutherford & 
Campbell, 2007).  However, this training technique has been mainly focussed on 
training attention towards or away from negative stimuli.  To date, only one study 
has attempted to manipulate positive attentional bias using this technique 
(Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008).  However, the direct effect of attentional training 
was not reported in Wadlinger and Isaacowitz’s study, therefore it remains unclear 
whether this method of attentional training can successfully manipulate positive 
attentional bias. 
Consequently, this research aimed to use a version of the dot-probe 
attentional training task to induce both negative and positive attentional biases to 
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examine the effect on rumination.  In order to do so, it was necessary to pilot our 
attentional training task to ensure that it would successfully induce attentional 
biases.   
 
6.3 Pilot 1 
6.3.1 Aims, research questions and hypotheses 
This pilot aimed to address the research question of whether attentional 
training, based on dot-probe methods could differentially manipulate attentional 
bias between two training groups – ‘attend negative’ and ‘attend positive’.  
Following previous research, we hypothesised that the ‘attend negative’ group 
would increase in negative attentional bias, compared to the ‘attend positive’ group.  
In contrast we hypothesised that the ‘attend positive’ group would increase in 
positive attentional bias compared to the ‘attend negative’ group.   
 
6.3.2 Method 
6.3.2.1 Participants 
Forty-four healthy young adults were recruited from a Scottish University. 
Participants were volunteers recruited via an online experiment management system 
and they were offered course credit in return for participation.  All participants were 
first informed that participation was voluntary and confidential and even after 
giving initial consent, they were free to withdraw at any stage.  Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of two groups:  attend negative or attend positive.  The 
sample was predominantly female (77.3%) and aged between 18 and 68 years with 
a mean age of 27.3 (SD = 11.3).   
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6.3.3 Measures 
Dot-Probe Task.  One hundred and twenty word pairs were created for the 
dot-probe attentional training task, 60 of which were negative-neutral word pairs 
and the remainder positive-neutral word pairs (see Appendix 15).  The negative-
neutral word pairings were taken from MacLeod and colleagues (2002) and were 
matched with regard to word length and frequency of usage, but differed in 
emotional valence.  The positive-neutral word pairings were created from the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  There 
were no differences in length (F (1, 119) = 0.0, n.s.) or frequency (F (1, 119) = .08, 
n.s.) of the positive and neutral words, the means and standard deviations are 
illustrated in Table 6.1.  As expected, the positive and neutral words significantly 
differed in terms of valence (F (1, 119) = 75.4, p<.001), as can be seen in Table 6.1.  
The 120 word pairs were split into two separate sets, each with 30 negative-
neutral and 30 positive-neutral word pairs.  The negative-neutral word pairs were 
split following MacLeod and colleagues (2002).  The positive-neutral word pairings 
did not differ between sets with regards to word length (F (1, 119) = 0.0, n.s.), 
frequency of usage (F (1,119) = .334, n.s.) or valence (F (1,119) = .893, n.s.) as can 
be seen in Table 6.1.   
Table 6.1.  Mean length, frequency of usage and emotionality by word type and set 
Word Type Word Set Mean Length (SD) Mean Frequency (SD) Mean Valence (SD) 
Set One 6.3  (1.8) 40.6  (48.7) 6.9 (1.5) 
Set Two 6.3  (1.7) 33.6  (41.9) 6.3 (2.1) 
Positive 
  
  Total 6.3  (1.7) 37.1  (45.2) 6.6 (1.8) 
Set One 6.3  (1.8) 36.0  (39.6) 3.9 (1.6) 
Set Two 6.3  (1.7) 33.8  (46.3) 3.7 (1.8) 
Neutral 
  
  Total 6.3  (1.7) 34.9  (42.7) 3.8 (1.7) 
Set One 6.3  (1.8) 38.3  (44.1) 5.4 (2.1) 
Set Two 6.3  (1.7) 33.7  (43.8) 5.0 (2.3) 
Total 
  
  Total 6.3  (1.7) 36.0  (43.8) 5.2 (2.2) 
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The dot-probe attentional training task consisted of 540 trials.  In each trial a 
fixation cross was presented in the centre of the screen for 500ms.  This was 
immediately followed by the simultaneous presentation of two words, one above 
and one below centre, 3.5cm apart.  The words remained on the screen for 750ms 
before a probe appeared in the location of one of the previous words.  Participants 
pressed a response box button to indicate whether this probe was above or below 
centre and reaction times were recorded.  Immediately following the participants’ 
response the screen was blank for 500ms before the procedure repeated again.  The 
first 60 trials were ‘test trials’, using the stimuli from set one, in which the probe 
appears in the same location as the valenced or the neutral word with equal 
probability.  The next 420 trials were training trials, again using the stimuli from set 
one, in which the probe always appeared in the same location as the word type to be 
trained towards.  Thus, in the attend negative condition the probe always appeared 
in the position of the negative word, however for the positive-neutral word pairs the 
probe appeared in the location of either word type with equal probability.  
Conversely in the attend positive condition, the probe always appeared in the 
location of the positive word, however for the negative-neutral word pairs the probe 
appeared equally in the location of either word type.  Within these training trials, 
each word pair was presented seven times.  The final 60 trials were test trials using 
previously unseen word pairs from set two, where the probe appeared in the location 
of either word with equal probability.   
 
6.3.3.1 Procedure 
Prior to the collection of any data, ethical approval was obtained from the 
University Psychology Department ethics committee.  Participants were randomly 
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allocated to either the attend negative or the attend positive condition.  Participants 
were told that they would be presented with a fixation cross in the centre of the 
screen and that they should look at this cross.  Participants were then told that the 
cross would disappear and two words would briefly appear on the screen, one above 
and one below centre.  It was explained to participants that these words would also 
disappear and a small dot would appear on the screen.  Participants were told that 
their task was to indicate the position of the dot relative to the centre of the screen 
using the response box.  It was emphasised that participants should try to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible.  Participants then completed all 540 dot-probe 
trials, taking approximately 23 minutes before being fully debriefed.     
 
6.3.3.2 Power, sample and analytic strategy 
Differences between manipulation groups were examined using repeated 
measures analysis of variance.  Our sample of 44 participants afforded detection of 
a medium to large sized effect (f = 0.30) with 95% power and a 5% level of 
statistical significance.   
 
6.3.4 Results 
6.3.4.1 Attentional Bias Scores 
Prior to calculating attentional bias, consistent with other studies in the field 
(e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003; Bradley et al., 1997), all incorrect responses along 
with very fast (less than 200 ms) and very slow (over 2000 ms) responses were 
identified and together with outlying responses (more than 2 standard deviations 
above an individual’s mean score) were excluded from all analyses. This excluded 
data accounted for 6.0% of total responses. 
 126 
Following Mogg et al. (1995) attentional bias scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean response times from trials where the probe was in the same 
location as the valenced word from the mean response times in those trials where 
the probe was in a different location from the valenced word.  This can be 
calculated in using the following equation: 
 
[(Valenced word upper, probe lower + Valenced word lower, probe upper) – 
(Valences word upper, probe upper + Valenced word lower, probe lower)] / 2 
 
Attentional bias scores were calculated separately for positive and negative 
conditions at both pre and post attentional training.  Positive attentional bias values 
indicate increased attention towards the valenced stimuli in comparison to the 
neutral stimuli, whilst negative values reflect “avoidance” of the valenced stimuli.   
 
6.3.4.2 Baseline differences between groups 
One way ANOVA was used to examine whether the attend negative and the 
attend positive groups differed in attentional bias prior to attentional training.  No 
differences were found between groups for initial levels of negative attentional bias 
(F (1, 43) =.702, n.s.).  However, despite random allocation, the manipulation 
groups differed on initial levels of positive attentional bias (F (1, 43) = 5.45, p<.05), 
with participants in the attend negative condition having significantly higher 
positive attentional bias than participants in the attend positive condition.  The 
means and standard deviations of the initial attentional bias scores between groups 
can be seen in Table 6.2.   
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Table 6.2.  Attentional bias mean scores and standard deviations (SD) pre and post attentional 
training by group 
 Manipulation Group Pre-Training Mean (SD) Post-Training Mean (SD) 
Attend Negative -0.18     (27.43) 9.25         (31.48) Negative Attentional Bias 
Attend Positive -7.37     (29.41) -10.53      (34.59) 
Attend Negative 8.26      (23.20) 2.62         (29.17) Positive Attentional Bias 
Attend Positive -7.60     (21.86) -8.49        (25.08) 
 
6.3.4.3 Differences between groups following attentional training 
Table 6.2 illustrates the means and standard deviations of each group both 
pre and post attentional training.  As can be seen from Table 6.2, the attend negative 
group increased in negative attentional bias, as expected, and decreased in positive 
attentional bias.  However, the attend positive group decreased in both positive and 
negative attentional bias following training.  Repeated measures ANOVA was used 
to examine differences between the attend negative and attend positive groups from 
pre-to-post attentional training.  There was no significant main effect of time for 
either negative (F (1, 42) = .18, n.s.) or positive attentional bias (F (1, 42) = .36, 
n.s.), meaning there was no difference in attentional bias from pre to post attentional 
training, regardless of group.  However, there a significant main effect of 
manipulation group for both positive (F (1, 42) = .6.67, p<.05) and negative (F (1, 
42) = 5.48, p<.05) attentional bias, illustrating the higher levels of both negative and 
positive attentional bias for the attend negative group overall.  Nonetheless, the 
interaction between manipulation group and time was not significant for either 
positive (F (1, 42) = .19, n.s.) or negative (F (1, 42) = .75, n.s.) attentional bias 
indicating that the attentional training procedure did not have a differential impact 
between manipulation groups.   
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6.3.5 Discussion 
This pilot aimed to examine whether a dot-probe attentional training task 
could be used to manipulate attentional bias.  The results of the current pilot failed 
to support our initial hypotheses, as the attentional training task failed to 
differentially manipulate attentional bias between training groups.  There are a 
number of reasons which may explain why this attentional training was 
unsuccessful and these are discussed below.   
First, despite random allocation to manipulation groups, there was a 
difference in initial levels of positive attentional bias between groups, with the 
attend positive group having significantly lower levels of positive attentional bias.  
This illustrates that the two groups were not comparable prior to receiving the 
attentional training, making it more difficult to detect a differential effect of 
attentional bias.  However visual inspection of the data indicates that the attend 
positive group actually decreased in positive attentional bias following attentional 
training, which suggests that this initial difference between groups cannot fully 
explain the failure of the manipulation task.    
A second possible explanation of the failure of the attentional training task 
relates to the methodology employed.  The attentional training task used in the 
current pilot had fewer trials than previously successful versions of this task.  
MacLeod and colleagues (2002) had 768 trials, 576 of which were attentional 
training trials, in their version of this task which successfully manipulated 
attentional bias.  MacLeod and colleagues (2007) have also successfully 
manipulated attentional bias using a shorter version of the task with only 288 
attentional training trials.  In the present study, in an attempt to limit time demands 
on participants only 540 trials were included, of which 420 were attentional training 
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trials.  However, due to the inclusion of both negative-neutral and positive-neutral 
word pairings, participants were only trained on 210 of the 420 trials.  It may be that 
the reduction in length of the training could explain our failure to manipulate 
attentional bias, therefore a replication of this pilot using the same number of trials 
as MacLeod and colleagues is required.   
A further difference between the current pilot and MacLeod and colleagues 
study is the discriminatory task given to participants.  In the present study, 
participants were asked to indicate, via a response box, whether a dot-probe on the 
screen was in the upper or lower position.  This meant that the attentional training 
task would be comparable with the previous measures of attentional bias used in 
this thesis.  However, MacLeod and colleagues have used discriminatory tasks 
which do not involve a judgement relating to the spatial location of the probe (e.g. 
whether the probe consists of one or two dots or whether the probe is a ‘<’ or a ‘>’).  
It is possible that the different focus of the discriminatory task may account for the 
differences observed between the current pilot and MacLeod and colleagues results.  
In order to further examine this possibility it is necessary to replicate the current 
pilot using the same discriminatory task as MacLeod and colleagues.   
Another difference between the present pilot and MacLeod et al.’s task was 
the length of time that the word pairs stayed on the screen.  In our version of the 
attentional training task word-pairs remained on screen for 750 milliseconds.  
However, in MacLeod and colleagues versions of the task, words remained on the 
screen for only 500 milliseconds.  As noted in section 2.3.2, previous research has 
found attentional biases are more frequently associated with depression when 
presented for longer durations; hence our initial desire to use a 750 millisecond 
exposure, meaning the attentional training procedure was consistent with the other 
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measures of attentional bias employed through out this thesis.  However, it is 
possible that this different exposure time may explain why we were unsuccessful at 
manipulating attentional bias.  Consequently, it is necessary to replicate this 
attentional training procedure using a 500 millisecond duration, following MacLeod 
and colleagues.   
A final difference between the current task and that of MacLeod and 
colleagues is that the current pilot also included a positive training condition.  
MacLeod and colleagues were able to manipulate attentional bias such that 
participants were trained to attend towards or away from negative words in 
comparison to neutral words.  However, it is possible that the inclusion of positive-
neutral word pairings in the current pilot may have impeded the attentional training 
task, particularly as attentional training only applied to half of the presented trials 
(i.e. for participants in the attend negative group, attentional training only applied to 
the trials containing negative-neutral word pairs and vice versa for the attend 
positive group).  Indeed, the extent to which the effects of training will generalise to 
differently valenced words is difficult to predict.  As noted earlier, the only study 
which has attempted to manipulate positive attentional biases did not report the 
direct effects of their attentional training (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008).  
Additionally, Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2008) only used positive-neutral word 
pairs, in contrast to the current study which used both positive-neutral and negative-
neutral word pairings.   
In the present study we directly compared the effects of training towards 
negative words with training towards positive words.   However, these comparisons 
may have affected our results, as the impact of training towards one type of stimuli 
may have had a number of consequences on other word types.  For example the 
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attend negative group completed training which aimed to teach them to attend to 
negative (in comparison to neutral) words, however the effect of this training on 
positive-neutral word pairs may take a number of forms, including: (i) no impact on 
positive-neutral word pairings; (ii) a decrease in attention towards any words which 
are not negative, including both positive and neutral words, meaning positive 
attentional bias decreases or; (iii) an increase in attention towards valenced as 
opposed to neutral words, meaning attention towards both positive and negative 
words would increase.  Thus, it would be possible for both training conditions to 
have the same impact on attentional bias scores (i.e. to increase both positive and 
negative attentional bias).  Initially we aimed to include both negative-neutral and 
positive-neutral words pairs to control for the possible mood effects of exposure to 
positive compared to negative words, however it appears that an attentional training 
task which separates negative-neutral and positive-neutral word pairs may provide 
better controlled conditions for comparison between training groups.   
In summary, a number of differences between the current pilot and the 
previous successful attentional training tasks developed by MacLeod and colleagues 
(2002, 2007) may explain our failure to manipulate attentional bias.  In order to 
examine this further it is necessary to replicate the current pilot using an attentional 
training task which aims includes a greater number of trials, using stimuli presented 
for the same length of time and using the same discrimination judgement as 
MacLeod and colleagues.   In addition it is necessary to separate the positive and 
negative conditions so that participants are presented with only negative-neutral or 
positive-neutral word pairs.   
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6.4 Pilot 2 
6.4.1 Aims, research questions and hypotheses 
Pilot two aimed to test an updated measure of a dot-probe attentional 
training task, which had been modified to include the necessary components 
highlighted through the failure of pilot one.  This pilot aimed to address the research 
question of whether this modified attentional training task could differentially 
manipulate attentional bias between training groups.  We hypothesised that the 
‘attend negative’ group would increase in negative attentional bias following 
training, in contrast to the ‘attend neutral (not negative)’group who would decrease 
in negative attentional bias.  Similarly, we hypothesised that the ‘attend positive’ 
group would increase in positive attentional bias following training, whilst the 
‘attend neutral (not positive)’ group would decrease in positive attentional bias 
following training.   
 
6.4.2 Method 
6.4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 72 young adults from a Scottish University.  Participants 
were volunteers recruited via an online experiment management system and they 
were offered course credit in return for participation.  All participants were first 
informed that participation was voluntary and confidential and even after giving 
initial consent, they were free to withdraw at any stage.  Participants were aged 
between 18 and 62, with a mean age of 21.2 years (SD= 6.7).  53 participants 
(73.6%) were female.  Participants were randomly allocated to one of four 
conditions: attend negative; attend neutral (not negative); attend positive; attend 
neutral (not positive).   
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6.4.2.2 Materials 
Dot-Probe Task.  Two separate sets of stimuli were compiled for the dot-
probe attentional training task, one for the negative conditions and one for the 
positive conditions.  Ninety six negative-neutral and 96 positive-neutral word pairs 
were created from words on the ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 1999) (see Appendix 
16).  There was no difference in word length or frequency of usage for either the 
positive-neutral or negative-neutral word pairs (see Table 6.3.).  Again these word 
pairs were split into two sets to allow the effects training to be examined using 
word-pairs which had not previously been seen by participants and there were no 
differences in word length, frequency of usage or valence between these sets for 
either the negative-neutral pairs or the positive-neutral pairs.  Means and standard 
deviations of the word length, frequency of usage and valance for both the negative-
neutral and the positive-neutral pairs, divided by set can be seen in Table 6.3 
alongside the F values for differences between sets.   
Following MacLeod and colleagues (2002), the dot-probe attentional 
training task consisted of 768 trials.  Each trial started with the words ‘Next Trial’ in 
the centre of the screen for 500ms.  This was immediately followed by the 
simultaneous presentation of two words, one above and one below centre.  The 
words were presented 3.5cm apart and remained on screen for 500ms.  Immediately 
following the words one or two dots appeared on the screen in the position of one of 
the two previous words.  Participants used a response box to indicate the number of 
dots displayed on the screen.  Reaction times were recorded and quicker reaction 
times were taken to indicate that participants were attending to the word previously 
in the same location as the dot-probe.   
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The first 96 trials were ‘test’ trials where the probe appeared in the location 
of either word type with equal probability.  Each of the 48 word pairs from the first 
set were presented twice in this testing session with the order of presentation being 
randomised, with the constraint that each of the pairs must be presented once before 
being repeated.  The proceeding 576 trials were ‘training’ trials where the probe 
always appeared in the same location as the word type to be trained towards (e.g. in 
the attend negative condition, the probe always appeared in the same location as the 
negative word).  These training trials used the same word pairs which were 
presented in the first test trials, with each pair being presented 12 times.  The final 
96 trials were test trials using new word pairs not previously seen by participants.  
Similar to the first test session, each of the 48 word pairs were presented twice to 
participants again with the constraint that each pair must be presented once prior to 
repetition.        
 
Table 6.3.  Mean scores and standard deviations (SD) of word length, frequency of usage and 
valence score for each word type and F value for the difference between sets 
  Mean Word  
Length (SD) 
F 
value  
Mean Frequency  
of Usage (SD) 
F 
value 
 
Mean Valence 
Score (SD) 
F 
value 
Set 1  6.63   (1.78) 27.20   (49.66) 1.94   (0.24) 
Set 2  6.65   (1.79) 29.11   (69.12) 1.94   (0.24) 
Negative 
Words 
Total  6.64   (1.78) 
.00 
28.14   (59.75) 
.02 
1.94   (0.24) 
.02  
Set 1  6.63   (1.78) 29.71   (52.85) 5.58   (0.58) 
Set 2  6.65   (1.79) 22.70   (23.12) 5.58   (0.61) 
Neutral (Not 
Negative) 
Words Total  6.64   (1.78) 
.00 
26.54   (41.19) 
.64 
5.58   (0.59) 
.00 
Set 1  6.23   (1.81) 61.75   (95.46) 8.03   (0.25) 
Set 2  6.40   (1.71) 60.30   (81.82) 8.05   (0.30) 
Positive 
Words 
Total  6.31   (1.76) 
.22 
61.04   (88.58) 
.01 
8.04   (0.27) 
.08 
Set 1  6.23   (1.81) 60.36   (93.41) 5.46   (0.68) 
Set 2  6.40   (1.71) 60.43   (83.07) 5.68   (0.59) 
Neutral (Not 
Positive) 
Words Total  6.31   (1.76) 
.22 
60.40   (88.07) 
.00 
5.57   (0.65) 
2.71 
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6.4.2.3 Procedure 
Prior to the collection of any data, ethical approval was obtained from the 
University Psychology Department’s ethics committee.  Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the four conditions:  attend negative; attend neutral (not 
negative); attend positive; attend neutral (not positive).  Participants were given the 
same instructions as in the first pilot, with necessary adaptations regarding the slight 
changes in methodology so that participants were informed that the words ‘next 
trial’ would appear on the screen (as opposed to the fixation cross in Pilot 1) and 
that their task was to identify whether there was one or two dots on the screen using 
the response box (as opposed to the location of the dot in Pilot 1).  Participants then 
completed all 768 dot-probe trials, taking approximately 28 minutes.  Finally, 
participants were fully debriefed.   
 
6.4.2.4 Power, sample and analytic strategy 
Following the methods used in the first pilot, repeated measures analysis of 
variance was used to examine the impact of the manipulation task.  The two positive 
and two negative manipulation groups were analysed separately, meaning that our 
sample of 77 participants provided 95% power to detect a medium to large effect 
size (f = 0.31) with a significance level of 5%.   
  
6.4.3 Results 
6.4.3.1 Attentional bias scores 
Similar to the first pilot, prior to calculating attentional bias, consistent with 
other studies in the field (e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003; Bradley et al., 1997), all 
incorrect responses along with very fast (less than 200 ms) and very slow (over 
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2000 ms) responses were identified and along with outlying responses (more than 2 
standard deviations above an individual’s mean score) were excluded from all 
analyses.  This excluded data accounted for 6.83% of total responses. 
Attentional bias scores were calculated using the same equation as in the 
first pilot, again following Mogg and colleagues (1995):  
 
[(Valenced word upper, probe lower + Valenced word lower, probe upper) – 
(Valences word upper, probe upper + Valenced word lower, probe lower)] / 2 
 
The attentional training procedures used in this pilot task were such that 
participants were presented with either positive-neutral pairs or negative-neutral 
pairs, not both.  Consequently, the data for the negative stimuli and the positive 
stimuli were analysed separately.   
 
6.4.3.2 Baseline differences between groups 
ANOVA was used to check for any differences between the manipulation 
groups prior to attentional training.  Table 6.4 illustrates the mean scores and 
standard deviations for pre-training attentional bias in each manipulation group.  No 
significant differences in attentional bias prior to attentional training were found 
between either the attend negative/attend neutral (not negative) groups (F (1, 35) = 
3.56, n.s.) or the attend positive/attend neutral (not positive) groups (F (1, 35) = .07, 
n.s.).   
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Table 6.4.  Means scores and standard deviations (SD) of attentional bias pre and post 
attentional training by group 
Manipulation Group Mean Attentional Bias Pre-
Training (SD) 
Mean Attentional Bias Post-
Training (SD) 
Attend Negative -3.73     (10.73) 1.98      (16.28) 
Attend Neutral (Not Negative) 5.66      (18.16) 0.39      (15.22) 
Attend Positive -1.96     (16.65) -2.52     (14.68)  
Attend Neutral (Not Positive) -0.57     (14.03) 0.16      (23.86) 
 
6.4.3.3 Differences between groups following attentional training 
As can be seen in Table 6.4, the attend negative group increased in negative 
attentional bias from pre-to-post attentional training, whilst the attend neutral (not 
negative) group decreased in negative attentional bias.  The attend positive group 
decreased in positive attentional bias from pre-to-post attentional training, whilst the 
attend neutral (not positive) group increased in positive attentional bias.  There was 
no overall main effect of time for either the positive (F (1, 34) = .001, n.s.) or the 
negative (F (1, 34) = .003, n.s) conditions.  There was also no main effect of 
manipulation group in either the positive (F (1, 34) = .23, n.s.) or the negative (F (1, 
34) = 1.24, n.s.) conditions.  The interaction between time and manipulation group 
was also not significant for either the positive (F (1, 34) = .03, n.s.) or the negative 
(F (1, 34) = 2.17, n.s.) conditions, indicating that there was no differential impact of 
the attentional training procedure between manipulation groups.   
 
6.4.4 Discussion 
This second pilot aimed to examine whether our modified version of the dot-
probe attentional training task could successfully manipulate attentional bias either 
towards or away from positive and negative stimuli.  We found that the attentional 
training task did not have significantly differential effects on attentional bias 
between the different training groups in either the positive or the negative 
conditions, meaning our hypotheses were not supported.   
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6.5 General Discussion 
This study piloted two tasks aimed at manipulating attentional bias using a 
dot-probe attentional training task.  However, neither of these methods was 
successful meaning we were unable to consistently manipulate attentional bias in 
the desired direction.   As a consequence we are unable to examine the causal 
impact of attentional bias on rumination.   
One possibility which may account for our failure to replicate the findings of 
previous authors who have manipulated attentional bias was the inclusion of 
positive attentional bias in our manipulation tasks.  Previous work has mainly 
focussed on manipulating attention towards either negative or neutral stimuli (e.g. 
MacLeod et al., 2002, 2007).  Indeed, we are aware of only one study which has 
attempted to manipulate positive attentional bias and this study failed to report 
whether the manipulations had any direct effect on a dot-probe measure of 
attentional bias (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008).  However, the second task we 
piloted separated the negative and positive stimuli into different conditions 
completed by different participants, yet we were still unable to differential 
manipulate attentional bias between training groups, even in the negative 
conditions, suggesting that the failure of our manipulations was not simply due to 
the inclusion of a positive component.   
MacLeod and colleagues have previously manipulated attentional bias using 
a similar population of healthy young adults, suggesting that the participant 
population in the present research is unlikely to explain the difference in our 
findings.  In addition, the methodology employed in our second pilot attempt 
replicated that of MacLeod and colleagues (2002) with regards to the timing, the 
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number of trials and the task presented to participants, yet we still failed to find an 
effect.  
In summary, we were unable to reliably manipulate attentional bias meaning 
we were unable to examine the causal impact of positive or negative attentional bias 
on rumination.  The ability to manipulate both positive and negative attentional 
biases was crucial to the aims of the study we had hoped to conduct to examine the 
causal impact of attentional bias on rumination.  The inclusion of a positive 
attentional bias manipulation was particularly pertinent given that previous research 
has demonstrated the effects of manipulating rumination on positive attentional bias 
(e.g. Chapter 3, Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  Given that both positive and 
negative attentional bias were not differentially manipulated in either pilot study 
and this may have been particularly linked to the inclusion of a positive 
manipulation condition, in combination with the time constraints associated with 
PhD research, we were unable to manipulate attentional bias to examine the impact 
on rumination.   
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7 Study 3: A self-report study examining moderating and mediating 
influences in the relationships between both rumination and 
distress and perfectionism and distress 
7.1 Abstract 
Objectives.  This study aimed to clarify the findings of study one by 
examining whether the observed effects could be replicated for the two components 
of rumination and differing measures of stress.   
Design.  A test-retest design was utilised.  The prospective nature of this 
study allowed for the prediction of distress over time, after controlling for initial 
levels of distress.     
Method.  At time one, 250 students completed initial self-report measures of 
perfectionism, rumination, goal adjustment, perceived stress, life events stress and 
psychological distress.  At time two, 205 participants re-completed self-report 
measures of stress and psychological distress.   
Results.  A series of multiple hierarchical regression analyses were used to 
investigate moderating and mediating effects and a number of moderating and 
mediating relationships were apparent.   
Conclusions.  Perceived stress and stressful life events were found to have a 
differential impact on the relationship between both perfectionism and distress and 
rumination and distress, indicating differences between these two measures of 
stress.  The two components of rumination were also found to have varying roles in 
the relationship with distress.   
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7.2 Introduction 
7.2.1 Influences on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
As outlined in section 2.4.2, perfectionism has consistently been linked with 
distress (although this relationship varies as a function of the dimension of 
perfectionism under study).  A number of variables have been suggested to have an 
impact on the perfectionism-distress relationship, including:  stress, brooding and 
reflective rumination and goal adjustment.   
 
7.2.1.1 Stress 
Sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 outlined some of the different ways in which stress 
can be measured.  Two broad categories of measures can be distinguished:  (i) 
checklist life events measures and (ii) cognitively focussed measures of stress-
appraisal.  There is considerable debate over the relative merits of each type of 
measure and whether they are tapping into the same construct.  Thus, although 
research has suggested that stress may moderate (e.g. Flett et al., 1995; Chang & 
Rand, 2000) and/or mediate (e.g. Chang, 2000; Hewitt et al., 2001) the relationship 
between perfectionism and distress (see section 2.4.3 for more details), it is unclear 
whether these relationships hold for different measures of stress.  This indicates a 
clear need for comparative research where stress is measured through varying 
methodologies.    
 
7.2.1.2 Rumination 
Treynor and colleagues (2003) recently identified two components of 
rumination: brooding and reflection.   Brooding refers to ruminative thoughts in 
which one compares one’s current situation with an unachieved benchmark, whilst 
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refection refers to self-focus aimed at problem solving in response to depressed 
mood.  Recent research has examined the possibility that rumination may be a 
mechanism by which perfectionism impacts on distress (e.g. Flett et al., 2002; 
O’Connor et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008).  However, following the identification of 
two different components of rumination, it is important to consider which, if either, 
of these components provides a mechanism for perfectionism to impact on distress.  
O’Connor and colleagues (2007) found that brooding rumination either fully or 
partially mediated the effects of both socially prescribed and self-oriented 
perfectionism on a range of measures including depression, hopelessness, suicidal 
thinking and psychological distress.  However, this research did not include a 
measure of reflective rumination.  Harris and colleagues (2008) examined the 
mediating role of both brooding and reflection in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship in a cross-sectional study.  They found that brooding fully mediated the 
maladaptive perfectionism-depression relationship, whilst reflection partially 
mediated this relationship.  However, Harris and colleagues measured specific 
ruminations about failure in a test, as opposed to the more general tendency to 
ruminate in response to negative mood, usually measured by Response Styles 
theory.   
It is also possible that rumination may have a moderating role in the 
relationship between perfectionism and distress, such that rumination enhances the 
negative consequences associated with perfectionism.  However, this possibility has 
generated little research to date.  Study one of this thesis (Chapter 5) found that 
rumination moderated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism 
and suicidal thinking.   However, the extent to which this moderating relationship 
holds for the two components of rumination remains unexplored.  Thus, there is a 
 143 
need for further research examining the impact of brooding and reflection on the 
perfectionism-distress relationship prospectively.   
 
7.2.1.3 Goal adjustment 
As outlined in section 2.5.3, we are aware of only one published study which 
has examined the role of goal adjustment in the perfectionism-distress relationship.  
O’Connor and Forgan (2007) found goal reengagement moderated and mediated the 
effects of socially prescribed perfectionism on suicidal thinking in a cross-sectional 
study.  This relationship was also examined prospectively in study one of this thesis, 
where we found that both goal disengagement and goal reengagement moderated 
the effects of socially prescribed perfectionism on change in suicidal thinking.  In 
addition, goal disengagement also moderated the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and change in suicidal thinking.  However, goal adjustment did not 
mediate the relationship between perfectionism and distress.  The difference 
between our findings and those of O’Connor and Forgan (2007) may reflect the 
differences in the relationships when examined cross-sectionally as opposed to 
prospectively.  However, given these varying findings there seems a need for 
replication to further examine the impact of goal adjustment on the perfectionism-
distress relationship.   
 
7.2.2 Influences on the rumination-distress relationship 
Similar to perfectionism, rumination has persistently been implicated in 
various types of distress (see section 2.2.3 for more details).  A number of factors 
have been proposed to influence the relationship between rumination and distress, 
including stress and goal adjustment.  However, as noted earlier, recent research by 
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Treynor and colleagues (2003) has identified two components of rumination:  
brooding and reflection.  Treynor and colleagues argue that brooding is the 
component of rumination most associated with distress and as such this may 
represent the maladaptive properties of rumination.  In contrast, reflection may 
represent the adaptive properties of rumination.  Consequently, research examining 
influences in the relationship between rumination and distress must consider these 
influences separately for the relationships between brooding rumination and distress 
and reflective rumination and distress.   
 
7.2.2.1 Stress 
The notion of stress-reactive rumination - where ruminations occur in 
response to stressful situations – has recently been proposed (Robinson & Alloy, 
2003).  However, the moderating effects of stress on the relationship between 
rumination and distress are not routinely reported.  Nonetheless, there is some 
evidence to suggest that a ruminative response style interacts with levels of stress to 
predict social dysfunction, dysphoria, hopelessness and suicidal thinking (Morrison 
& O’Connor, 2005, Morrison & O’Connor, 2008a).  However, to date, the 
moderating effect of stress on the relationship between rumination and distress has 
not been examined separately for brooding and reflection.  In addition, previous 
research has not examined the impact of stressful life events, as measured by a 
checklist, on the relationship between rumination and distress.  Finally, the 
possibility of stress as a mediator in the relationship between rumination and 
distress (i.e. the extent to which rumination results in increased stress, which in turn 
increases distress) has generated little research to date.  Study one of this thesis 
found limited prospective evidence of perceived stress as a mediator in the 
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relationship between rumination and a number of measures of distress, however it is 
unclear whether this relationship will hold for both brooding and reflective 
rumination or for a different conceptualisation of stress.   
 
7.2.2.2 Goal adjustment 
Indirect evidence has implicated goal adjustment as a potential influence on 
the relationship between rumination and distress:  goal adjustment has been 
associated with increased intrusive thinking (Wrosch et al., 2003) and ruminations 
regarding goal pursuit have been suggested as a mechanism by which goal 
adjustment affects immune functioning (Miller & Wrosch, 2007).  Goal adjustment 
as an influence on the relationship between rumination and distress, was directly 
explored in study one of this thesis where we found that goal disengagement 
moderated the impact of rumination on hopelessness and suicidal thinking.  
However, it remains unclear whether this relationship will hold for brooding and/or 
reflection.   
 
7.2.3 Aims 
The two main objectives of this study were: first, to examine whether the 
relationships between rumination, perfectionism, goal adjustment and stress, 
observed in study one, would hold for the two components of rumination: brooding 
and reflection.  Second, we aimed to determine whether the impact of stress on the 
relationship between both perfectionism and rumination and distress varied 
according to the measure of stress.  An additional aim was to further examine the 
impact of goal adjustment on the relationship between perfectionism and distress in 
an attempt to clarify previous conflicting findings.   
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7.2.4 Research Questions and hypotheses   
1) Does perceived stress or stressful life events impact on the perfectionism-
distress relationship?  Given that measures of perceived stress and stressful life 
events claim to be measuring a similar construct, we hypothesised that both would 
moderate the relationship between self-oriented and socially prescribed 
perfectionism and distress, in line with previous diathesis-stress conceptualisations.  
It was also hypothesised that both perceived stress and stressful life events would 
mediate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and distress, 
again consistent with previous research. 
2) Does brooding or reflective rumination impact on the perfectionism-
distress relationship?  Following previous research in this area, we hypothesised 
that brooding would fully mediate the relationship between both self-oriented and 
socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  We also hypothesised that reflection 
would partially mediate the relationship between both self-oriented and socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress.  With regards moderation, we hypothesised 
that brooding would moderate the relationship between self-oriented and socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress such that increased perfectionism, combined 
with increased brooding, would be predictive of higher levels of distress.     
3) Does goal adjustment impact on the perfectionism-distress relationship?  
Following our previous prospective findings we hypothesised that both goal 
disengagement and goal reengagement would moderate the effects of socially 
prescribed perfectionism on distress, such that an inability to disengage from goals, 
or a difficulty in reengaging with new goals when combined with socially 
prescribed perfectionism would be predictive of increased distress.   We also 
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hypothesised that goal disengagement would moderate the relationship between 
self-oriented perfectionism and distress, such that an inability to disengage from 
goals, when combined with self-oriented perfectionism, would be predictive of 
increased distress.  In addition, we hypothesised that goal adjustment would not 
mediate the perfectionism-distress relationship.   
4) Does perceived stress or stressful life events impact on either the 
brooding-distress relationship or the reflection-distress relationship?  Given the 
lack of research in this area we made no specific hypotheses regarding the impact of 
either perceived stress or stressful life events on the relationship between brooding 
and reflective rumination and distress.   
5) Does goal adjustment impact on either the brooding-distress relationship 
or the reflection-distress relationship?  We hypothesised that goal disengagement 
would moderate the relationship between both brooding and reflection rumination 
and hopelessness and suicidal thinking, in line with previous findings for rumination 
as a whole.    With regards to mediation, we hypothesised that goal adjustment 
would not mediate the relationship between either brooding or reflection and 
distress.   
 
7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Participants 
Two hundred and fifty students were recruited from a Scottish University.  
Participants were volunteers recruited via an online experiment management system 
and they were offered course credit in return for participation.  All participants were 
first informed that participation was voluntary and confidential and even after 
giving initial consent, they were free to withdraw at any stage.  Participants were 
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aged between 16 and 62 with a mean age of 21.36 years (SD = 6.88).  One hundred 
and ninety one females and 59 males participated in the study.  The majority of 
participants were not married (96.8%).  205 of the original participants went on to 
re-complete measures at time two, between 39 and 204 days later (mean gap = 81 
days) representing an 82% response rate at time two.  Participants who did not 
complete time two did not significantly differ from those who completed time two 
on any of the time one measures (range of F-values .02-2.63, range of Chi-square 
values .93-2.88).     
 
7.3.2 Measures 
Rumination.  The original 22-item Response Style Questionnaire provided a 
measure of participants’ ruminative tendencies in negative situations.   Two 
subscales representing brooding and reflective rumination can be drawn from this 
measure, following Treynor et al (2003) (see section 4.2.1 for a more detailed 
description).  Internal consistency for both the brooding and reflection subscales 
was satisfactory in this sample (α = .77 and .76 respectively).   
Hopelessness.  The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al., 1974) 
measured pessimism towards the future (e.g. ‘It’s very unlikely that I will get any 
real satisfaction in the future’) (see section 4.3.1 for more a more detailed 
description).  Satisfactory internal consistency was achieved in this sample (α > .87 
at both administrations).    
Anxiety and Depression.  The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) measured both depression and anxiety (e.g. ‘I 
feel as if I am slowed down’ and ‘Worrying thoughts go through my mind’) (see 
section 4.3.2 for more a more detailed description).  Cronbach’s alpha in this sample 
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ranged from .79 - .82 across administrations, indicating adequate internal 
consistency. 
Dysphoria.  The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-
D; Radloff, 1977) provided a measure of dysphoria (e.g. ‘I felt that I was just as 
good as other people’) (see section 4.3.3 for more a more detailed description).  
Internal consistency in this sample was good across each time point (range of α = 
.91 - .93). 
Suicidal Thinking.  The Suicide Ideation Subscale of the Suicide Probability 
Scale (SPS; Cull & Gill, 1988) provided a measure of suicide ideation (e.g. ‘In 
order to punish others, I think of suicide’) (see section 4.3.4 for more a more 
detailed description).     Internal consistency in this sample was good (range α = .89 
- .91).   
Perfectionism.  The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) (Hewitt & 
Flett, 1991) provided a measure of perfectionism (see section 4.2.2 for more a more 
detailed description).    Cronbach’s alpha in this sample was good (range α = .78-
.91). 
Goal Adjustment.  The Goal Adjustment Scale (Wrosch, et al, 2003) 
provided a measure of both goal disengagement and goal reengagement (see section 
4.2.3 for more a more detailed description).  Internal consistency in this sample was 
confirmed (Cronbach’s α range = .82-.89).    
Stress.  The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983) measured 
global stress in the two weeks prior to time one and the weeks between time one and 
time two (e.g. ‘How often have you felt nervous and stressed?’) (see section 4.2.5 
for more a more detailed description).  Internal consistency in this sample was 
satisfactory at both time points (Cronbach’s α range = .79-.83). 
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Life Events.  The Life Events Scale for Students (LESS; Linden, 1984) 
provided a checklist measure of stressful life events both in the year preceding time 
one and the weeks between time one and time two (see section 4.2.6 for a more 
detailed description).   
 
7.3.3 Procedure 
Prior to the collection of any data, ethical approval was obtained from the 
University Psychology Department’s ethics committee.  At time one (T1), 
participants completed all self-report measures.  At time two (T2), approximately 11 
weeks later, participants re-completed measures of hopelessness, depression, 
anxiety, dysphoria and suicidal thinking in addition to measures of both perceived 
stress and stressful life events experienced in the period between T1 and T2.  A flow 
chart of the procedure followed in this study can be seen in Figure 7.1.   
 
 
Figure 7.1.  Flow chart of study three procedure 
   
Time One 
(n=250) 
Time Two 
(n=205) 
Self-report measures of: 
rumination, perfectionism, goal 
adjustment, perceived stress, life 
events stress, anxiety, depression, 
dysphoria, hopelessness and 
suicidal thinking. 
Self-report measures 
perceived stress, life events 
stress, anxiety, depression, 
dysphoria, hopelessness and 
suicidal thinking. 
 151 
7.3.4 Power, sample and analytic strategy 
Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were used to predict the dependent 
variables at T2.  Our sample of 205 participants at T2 provided 95% power to detect 
a small to medium sized effect (f 2 = 0.10) with a 5% significance level in a 
regression with 5 predictors.   
 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Correlations between variables 
A table of the mean scores and correlations between all variables can be seen 
in Table 7.1.  Brooding was significantly negatively correlated with goal 
disengagement (r = -.139) and goal reengagement (r = -.170) and significantly 
positive correlated with every other measure (range of r = .162 - .665) with the 
exception of self and other oriented perfectionism (no relationship was evident).  
Reflection significantly negatively correlated with goal reengagement (r = -.145) 
and positively correlated with every other measure (range of r = .184 - .449) with 
the exception of self and other oriented perfectionism and stressful life events at 
both time points.  Goal disengagement was significantly positively correlated with 
goal reengagement (r = .247) and negatively correlated with each dimension of 
perfectionism, perceived stress, anxiety and dysphoria (range of r = -.142 - .322).  
Goal reengagement was significantly negatively correlated with each measure of 
distress at both time points, in addition to perceived stress at T2 (range of r = -.147 - 
-.269).  Self-oriented perfectionism significantly positively correlated with both 
other oriented (r = .489) and socially prescribed perfectionism (r = .409) in addition 
to anxiety at T1 (r = .147).  Other oriented perfectionism was significantly 
positively correlated with socially prescribed perfectionism (r = .288) in addition to 
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being negatively correlated with hopelessness at both time points and suicidal 
thinking at T2 (range of r = -.148 - -.224).  Socially prescribed perfectionism was 
positively correlated with each measure of stress and distress at both time points 
(range of r = .201-.385).  Perceived stress at both time points significantly positively 
correlated with stressful life events and each measure of distress (range of r = .177 - 
.767).  In contrast, stressful life events at T1 positively correlated with depression, 
dysphoria and suicidal thinking at both time points in addition to hopelessness at T1 
and anxiety at T2 (range of r = .145 - .239), whilst stressful life events at T2 
positively correlated with each measure of distress at both time points (range of r = 
.256 - .344).  Finally, each of the measures of distress were significantly positively 
inter-correlated at both time points (range of r = .423 - .783).  
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Table 7.1. Mean scores, standard deviations and correlations between all variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. Brood -                     
2. Reflect .510** -                    
3. Goal Dis -.139* -.093 -                   
4. Goal Re -.170** -.145* .247** -                  
5. Self -.014 .077 -.322** .099 -                 
6. Other -.008 .050 -.235** .028 .489** -                
7. Social .285** .184** -.277** -.090 .409** .288** -               
8. PSS 1 .665** .448** -.193** -.221 .034 -.010 .385** -              
9. Life 1 .162* .115 -.068 -.020 .066 -.022 .201** .177* -             
10. BHS 1 .439** .404** -.123 -.269** -.076 -.155* .305** .587** .145* -            
11. Anx 1 .491** .385** -.244** -.241** .147* .052 .323** .652** .113 .532** -           
12. Dep 1 .469** .449** -.119 -.230** .046 -.013 .286** .538** .216** .554** .625** -          
13. CESD 1 .588** .510** -.142* -.248** -.043 -.033 .337** .726** .190** .678** .679** .749** -         
14. SPS 1 .500** .463** -.117 -.164** .045 .001 .292** .500** .203** .613** .491** .544** .606** -        
15. BHS 2 .379** .377** -.050 -.268** -.090 -.224** .245** .555** .115 .783** .447** .423** .565** .525** -       
16. Anx 2 .396** .307** -.202** -.172* .087 -.032 .261** .475** .151* .425** .644** .501** .533** .412** .537** -      
17. Dep 2 .417** .396** -.071 -.188** -.009 -.123 .232** .468** .202** .483** .480** .638** .614** .442** .572** .667** -     
18. CESD 2 .435** .405** -.170* -.217** .076 -.097 .334** .556** .239** .547** .515** .539** .664** .481** .666** .727** .772** -    
19. SPS 2 .497** .389** -.128 -.147* .019 -.148* .242** .495** .179* .550** .444** .427** .530** .755** .611** .516** .541** .612** -   
20. PSS 2 .481** .343** -.210** -.214** .010 -.090 .275** .676** .182** .523** .500** .486** .637** .464** .622** .670** .655** .767** .512** -  
21. Life 2 .177* .070 -.088 -.025 .030 -.003 .205** .219** .412** .289** .277** .344** .256** .283** .259** .299** .340** .305** .281** .325**  
Mean  4.60 3.61 2.95 3.73 63.08 54.65 53.87 26.07 429.27 4.15 6.91 3.50 14.47 1.70 4.01 6.45 3.33 13.27 1.24 24.79 202.13 
SD 2.87 3.08 0.82 0.66 16.66 11.49 12.77 6.17 220.86 3.96 3.68 3.21 10.03 3.19 4.13 3.91 3.27 11.04 2.92 7.04 179.4 
Note:  Brood=Brooding Rumination; Refect=Reflective rumination; Goal Dis=Goal Disengagement; Goal Re=Goal Reengagement; Self=Self-oriented perfectionism; Other = Other oriented perfectionism; 
Social=Socially prescribed perfectionism; PSS 1=Perceived Stress T1; Life 1=Stressful Life Events T1; BHS 1 = Hopelessness T1; Anx 1= HADS Anxiety T1; Dep 1= HADS Depression T1; CESD 1 = 
Dysphoria T1; SPS 1 = Suicide Probability Scale T1; BHS 2 = Hopelessness T2; Anx 2=HADS Anxiety T2; Dep 2=HADS Depression T2; CESD 2=Dysphoria T2; SPS 2=Suicide Probability Scale T2; PSS 
2=Perceived Stress T2; Life 2=Stressful Life Events T2 
* Significant at the .05 level (two tailed), ** Significant at the .01 level (two tailed) 
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7.4.2 Differences in distress between T1 and T2 
As can be seen in Table 7.1, levels of each type of distress decreased between 
T1 and T2.  However, paired samples t-tests indicated that these decreases were only 
significant for suicidal thinking (t (204) =3.85, p<.0001) and dysphoria (t (204) = 
2.05, p<.05).  In addition, anxiety showed a trend towards significantly decreasing 
between T1 and T2 (t (204) = 1.82, p=.07).  Table 7.2 illustrates the effect sizes for 
these differences in distress between T1 and T2.    
 
Table 7.2.  Effect size r for the differences in distress between T1 and T2 
Measure of distress Effect size r for change between T1 and T2 
Hopelessness 0.02 
Depression 0.03 
Anxiety 0.06 
Dysphoria 0.06 
Suicidal Thinking 0.07 
 
7.4.3 Moderation Analyses 
A series of regression analyses were used to test for moderating relationships 
between variables, as outlined in the research questions for this study (see section 
7.2.4).  Prior to analysis, predictor variables were centred, as recommended by Aiken 
and West (1991).  In each regression analysis the dependant variable was the measure 
of distress at time two.  Time one distress was controlled for in the first step of each 
analysis2.  In addition, gender was also entered in the first step of each analysis 
involving rumination (to control for the gender differences associated with 
rumination).  The second step of the analysis contained the appropriate main effect 
variables (for example: self-oriented perfectionism and perceived stress), whilst the 
                                                 
2
 Thus, any reference to predicting change in distress refers to the prediction of distress at T2 after 
controlling for distress at T1 (e.g. the variance remaining in T2 after the variance associated with T1 
has been removed).   
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final step contained the appropriate multiplicative terms for these main effect 
variables (for example: self-oriented perfectionism x perceived stress).   
Significant interactions were plotted at high and low levels of each of the 
interaction terms, consonant with Aiken & West (1991).  These interactions were then 
probed post-hoc using simple slope analysis to determine whether either slope 
significantly differed from zero, again consonant with Aiken and West (1991).   
 
7.4.4 The effect of moderation in the perfectionism-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
7.4.4.1 Perceived stress as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
7.4.4.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, as a main effect perceived stress 
was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .29, t (204) = 6.03, p =.0001), anxiety 
(β = .46, t (204) = 8.56, p =.0001), depression (β = .45, t (204) = 8.31, p = .0001), 
dysphoria (β = .57, t (204) = 10.29, p =.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .20, t (204) = 
4.02, p = .0001).  However, as a main effect, self-oriented perfectionism was not 
significantly predictive of change in any measure of distress, nor was the interaction 
between self-oriented perfectionism and perceived stress.   
 
7.4.4.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, as a main effect perceived stress 
was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .29, t (204) = 5.90, p = .0001), anxiety 
(β = .44, t (204) =  7.97, p = .0001), depression (β = .43, t (204) = 7.68, p = .0001), 
dysphoria (β = .55, t (204) = 9.86, p = .0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .18, t (204) = 
3.56, p = .0001).  Also as a main effect, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
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predictive of change in dysphoria (β = .09, t (204) = 2.06, p = .041).  The interaction 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and perceived stress was predictive of 
change in suicidal thinking (β = .15, t (204) = 3.13, p = .002).   A plot of the lines of 
best fit for this interaction can be seen in Figure 7.2.   Post hoc examination of this 
interaction revealed that the low slope significantly differed from zero (β = -.15, t 
(204) = -2.40, p = .018) and the high slope showed a trend towards significantly 
differing from zero (β = .12, t (204) = 1.86, p = .064).  Thus for high social 
perfectionists, high levels of perceived stress were associated with an increase in 
suicidal thinking from T1 to T2, whilst low levels of perceived stress were associated 
with a decrease in suicidal thinking.   
 
 
Figure 7.2.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x perceived stress to predict change in suicidal 
thinking 
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7.4.4.2 Stressful life events as a moderator on the perfectionism-distress 
relationship  
7.4.4.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, stressful life events as a main 
effect, were predictive of anxiety (β = .13, t (204) = 2.26, p = .025), depression (β = 
.14, t (204) = 2.51, p = .013) and dysphoria (β = .15, t (204) = 2.86, p = .005).  The 
interaction between self-oriented perfectionism and stressful life events was 
predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .10, t (204) = 2.40, p = .017) and dysphoria 
(β = .11, t (204) = 2.17, p = .031).   A plot of the lines of best fit for these interactions 
can be seen in Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4, respectively.  Post hoc examination of these 
interactions revealed that for hopelessness the low slope significantly differed from 
zero (β = -.15, t (204) = -2.38, p = .018).  Whilst for dysphoria, the high slope 
significantly differed from zero (β = .18, t (204) = 2.57, p = .011).  Thus, under low 
levels of stressful life events, low self-oriented perfectionists experienced a greater 
increase in hopelessness between T1 and T2 compared to high self-oriented 
perfectionists.  Whilst under high levels of stressful life events, high self-oriented 
perfectionists experienced a greater increase in dysphoria compared to low self-
oriented perfectionists.  It is worth noting that under low stress, both low and high 
self-oriented perfectionists report lower levels of dysphoria compared to under high 
stress.   
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Figure 7.3.  Self-oriented perfectionism x stressful life events to predict change in hopelessness T2 
 
 
Figure 7.4.  Self-oriented perfectionism x stressful life events to predict change in dysphoria 
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7.4.4.2.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, stressful life events as a main 
effect were predictive of change in anxiety (β = .13, t (204) = 2.32, p = .021) and 
dysphoria (β = .11, t (204) = 2.03, p = .043) and showed a trend approaching 
significance to predict depression (β = .11, t (204) = 1.83, p = .068).  Also as a main 
effect, socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of dysphoria (β = .13, t (204) 
= 2.50, p = .013).  The interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism and 
stressful life events showed a trend approaching significance to predict change in 
depression (β = .11, t (204) = 1.96, p = .052) and dysphoria (β = .100, t (204) = 1.93, 
p = .055).   
 
7.4.4.3 Brooding rumination as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
7.4.4.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect 
brooding rumination was predictive of change in suicidal thinking (β = .13, t (204) = 
2.48, p = .014) and depression (β = .13, t (204) = 2.17, p = .031).  No interaction 
effects between self-oriented perfectionism and brooding rumination were predictive 
of change in any measure of distress. 
 
7.4.4.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect 
socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of change in dysphoria (β = .13, t 
(204) = 2.42, p = .016).  The interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism 
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and brooding was predictive of change in anxiety (β =.16, t (204) = 2.78, p = .006), 
dysphoria (β = .13, t (208) = 2.32, p = .022) and suicidal thinking (β = .17, t (204) = 
3.42, p = .001).   Plots of the lines of best fit for these interactions can be seen in 
Figure 7.5, Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7, respectively.   Post hoc examination revealed 
that in the interactions predicting anxiety (β = .18, t (204) = 2.40, p = .017) and 
dysphoria (β = .25, t (204) = 3.46, p = .001) the high slopes significantly differed 
from zero.  In the interaction to predict suicidal thinking, both the high (β = .15, t 
(204) = 2.37, p = .019) and the low slopes (β = -.15, t (204) = -2.34, p = .021) 
significantly differed from zero.  Thus, high brooding was associated with increased 
anxiety, dysphoria and suicidal thinking in high social perfectionists, compared to low 
social perfectionists.  In addition, low brooding was associated with increased suicidal 
thinking for low social perfectionists compared to high social perfectionists.   
 
 
Figure 7.5.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x brooding rumination to predict change in anxiety 
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Figure 7.6.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x brooding rumination to predict change in 
dysphoria 
 
 
Figure 7.7.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x brooding rumination to predict change in suicidal 
thinking 
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7.4.4.4 Reflection as a moderator in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
7.4.4.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
No main or interaction effects of self-oriented perfectionism or reflection were 
observed to predict change in any measure of distress. 
 
7.4.4.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect, 
socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of change in dysphoria (β = .14, t 
(204) = 2.48, p = .014).  The interaction between socially prescribed perfectionism 
and reflection was predictive of anxiety (β = .16, t (204) = 2.89, p = .004).  A plot of 
the lines of best fit for this interaction can be seen in Figure 7.8.  Post hoc analyses of 
this interaction revealed that the high slope significantly differed from zero (β = .18, t 
(204) = 2.52, p = .013).  In other words, high reflection in combination with high 
social perfectionism was associated with increasing levels of anxiety between T1 and 
T2.   
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Figure 7.8.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x reflective rumination to predict change in anxiety 
 
 
7.4.4.5 Goal adjustment as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
7.4.4.5.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, the interaction between goal 
disengagement and self-oriented perfectionism was predictive of change in 
hopelessness (β = -.10, t (204) = -2.19, p = .03) and showed a trend towards 
significance to predict change in dysphoria (β = -.01, t (204) = -1.86, p = .065) and 
suicidal thinking (β = -.09, t (204) = -1.93, p = .056).  A plot of the lines of best fit for 
the significant interaction between goal disengagement and self-oriented 
perfectionism to predict hopelessness can be seen in Figure 7.9.  Post hoc analysis of 
this interaction revealed that the high slope showed a trend towards significantly 
differing from zero (β = -.12, t (204) = -1.95, p = .052).  In other words, high self-
oriented perfectionists who tended to disengage from goals showed a trend towards 
lower hopelessness compared to low self-oriented perfectionists who were also high 
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on goal disengagement.  The interaction between goal reengagement and self-oriented 
perfectionism also showed a trend approaching significance (β = .10, t (204) = 1.90, p 
= .059) to predict change in anxiety.   
 
 
Figure 7.9.  Self-oriented perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in hopelessness 
 
7.4.4.5.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
After controlling for initial levels of distress, as a main effect socially oriented 
perfectionism was predictive of change in dysphoria (β = .13, t (204) = 2.38, p = 
.018).  Also as a main effect, goal reengagement showed a trend approaching 
significance to predict change in hopelessness (β = -.09, t (204) = -1.92, p = .056).  
The interaction between goal disengagement and socially prescribed perfectionism 
was predictive of change in anxiety (β = -.11, t (204) = -1.98, p = .050), depression (β 
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= -.13, t (204) = -2.29, p = .023) and dysphoria (β = -12, t (204) = -2.32, p = .021).   
Plots of the lines of best fit for this interaction can be seen in Figure 7.10, Figure 7.11 
and Figure 7.12.  Post hoc examination of these interactions revealed that for 
depression (β = .20, t (204) = 2.39, p = .018) and dysphoria (β = .25, t (204) = 3.16, p 
= .002) the low slopes significantly differed from zero and for anxiety (β = .17, t (204) 
= 1.97, p = .051) the low slope showed a trend towards significantly differing from 
zero.  Thus, for high social perfectionists, an inability to disengage from goals was 
associated with increased anxiety, depression and dysphoria.   
 
 
Figure 7.10.  Socially prescribed perfection x goal disengagement to predict change in anxiety. 
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Figure 7.11.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in 
depression. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in 
dysphoria. 
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7.4.5 The effect of moderation in the rumination-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress 
7.4.5.1 Perceived stress as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
7.4.5.1.1 Brooding rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect, 
perceived stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .33, t (204) = 7.04, p = 
.0001), anxiety (β = .47, t (204) = 8.55, p = .0001), depression (β = .45, t (204) = 8.10, 
p = .0001), dysphoria (β = .58, t (204) = 10.56, p = .0001) and suicidal thinking (β = 
.21, t (204) = 4.52, p = .0001).   Also as a main effect, brooding rumination was 
predictive of change in hopelessness (β = -.12, t (204) = -2.51, p = .013).  The 
interaction between brooding rumination and perceived stress was predictive of 
change in hopelessness (β = .18, t (204) = 4.16, p = .0001), dysphoria (β = .11, t (204) 
= 2.49, p = .014) and suicidal thinking (β = .38, t (204) = 8.33, p = .0001) and showed 
a trend towards significance to predict anxiety (β = .10, t (204) = 1.96, p = .051).   
Plots of the lines of best fit for these significant interactions can be seen in Figure 
7.13, Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15.  Post hoc examination revealed, that for the 
interaction predicting change in hopelessness, the low slope significantly differed 
from zero (β = -.25, t (204) = -4.07, p = .0001) and for the interaction predicting 
change in dysphoria, the low slope showed a trend towards significance (β = -.13, t 
(204) = -1.90, p = .059).   For the interaction predicting change in suicidal thinking 
both the high (β = .32 t (204) = 5.69, p = .001) and the low slopes (β = -.26, t (204) = -
4.23, p = .0001) significantly differed from zero.  Thus, under low levels of perceived 
stress, high brooding was associated with decreased hopelessness, dysphoria and 
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suicidal thinking from T1 to T2.  Whilst under high levels of perceived stress high 
brooding was associated with increased suicidal thinking between T1 and T2.   
 
Figure 7.13.  Brooding rumination x perceived stress to predict change in hopelessness 
 
 
Figure 7.14.  Brooding rumination x perceived stress to predict change in dysphoria 
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Figure 7.15.  Brooding rumination x perceived stress to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
7.4.5.1.2 Reflective rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect, 
perceived stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .28, t (204) = 5.93, p = 
.0001), anxiety (β = .45, t (204) = 7.98, p = .0001), depression (β = .46, t (204) = 8.27, 
p = .0001), dysphoria (β = .58, t (204) = 10.32, p = .0001) and suicidal thinking (β = 
.18, t (204) = 3.53, p = .001).  The interaction between reflection and perceived stress 
was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .94, t (204) = 2.13, p = .034) and 
suicidal thinking (β = .20, t (204) = 4.03, p = .0001).   A plot of the lines of best fit for 
these interactions can be seen in Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.17 respectively.  Post hoc 
analysis of these interactions showed that for suicidal thinking both the high (β = .17, 
t (204) = 2.59, p = .010) and the low (β = -.14, t (204) = -2.36, p = .019) slopes 
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significantly differed from zero.  However for hopelessness neither the high (β = .07, t 
(204) = 1.31, n.s.) nor the low slope (β = -.07, t (204) = -1.28, n.s.) significantly 
differed from zero.  In other words, high reflection was associated with increased 
suicidal thinking when combined with high levels of perceived stress, however the 
opposite pattern is observed for high reflection combined with low perceived stress, 
as this is associated with decreasing suicidal thinking.  A similar, non-significant, 
trend was observed for hopelessness.   
 
 
Figure 7.16.  Reflective rumination x perceived stress to predict change in hopelessness 
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Figure 7.17.  Reflective rumination x perceived stress to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
7.4.5.2 Stressful life events as a moderator in the rumination-distress relationship  
7.4.5.2.1 Brooding rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for initial distress and gender, as main effect, stressful life 
events were predictive of change in depression (β = .14, t (204) = 2.52, p = .013), 
dysphoria (β = .14, t (204) = 2.61, p = .010) and anxiety (β = .12, t (204) = 2.20, p = 
.029).  Also as a main effect, brooding was predictive of change in suicidal thinking 
(β = .12, t (204) = 2.26, p = .025) and showed a trend towards significance to predict 
change in depression (β = .12, t (204) = 1.91, p = .057).  The interaction between 
brooding and stressful life events was predictive of change in suicidal thinking (β = 
.10, t (204) = 2.05, p = .042) and showed a trend approaching significance to predict 
change in depression (β = .10, t (204) = 1.77, p = .078).  A plot of the lines of best fit 
for the interaction between brooding and stressful life events to predict suicidal 
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thinking can be seen in Figure 7.18.  Post hoc examination of this interaction revealed 
that the high slope significantly differed from zero (β = .21, t (204) = 3.20, p = .002).  
In other words, high brooding was associated with increased suicidal thinking, but 
only when combined with high levels of stressful life events.   
 
 
Figure 7.18.  Brooding rumination x stressful life events to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
7.4.5.2.2 Reflective rumination-distress relationship  
After controlling for initial levels of distress and gender, as a main effect, 
stressful life events were predictive of change in depression (β = .15, t (204) = 2.58, p 
= .011), dysphoria (β = .14, t (204) = 2.55, p = .012) and anxiety (β = .11, t (204) = 
2.03, p = .044).  Also as a main effect, reflection was predictive of depression (β = 
.13, t (204) = 2.10, p = .037).  No significant interaction effects between reflective 
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rumination and stressful life events were predictive of change in any measure of 
distress.    
  
7.4.5.3 Goal adjustment as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
7.4.5.3.1 Brooding rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for time one distress and gender, as a main effect, brooding 
rumination was predictive of change in depression (β = .14, t (204) = 2.32, p = .022) 
and suicidal thinking (β = .15, t (204) = 2.72, p = .007).  However no significant 
interactions between goal adjustment and brooding were observed.   
 
7.4.5.3.2 Reflective rumination-distress relationship 
After controlling for time one distress and gender, the interaction between 
reflection and goal disengagement was showed a trend towards significance to predict 
change in suicidal thinking (β = -.09, t (204) = -1.82, p = .07).  However, no other 
interactions or main effects were observed.   
 
7.4.6 Moderation Summary 
With regards to the effects of moderation in relationship between 
perfectionism and distress:  Perceived stress was found to moderate the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal thinking, whilst stressful life 
events moderated the relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and both 
hopelessness and dysphoria.  Brooding was shown to moderate the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, dysphoria and suicidal 
thinking.  In contrast, reflection was found to moderate only the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety.  Goal disengagement moderated the 
  
174 
relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and hopelessness in addition to the 
relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, depression and 
dysphoria.   
Perceived stress was found to moderate the relationship between brooding and 
hopelessness, dysphoria and suicidal thinking.  Perceived stress also moderated the 
relationship between reflection and hopelessness and suicidal thinking.  Stressful life 
events moderated the relationship between brooding and suicidal thinking, but did not 
moderate the relationship between reflection and any type of distress.   
 
7.4.7 Mediation Analyses 
Mediation effects were examined through a series of regression analyses 
following the procedure outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986) and Kenny and 
colleagues (1998) (see section 5.4.12 for a more detailed explanation).   
Similar to the analyses examining moderation, we conducted analyses to 
predict distress at T2, after controlling for distress at T1.   Again gender was also 
controlled for in all analyses involving either component of rumination.   
 
7.4.8 The effect of mediation in the perfectionism-distress relationship when 
predicting change in distress at T2 
7.4.8.1 Perceived stress as a mediator of the perfectionism-distress relationship  
7.4.8.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
Self-oriented perfectionism was not significantly predictive of perceived stress 
(β = .01, t (204) = .14, n.s.) meaning the first condition of meditation was not met.  
Consequently, perceived stress did not mediate the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and any measure of distress.   
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7.4.8.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
After controlling for dysphoria at T1, socially prescribed perfectionism was 
predictive of dysphoria at T2 (β = .15, t (204) = 2.67, p = .008).  The addition of 
perceived stress in the next step of the analysis explained an additional 18.8% of the 
variance (β = .57, t (204) = 10.26, p = .0001) and reduced the beta weight of socially 
prescribed perfectionism (β = .10, t (204) = 2.14, p = .033).  A Sobel test confirmed 
this reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 3.77, p = .0002) indicating partial 
mediation (see Figure 7.19).  However, perceived stress did not mediate the 
relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and any other measure of 
distress.   
 
 
Figure 7.19.  The mediating effect of perceived stress on the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and dysphoria 
 
7.4.8.2 Stressful life events as a mediator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
7.4.8.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
Self-oriented perfectionism was not significantly predictive of stressful life 
events (β = .03, t (204) = .43, n.s.) thus the first condition of mediation was not 
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fulfilled.  As a result, stressful life events did not mediate the relationship between 
self-oriented perfectionism and any measure of distress. 
 
7.4.8.2.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
After controlling for initial levels of dysphoria, socially prescribed 
perfectionism was predictive of dysphoria at T2 (β = .15, t (204) = 2.67, p = .008).  
The addition of stressful life events in the next step of the analysis explained an 
additional 1.2% of variance (β = .13, t (204) = 2.38, p = .018) and reduced the beta 
weight of socially prescribed perfectionism (β = .13, t (204) = 2.35, p = .020).  A 
Sobel test confirmed that this reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 1.99, p = 
.05) indicating partial mediation (see Figure 7.20).  However, stressful life events did 
not mediate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and any other 
measure of distress.   
 
Figure 7.20.  The mediating effect of stressful life events on the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and dysphoria 
 
 
7.4.8.3 Brooding rumination as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
7.4.8.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
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Self-oriented perfectionism was not a significant predictor of brooding 
rumination (β = -.01, t (204) = -.22, n.s.) meaning the first condition of mediation was 
not met.  Consequently, brooding rumination did not mediate the relationship between 
self-oriented perfectionism and any measure of distress. 
 
7.4.8.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
Brooding rumination was not found to mediate the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and any measure of distress. 
 
7.4.8.4 Reflective rumination as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
7.4.8.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
Self-oriented perfectionism was not significantly predictive of reflection (β = 
.08, t (204) = 1.22, n.s.) meaning the first condition of mediation was not met.  Thus, 
reflection did not mediate the relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and 
any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.8.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
The full conditions of mediation were not met for reflection with regards the 
relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.8.5 Goal adjustment as a mediator of the perfectionism distress relationship 
7.4.8.5.1 Self-oriented perfectionism 
Neither goal disengagement nor goal reengagement met the criteria to mediate 
the relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and distress.  
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7.4.8.5.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism 
Neither goal disengagement nor goal reengagement met the criteria to mediate 
the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  
 
7.4.9 The effect of mediation in the rumination-distress relationship when predicting 
change in distress at T2 
7.4.9.1 Perceived stress as a mediator in the rumination-distress relationship 
7.4.9.1.1 Brooding rumination 
After controlling for gender and initial levels of depression, brooding was 
predictive of change in depression (β = .14, t (204) = 2.20, p = .029).  The addition of 
perceived stress in the next step of the analysis explained an additional 14.3% of 
variance (β = .46, t (204) = 8.15, p = .0001) and reduced the beta weight of brooding 
to non-significance (β = -.01, t (204) = -.20, n.s.).  A Sobel test confirmed this 
reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 5.64, p<.0001) indicating full mediation 
(see Figure 7.21). 
 
 
Figure 7.21.  The mediating effect of perceived stress on the relationship between brooding 
rumination and depression 
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After controlling for gender and initial levels of suicidal thinking, brooding 
was predictive of change in suicidal thinking (β = .13, t (204) = 2.50, p = .013).  The 
addition of perceived stress in the next step of the analysis accounted for a further 
2.4% of variance (β = .19, t (204) = 3.52, p = .001) and reduced the beta weight of 
brooding rumination to non-significance (β = .07, t (204) = 1.33, n.s.).  A Sobel test 
confirmed this reduction in beta weight was significant (Z = 3.19, p = .001) indicating 
full mediation (see Figure 7.22).   
 
 
Figure 7.22.  The mediating effect of perceived stress on the relationship between brooding 
rumination and suicidal thinking 
 
7.4.9.1.2 Reflective rumination 
The conditions of mediation were not met with regards to perceived stress as a 
possible mediator of the relationship between reflection and any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.9.2 Stressful life events as a mediator of the rumination-distress relationship 
7.4.9.2.1 Brooding rumination 
After controlling for gender and initial levels of depression, brooding 
rumination was predictive of change in depression (β = .14, t (204) = 2.20, p = .029).  
The addition of stressful life events in the next step of the analysis accounted for an 
Brooding 
Rumination 
 
Perceived 
Stress 
 
 
Suicidal 
Thinking 
 
.13* 
.19*** .48*** 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
  
180 
additional 1.3% of variance (β = .13, t (204) = 2.36, p = .019) and reduced the beta 
weight of brooding rumination (β = .13, t (204) = 2.21, p = .029).  However a Sobel 
test revealed that this reduction in beta weight was not significant (Z = 1.58, n.s.) 
indicating mediation had not occurred.  Stressful life events did not mediate the 
relationship between brooding rumination and any other measure of distress. 
   
7.4.9.2.2 Reflective rumination 
Reflective rumination was not significantly predictive of stressful life events 
(β = .07, t (204) = 1.00, n.s.), meaning the first condition of mediation was not met.  
Consequently stressful life events did not mediate the relationship between reflective 
rumination and any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.9.3 Goal adjustment as a mediator in the rumination-distress relationship 
7.4.9.3.1 Brooding rumination 
Neither goal disengagement nor goal reengagement was found to mediate the 
relationship between brooding rumination and any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.9.3.2 Reflective rumination 
Neither goal disengagement nor goal reengagement was found to mediate the 
relationship between reflective rumination and any measure of distress.   
 
7.4.10 Mediation Summary 
Perceived stress was found to partially mediate the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and dysphoria.  Similarly, stressful live events also 
partially mediated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and 
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dysphoria.    Neither brooding nor reflection were found to mediate the perfectionism-
distress relationship.  Likewise, goal adjustment was not found to mediate the 
perfectionism-distress relationship.   
Perceived stress was found to fully mediate the relationship between brooding 
and both depression and suicidal thinking.  However, stressful life events were not 
found to mediate the relationship between brooding and any measure of distress.  
Similarly, neither measure of stress was found to mediate the relationship between 
reflection and distress.  Goal adjustment was not found to mediate the relationships 
between either brooding or reflection and distress.   
 
7.5 Discussion 
The three aims of this study were: (i) to examine whether the relationships 
between rumination, perfectionism, goal adjustment and stress, observed in study one, 
would hold for the two components of rumination: brooding and reflection;  (ii) to 
determine whether the impact of stress on the relationship between both perfectionism 
and rumination and distress varied according to the measure of stress and; (iii)  to 
examine the impact of goal adjustment on the relationship between perfectionism and 
distress in an attempt to clarify previous conflicting findings.  The extent to which our 
hypotheses are supported and how our findings fit in with previous research are 
detailed below.   
 
7.5.1 The effect of stress on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that both perceived stress and stressful life events would 
moderate the relationship between self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism 
and distress.  We found limited support for this hypothesis, as perceived stress 
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moderated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal 
thinking, whilst stressful life events moderated the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and both hopelessness and dysphoria.  Previous research has reported a 
similar variation in the impact of stress on the relationship between the different 
dimensions of perfectionism and distress, dependant on the type of stress measured.  
As noted in section 2.4.3, Hewitt & Flett (1993) propose the specific vulnerability 
hypothesis where socially prescribed perfectionism is posited to interact with 
interpersonal stressors to predict increased distress, whilst self-oriented perfectionism 
interacts with attainment related stressors to predict increased distress.  The measures 
of stress in the present study do not appear to map directly onto the stressors cited by 
the specific vulnerability hypothesis, as our measure of perceived stress is not specific 
to interpersonal stressors (i.e. the scale included items such as ‘How often have you 
found yourself thinking about things that you have to accomplish?’ or ‘How often 
have you found that you could not cope with all the things you had to do?’), nor is our 
measure of stressful life events restricted to attainment related stressors (i.e. the scale 
included events such as ‘Major argument with parents’ or ‘Break up with 
boy/girlfriend’).  Nevertheless, it is possible that the predominant focus of each scale 
reflected this difference, or the way in which participants responded to each measure 
reflected this difference.  However, we had no reason to pre-suppose that this would 
be the case and it is a purely speculative explanation.  Each scale has also been 
previously used in university student populations (e.g. Clements & Turpin, 1996; 
Cohen et al., 1983) so this is unlikely to explain the differing findings.  Regardless of 
whether our findings are explained by the specific vulnerability hypothesis, our results 
certainly suggest differences between the two measures of stress adding further 
support to the notion that measures of perceived stress and checklist measures of 
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stressful life events are tapping into varying constructs (see section 4.2.5 for a more 
detailed discussion).   
We also hypothesised that both perceived stress and stressful life events would 
mediate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  Our 
findings supported this hypothesis as both perceived stress and stressful life events 
partially mediated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and 
dysphoria.  This indicates that the differences between the two measures of stress may 
be observed for moderating relationships as opposed to mediating relationships.  A 
consideration of the differences between mediating and moderating relationships can 
explain this apparent discrepancy.  A mediating effect of stress, on the relationship 
between perfectionism and distress, implies that perfectionism generates stress and 
that this, in turn, increases distress.  In contrast, a moderating effect of stress, on the 
relationship between perfectionism and distress, implies that the experience of stress 
amplifies the negative consequences associated with perfectionism.  Thus, our results 
suggest that socially prescribed perfectionism generates both perceived stress and 
stressful life events.  However, the negative consequences of socially prescribed 
perfectionism are only further amplified by the experience of perceived stress, whilst 
the negative consequences of self-oriented perfectionism are only further amplified by 
stressful life events.   
 
7.5.2 The effect of brooding and reflective rumination on the perfectionism-distress 
relationship 
We hypothesised that brooding would fully mediate the relationship between 
both self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  We also 
hypothesised that reflection would partially mediate the relationship between both 
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self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  However, contrary to 
these hypotheses neither brooding nor reflection was found to mediate the 
perfectionism-distress relationship.  This is in contrast to previous work by O’Connor 
and colleagues (2007) and Harris and colleagues (2008).  O’Connor and colleagues 
(2007) found that brooding fully or partially mediated the effects of both socially 
prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism on a number of measures of distress.  
Harris and colleagues (2008) also found that brooding fully mediated the relationship 
between maladaptive perfectionism and distress, whilst reflection partially mediated 
this relationship.  Harris and colleagues modified the rumination scale of the 
Response Style Questionnaire to specifically examine ruminations following a poor 
test score, as opposed to the more general tendency to ruminate in response to sad or 
negative mood.  It is possible that this modification may explain the conflicting results 
between the present study and Harris and colleagues.    However, it is less obvious 
why our results vary from those of O’Connor and colleagues (2007).  Unlike the 
present research, O’Connor and colleagues did not control for the effect of gender in 
their analyses, however they report that there were no differences between males and 
females on any of their measures, suggesting this is unlikely to explain the differences 
in findings.  Another possibility is that the follow up period in the present research 
was longer than in O’Connor and colleagues study which may have influenced the 
findings.  However, this difference was fairly minimal, around three weeks on 
average, so it is debateable whether this can account for the variation between our in 
findings.  Another difference between the current findings and that of O’Connor and 
colleagues is the age of participants, as participants were on average one year older in 
the present study.  It is possible that this difference in age may have impacted on our 
results as a reflection of the different adjustment issues experienced by undergraduate 
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students at different stages in their university careers.  Certainly, future research in 
this area could attempt to replicate and clarify this further.   
With regards moderation, we hypothesised that brooding rumination would 
moderate the relationship between both self-oriented and socially prescribed 
perfectionism and distress.    Our results partially supported this hypothesis, as 
brooding rumination moderated the relationship between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and anxiety, dysphoria and suicidal thinking, such that increased 
brooding combined with increased socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of 
higher levels of distress.  Similarly, we found that reflective rumination moderated the 
relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, such that 
increased reflection combined with increased socially prescribed perfectionism was 
associated with higher levels of anxiety.  This is in line with the findings of study one 
in this thesis, where rumination as a whole was found to moderate the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal thinking.  It has been 
suggested that brooding may be the maladaptive component of rumination, whilst 
reflection may be the adaptive component.  However, the results of the current study 
suggest that both brooding and reflection can augment the negative consequences 
associated with socially prescribed perfectionism to predicted increased levels of 
distress, albeit that, for brooding, this effect generalised to more measures of distress.  
Thus, for social perfectionists, both components of rumination appear to be 
maladaptive.   
 
7.5.3 The effect of goal adjustment on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
As hypothesised, goal adjustment did not mediate the perfectionism-distress 
relationship.  We hypothesised that both goal disengagement and goal reengagement 
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would moderate the effects of socially prescribed perfectionism on distress.  This was 
partially supported by our results as goal disengagement moderated the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, depression and dysphoria.  In 
each instance the inability to disengage from unattainable goals, in conjunction with 
socially prescribed perfectionism was predictive of increased distress.   
We had also hypothesised that goal disengagement would moderate the 
relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and distress.  This was supported by 
the finding that goal disengagement moderated the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and hopelessness.  In addition, we also found a trend towards 
significance for goal reengagement to interact with self-oriented perfectionism to 
predict change in anxiety.    
These findings are contrary to previous cross-sectional research by O’Connor 
and Forgan (2007) who found that goal reengagement both mediated and moderated 
the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal thinking.  Our 
results however, are consistent with the prospective findings of study one in this thesis 
(Chapter 5) where goal disengagement was found to moderate the relationship 
between both socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism and distress.  The 
findings of the present study indicate that goal disengagement, as opposed to goal 
reengagement, is more associated with distress over time.   
 
7.5.4 The effect of stress on the rumination-distress relationship 
We made no specific hypotheses regarding the impact of either perceived 
stress or stressful life events on the relationship between either brooding or reflection 
and distress.  However it was possible that the impact of stress on the relationship 
between rumination and distress could vary according to either the measure of stress 
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(i.e. perceived stress v. stressful life events), the component of rumination (i.e. 
brooding v. reflective rumination) or the type of relationship under study (i.e. 
moderating v. mediating).  We consider each of these possibilities in turn below. 
First, we consider the differences between our two measures of stress as 
moderators in the relationship between rumination and distress.  We found that 
perceived stress moderated the relationship between brooding rumination and 
hopelessness, dysphoria and suicidal thinking, whilst stressful life events moderated 
the relationship between brooding rumination and suicidal thinking.  In each instance, 
increased brooding combined with increased stress was predictive of higher distress.  
Thus, for the relationship between brooding rumination and distress, both measures of 
stress showed a moderating effect, although for our measure of perceived stress this 
effect generalised to more types of distress.  With regards to the impact of different 
measures of stress as moderators of relationship between reflection and distress, 
perceived stress moderated the relationship between reflection and both hopelessness 
and suicidal thinking, however a similar pattern was not observed for stressful life 
events.  This fits with previous research which has found the negative consequences 
of rumination as a whole are amplified by perceived stress (Morrison & O’Connor, 
2005, 2008a) and suggests that both the brooding and the reflective components of 
rumination can be associated with distress when combined with higher levels of 
perceived stress.   Again the differences between our two measures of stress are 
highlighted as stressful life events did not interact with reflective rumination to 
predict distress, unlike perceived stress.   
Second, we consider the impact of our two different measures of stress as 
mediators in the relationship between rumination and distress.  Perceived stress fully 
mediated the relationship between brooding and both depression and suicidal 
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thinking.  In contrast, stressful life events did not mediate the relationship between 
brooding and any measure of distress.  Neither measure of stress was found to 
mediate the relationship between reflective rumination and distress.  Thus, for the 
relationship between brooding and distress, only perceived stress mediated this 
relationship, again illustrating the differences in our two measures of stress.  This 
finding also highlights some differences between the two components of rumination 
as perceived stress only mediated the relationship between brooding and distress.  
Thus, our results illustrate that although both brooding and reflection can result in 
increased distress when combined with stress, only brooding rumination could 
potentially generate perceived stress, which in turn may contribute to increased 
depression and suicidal thinking.  This may explain why brooding rumination is the 
component most often associated with distress and why brooding, not reflection, has 
been associated with distress over time (e.g. Treynor et al., 2003).   
 
7.5.5 The effect of goal adjustment on the rumination-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that goal adjustment would not mediate the relationship 
between brooding or reflection and distress and our results were consistent with this 
hypothesis.  We also hypothesised that goal disengagement would moderate the 
relationship between both brooding and reflective rumination and hopelessness and 
suicidal thinking.  We found partial support for this hypothesis, as there was a trend 
towards significance for goal disengagement to moderate the relationship between 
reflective rumination and suicidal thinking.  This fits with the findings of study one in 
this thesis (see section 5.4.10.2), where goal disengagement was shown to moderate 
the effect of rumination on hopelessness and suicidal thinking.  The results of the 
present study suggest it is the influence of goal disengagement on the reflective 
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component of rumination which results in an impact on distress.  This is perhaps not 
surprising as reflection is considered to be the component of rumination most 
associated with problem solving.  In situations where goals become unattainable, the 
best solution to this problem is often to abandon the goal, however a difficulty with 
goal disengagement will disrupt this process and this in turn, is likely to disrupt the 
problem solving process of reflection, leading to an increase in distress.   
 
7.5.6 Limitations 
Three main limitations of this research should be noted.  First, the research 
used a sample of healthy young adults, thus the extent to which are results are 
replicable beyond this population is unknown.  However, research has identified 
elevated levels of distress being reported by university students (Furr et al., 2001) 
suggesting there is a need for research to target this population and to allow the 
identification of possible areas for intervention.  In addition, study four in this thesis 
will address the possible limitation of focussing on a healthy young adult sample by 
employing a clinical sample of parasuicide patients.   
A second potential limitation of this research is the reliance on self-report 
measures which may be subject to social desirability biases.  However, given that 
interaction effects emerged from the data, it seems unlikely that social desirability 
confounded our results.   
A final limitation of this research relates to the difference in distress between 
T1 and T2.  Although dysphoria and suicidal thinking significantly decreased from T1 
to T2, the effect size of this decrease was very small; this limited the power of the 
present study and may have increased the likelihood of type II error.  Although 
previous research has detected significant differences with similar effect sizes (e.g.  
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O’Connor et al., (2007) replication of this research using a larger sample could help to 
negate this potential weakness.   
 
7.5.7 Implications and future directions  
Despite the limitations noted above, there are a number of implications from 
this research.  First, we highlight the differing findings between measures of 
perceived stress and a checklist measure of life events.  In the current research, 
perceived stress was more frequently found to mediate and/or moderate the 
relationships both perfectionism and rumination with distress.  This suggests that our 
measure of perceived stress may provide a more useful measure for future research in 
this area, as opposed to a checklist measure of stressful life events.   
Second, this research also highlights the differences between brooding and 
reflective rumination.  Although for social perfectionists, both brooding and 
rumination were maladaptive, the present findings show that brooding, but not 
reflection generated perceived stress which in turn was predictive of increased 
distress.   In contrast, goal disengagement was found to moderate the relationship 
between reflective rumination and suicidal thinking, indicating that the reflective 
component of rumination is more associated with suicidal thinking when combined 
with a failure to disengage from important goals.   These differential findings 
highlight the need to consider the two components of rumination separately as this 
will improve the specificity of our understanding of the predictors of distress, which 
in turn can be used to aid the development of techniques aimed at reducing distress 
with at-risk individuals.   
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Future research should aim to examine whether the relationships observed in 
this study can be replicated in a clinical sample.  Consequently, study four in this 
thesis employs a clinical sample of participants.   
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8 Study Four:  A clinical study examining moderating and mediating 
effects in the relationships between both rumination and 
perfectionism and distress 
8.1 Abstract 
Objectives.  This study aimed to examine the mediating and moderating 
relationships previously observed in studies one and three in the context of a clinical 
population.   
Design.  A test-retest design was used.  The prospective nature of this study 
allowed for the prediction of distress over time after controlling for initial levels of 
distress.   
Method.  One hundred and fifty one parasuicide patients were recruited from a 
general hospital at time one and completed measures of attentional bias, 
perfectionism, rumination, goal adjustment, stress and psychological distress.  At time 
two, 76 participants re-completed self report measures of stress and psychological 
distress.   
Results.  Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were used to examine 
mediating and moderating relationships.  Logistic regression was used to examine 
those variables associated with self-harming behaviour in the follow up period.   
Conclusions.  Evidence was found to support a number of relationships 
observed in studies one and three, extending these findings to a clinical population.  
Other relationships were not replicated in the present study and possible reasons for 
this are discussed.   
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8.2 Introduction 
Studies one (Chapter 5) and three (Chapter 7) of this thesis have examined the 
role of a number of cognitive and personality variables in predicting psychological 
distress and suicidal thinking in student populations, with a view to informing theory 
as prescribed in the initial ‘pre-clinical’ phase of the Medical Research Council’s 
framework for developing complex interventions (MRC, 2000).  The logical 
progression from these analogue studies is to examine whether these relationships 
also hold in a clinical sample of participants, who would be the likely recipients of 
any complex intervention based on the theory which is being informed.  To this end, 
an investigation of the role of the same cognitive and personality variables examined 
in studies one and three of this thesis, using a clinical, parasuicide population, is 
required.   
 
8.2.1 Influences on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
As outlined in section 2.4.2, the detrimental role of perfectionism in both 
student and clinical populations has been highlighted in previous research, albeit the 
evidence is more consistent for the socially prescribed dimension of perfectionism 
(e.g. Hunter & O’Connor, 2003) than for self-oriented (e.g. Hewitt et al., 1994) or 
other oriented perfectionism (e.g. Hewitt et al., 1998).    A number of variables have 
been outlined as having a possible impact on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
including stress, rumination, goal adjustment and attentional bias (see sections 2.4.3, 
2.4.4, 2.5.3 and 2.4.5 for full details).   
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8.2.1.1 Perceived Stress 
As discussed in section 2.4.3, stress may impact on the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress by either moderating or mediating the relationship.  With 
regards moderation, a diathesis-stress conceptualisation of the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress has received consistent support in the literature.  However 
this support has frequently come from studies using undergraduate student 
populations (e.g. Hewitt & Dyke, 1986, Flett et al., 1995; Chang & Rand, 2000), so 
the extent to which a diathesis-stress model can explain the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress in a clinical sample remains largely unexplored.   
Stress, as mediator of the relationship between perfectionism and distress, has 
received considerably less research attention (in comparison to research concerning 
moderation) and again, research using a clinical population is lacking.  Consequently, 
there is a need for prospective research using a clinical population to examine the 
possible moderating and mediating impacts of stress on the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress.   
 
8.2.1.2 Rumination 
Previous research has indicated a mediating effect of rumination in the 
relationship between both socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism and 
distress (Flett et al., 2002, O’Connor et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008).  More 
specifically, the brooding component of rumination has been shown to fully or 
partially mediate this relationship with a range of measures of distress (O’Connor et 
al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008), whilst reflection has been shown to partially mediate 
the relationship with depressive symptoms (Harris et al., 2008) (see section 2.4.4 for a 
more detailed discussion).  Study one in this thesis, provided further support for the 
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notion of rumination as a mediator, with rumination mediating the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and both suicidal thinking and anxiety (see 
section 5.4.13.3.2).  However, when the components of rumination were considered 
separately in Study 3, neither brooding nor reflection mediated the relationship 
between either self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism and distress (see 
sections 7.4.4.3 and 7.4.4.4).  However, to date, research examining the role of 
rumination as a mediator in the perfectionism-distress relationship has focussed on 
student or general population samples, thus the extent to which these findings can be 
replicated in a clinical population remains unknown.   
Studies one and three in this thesis also examined the role of rumination as 
moderator in the relationship between perfectionism and distress.  Rumination and 
both brooding and reflection separately moderated the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress (see sections 5.4.7.3.2, 7.4.4.3.2 and 7.4.4.4.2).  
Again, there is a need to replicate these findings in a clinical sample.   
 
8.2.1.3 Goal Adjustment 
Previous cross-sectional research has indicated that the reengagement 
component of goal adjustment both moderated and mediated the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal thinking (O’Connor & Forgan, 2007).  
Study one of this thesis partially supported these findings as goal reengagement 
moderated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal 
thinking.  However, goal disengagement also moderated the relationship between both 
self-oriented and socially prescribed perfection and suicidal thinking (see section 
5.4.7.2).  Consistent with this, in study three of this thesis, goal disengagement 
moderated the relationship between both socially prescribed and self-oriented 
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perfectionism and distress, but again no mediating effects were observed (see sections 
7.4.4.5 and 7.4.8.5).  All of the previous research examining the impact of goal 
adjustment on the relationship between perfectionism and distress has focussed on 
student populations, thus replication using a clinical sample is required.   
    
8.2.1.4 Attentional Bias 
To our knowledge, the only empirical research which has examined the role of 
attentional bias in the relationship between perfectionism and distress is study one of 
this thesis.  Positive attentional bias was found to moderate the effect of socially 
prescribed perfectionism on hopelessness, such that high positive attentional bias 
combined with high socially prescribed perfectionism was associated with increased 
hopelessness five weeks later (see section 5.4.7.4.2).  Again there is a need for 
research to attempt to replicate this finding in a clinical sample.   
 
8.2.2 Influences on the rumination-distress relationship 
As outlined in section 2.2.3, rumination has previously been linked with 
psychological distress in both student and clinical populations.  More recently, 
research has focussed on the components of rumination, brooding and reflection, and 
their role in psychological distress.  A number of cognitive and personality factors 
have been suggested which may impact on the relationship between rumination and 
distress including: stress, goal adjustment and attentional bias (see sections 2.2.3, 
2.5.4 and 2.3.3 for a more detailed description) 
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8.2.2.1 Perceived Stress 
Previous research has found perceived stress moderated the relationship 
between rumination and distress (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005; Morrison & 
O’Connor, 2008a).  This has been further supported by study one in this thesis, where 
stress moderated the relationship between rumination and suicidal thinking, in 
addition to mediating the relationship between rumination and distress (see sections 
5.4.9.1 and 5.4.15.1).  Study three in this thesis found that both perceived stress and 
stressful life events moderated the relationship between brooding and distress, whilst 
perceived stress only, moderated the relationship between reflection and distress.  In 
each instance, greater levels of either brooding or reflection, combined with greater 
stress, were predictive of increased distress (see sections 7.4.5.1 and 7.4.5.2).  
Perceived stress was also found to mediate the impact of brooding, but not reflection, 
on distress (see section 7.4.5.1).  Again the influence of stress on the relationship 
between rumination and distress has not been explored in a clinical population.   
 
8.2.2.2 Goal Adjustment 
The only research which has examined the role of goal adjustment in the 
rumination-distress relationship to the author’s knowledge is study one and study 
three of this thesis.  In study one, goal disengagement was found to moderate the 
relationship between rumination and distress (see sections 5.4.9.2 and 5.4.10.2), 
whilst study three found a non-significant trend for goal disengagement to moderate 
the relationship between reflection and suicidal thinking (see section 7.4.5.3.2).  No 
mediating effect of goal adjustment on the rumination-distress relationship was found 
(see sections 5.4.16.2 and 7.4.9.3) in either study one or study three.  As this research 
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was all conducted in a student population, further work is necessary to replicate these 
findings in a clinical sample.   
 
8.2.2.3 Attentional Bias 
As outlined in section 2.3.3, to date, little research has examined the 
relationship between rumination and attentional bias.  In particular the possibility of 
attentional bias a moderator or a mediator of the relationship between rumination and 
distress has been under researched.  Study one of this thesis examined both these 
possibilities, however neither positive nor negative attentional bias was found to 
moderate or mediate the relationship between rumination and distress in a student 
sample (see sections 5.4.9.3, 5.4.10.3, 5.4.15.3 and 5.4.16.3).  However, the extent to 
which attentional bias impacts on the relationship between the components of 
rumination, brooding and reflection, and distress remains unexplored.  In addition, it 
is unclear whether the findings of study one would be replicable in a clinical sample.  
 
8.2.3 Predicting behaviour 
Previous research examining the role of rumination and perfectionism in 
suicidality (and the cognitive variables which may moderate or mediate these effects) 
has focussed on the associations with suicidal thinking, as measured by standardised 
self-report measures.  A logical extension of this work would be to also examine the 
prospective associations with self-reported accounts of actual self-harming behaviour.   
 
8.2.4 Aims 
The two main aims of this study were:  First, to examine whether the variables 
observed as impacting on both the perfectionism-distress relationship and the 
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rumination-distress relationship in studies one and three were replicable in a clinical, 
parasuicide sample.   Second, to examine whether the cognitive and personality 
variables measured throughout this thesis were predictive of self-harming behaviour, 
beyond the measures of distress.   
 
8.2.5 Research questions and hypotheses 
1)  Does perceived stress moderate and/or mediate the relationship between 
socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism and distress in a clinical sample?  
Based on previous research in this area we hypothesised that perceived stress would 
moderate the relationship between both self-oriented and socially prescribed 
perfectionism and distress, such that increased levels of stress, combined with 
increased perfectionism would be associated with greater levels of distress.  We also 
hypothesised that perceived stress would mediate the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress.   
2) Does rumination mediate and/ or moderate the relationship between both 
socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism and distress in a clinical sample?  
Given, the previous findings in studies one and three of this thesis, we hypothesised 
that both brooding and reflection would moderate the relationship between socially 
prescribed (but not self-oriented) perfectionism and distress, such that higher levels of 
brooding and/or reflection in conjunction with higher socially prescribed 
perfectionism would be predictive of increased distress.  Given the conflicting 
previous findings regarding brooding and reflection as mediators of the perfectionism-
distress relationship we made no specific hypothesis in this area.   
3) Does goal adjustment mediate and/or moderate the relationship between 
both self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and distress in a clinical 
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sample?  In line with the findings of the previous prospective studies in this thesis, we 
hypothesised that there would be no mediating effect of goal adjustment in the 
relationship between either self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism and 
distress.  We also hypothesised that, in line with previous studies in this thesis, goal 
adjustment would moderate the relationship between both self-oriented and socially 
prescribed perfectionism and distress such that lower levels of goal adjustment 
combined with high levels of perfection, would be predictive of increased distress.   
4) Does attentional bias moderate and/or mediate the relationship between 
perfectionism and distress in a clinical sample?  In line with previous findings in this 
thesis, we hypothesised that positive attentional bias would moderate the effect of 
socially prescribed perfectionism on distress, such that increased positive attentional 
bias, combined with high socially prescribed perfectionism would be predictive of 
higher levels of distress.  Also in line with previous findings, we hypothesised that 
attentional bias would not mediate the perfectionism-distress relationship.   
5) Does perceived stress moderate and/or mediate the relationship between 
brooding and/or reflection and distress in a clinical sample?  Following previous 
research, we hypothesised that perceived stress would moderate the relationship 
between both brooding and reflective rumination and distress, such that increased 
brooding or reflection, when combined with greater levels of perceived stress, would 
be predictive of increased levels of distress.  In addition, we hypothesised that 
perceived stress would mediate the relationship between brooding and distress.   
6) Does goal adjustment moderate and/or mediate the relationship between 
brooding and/or reflection and distress in a clinical sample?  Following previous 
studies, we hypothesised that goal disengagement would moderate the impact of 
reflection on distress, such that an inability to disengage from goals combined with 
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increased reflection would be predictive of increased distress.  In addition, we 
hypothesised that goal adjustment would not mediate the impact of either brooding or 
reflection on distress.   
7) Does attentional bias moderate and/or mediate the relationship between 
brooding and/or rumination and distress in a clinical sample? We made no specific 
hypotheses due to a lack of research in this area 
8) Do any of the cognitive or personality variables under study in this 
research distinguish those participants who self-harm in the follow up period between 
T1 and T2, from those who do not?    We hypothesised that, in addition to higher 
initial levels of distress, our key variables of brooding, reflection, socially prescribed 
and self-oriented perfectionism would differentiate those who self-harmed from those 
who did not during the follow up period.   
 
8.3 Method 
8.3.1 Participants 
One hundred and fifty one participants were recruited at time one.  
Participants were recruited from the combined assessment ward of a general hospital 
following acute self-poisoning (88.7%), self-cutting (9.3%) or both (2%).  Participants 
were seen within 24-48 hours of admission depending on their medical circumstances.  
Exclusion criteria were limited to those: (i) aged under 16 years; (ii) unfit for 
interview; (iii) non-native English speakers and; (iv) unable to give informed consent.  
Eleven percent of potential participants declined to take part in the study.   
There were 60 males and 91 females in the sample, with a mean age of 34.07 
years (SD=13.40).  Males and females did not significantly differ in mean age (35.03 
years and 33.44 years respectively).  29.8% (n=45) of participants had no history of 
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self-harm, whilst 19.2% (n=29) had self harmed on one previous occasion, 9.9% 
(n=15) had self-harmed on two or three occasions previously and 41.1% (n=62) had 
harmed themselves four or more times in the past.  The majority of participants 
(76.2%) reported suicidal intent at the time of the self harm episode which had 
resulted in their hospital admission.  30.5% (n=46) of participants were married or 
living with a partner, whilst 50.3% (n=76) were single, 7.3% (n=11) divorced, 11.3% 
(n=17) separated and 0.7% (n=1) widowed.  The majority of participants (6.1.6%) 
were given a psychiatric diagnosis at the time of admission.  A figure illustrating the 
primary psychiatric diagnostic categories (according to the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Health Related Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10; World 
Health Organisation, 2007)) assigned to participants can be seen in Figure 8.1.  As 
can be seen from the figure, those participants receiving a psychiatric diagnosis were 
most frequently given a primary diagnosis of a mood (affective) disorder, followed by 
mental and behavioural disorders due to psychoactive substance use.   
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Figure 8.1.  Percentage of participants assigned to primary psychiatric diagnostic categories 
 
 
Seven participants were subsequently excluded from further analyses due to 
missing data for two or more complete measures.  This was mainly a consequence of 
testing being halted early to allow medical staff to conduct necessary procedures or by 
the arrival of visitors for the patient.  These excluded patients were not included in the 
follow up sample. 
Seventy-six participants completed selected self-report measures at time two 
(T2), an average of 81 days later (SD = 49.41), reflecting a 52.8% follow up rate at 
time two.   Participants who did not complete T2 measures did not differ from those 
who did with regards gender (χ2 = .25 (1), n.s.) marital status (χ2 = 9.05 (5), n.s.), 
frequency of previous self-harming behaviour (χ2 = 1.84 (2), n.s.), suicidal intent at 
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the time of self-harm (χ2 = 1.02 (2) n.s.) or psychiatric diagnosis (χ2 = 11.62 (6), n.s.).  
However, T2 non-completers were significantly younger (mean age = 28.65 years, SD 
= 11.45) than those who completed T2 (mean age = 38.17 years, SD = 13.45) (F (1, 
143) = 20.69, p<.0001).      
 
8.3.2 Measures 
Hopelessness.  The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester 
& Trexler, 1974) measured pessimism towards the future (e.g. ‘It’s very unlikely that 
I will get any real satisfaction in the future’) (see section 4.3.1 for more a more 
detailed description).  Satisfactory internal consistency was achieved in this sample at 
both time-points (Cronbach’s α = .90-.91).   
Anxiety and Depression.  The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) measured both depression and anxiety ( e.g. ‘I feel as if I 
am slowed down’ and ‘Worrying thoughts go through my mind’) (see section 4.3.2 
for more a more detailed description).  Cronbach’s alpha in this sample was 
satisfactory, as the anxiety and depression subscales at both time-points ranged from 
.69 to .89.   
Suicidal Thinking.  The Suicide Probability Scale (SPS; Cull & Gill, 1988) 
provided a measure of suicide ideation (e.g. ‘In order to punish others, I think of 
suicide’) (see section 4.3.4 for more a more detailed description).     Internal 
consistency in this sample was acceptable across administrations (range of 
Cronbach’s α = .71-.90).   
Rumination.  The original 22-item Response Style Questionnaire provided a 
measure of participants’ ruminative tendencies in negative situations.   Two subscales 
representing brooding and reflective rumination can be drawn from this measure, 
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following Treynor et al (2003) (see section 4.2.1 for a more detailed description).  
Internal consistency was .71 for the brooding subscale and .68 for the reflective 
subscale.   
Perfectionism.  A shortened version of Hewitt and Flett’s (1991) 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Cox et al., 2002) provided a 15-item measure 
of perfectionism (see section 4.2.2 for a more detailed description).  Internal 
consistency for the self-oriented and the socially prescribed perfectionism subscales in 
this sample was satisfactory (Cronbach’s α = .79 for both), however internal 
consistency for the other oriented perfectionism subscale was much lower at .47.   
Following the poor internal consistency of the other-oriented perfectionism subscale, 
this subscale was excluded from all analyses.   
Goal Adjustment.  The Goal Adjustment Scale (Wrosch, et al, 2003) provided 
a measure of both goal disengagement and goal reengagement (see section 4.2.3 for 
more a more detailed description).  Internal consistency in this sample across both 
subscales was adequate (range of Cronbach’s α = .73 - .89).   
Stress.  The Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983) provided a four item 
measure of perceived stress in both the two weeks preceding T1 and the weeks 
between T1 and T2 (see section 4.2.5 for a more detailed description).  Internal 
consistency in this sample was .66 at T1 and .84 at T2.   
Attentional Bias.  A dot-probe task (MacLeod et al, 1986) was used to provide 
a measure of attentional bias.  This followed the same procedure as in study one of 
this thesis, consisting of 8 baseline trials and 60 experimental trials.  Each trial in this 
task began with a fixation cross presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms.  This 
was followed by the simultaneous presentation of two words, one above and one 
below centre (in the baseline trials strings of the letter X were used instead of words).    
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The words were 3.5cm apart and remained on the screen for 750 ms. Immediately 
following the word pair presentation, a dot-probe appeared in the location of one of 
the previous words and participants used a response box to indicate the spatial 
position of the probe.  The participants’ response concluded each trial, and after a 
1000 ms rest, the next trial began.  Participants’ reaction times were measured and 
quicker reaction times were taken to indicate that participants were attending to the 
word previously in the same location as the probe.   
The words used in this task were selected from a standardised list created by 
John (1988).  Each positive and negative word was paired with a neutral word 
matched for length and frequency of usage.  Of the 60 experimental trials, 30 
consisted of positive-neutral word pairings and 30 consisted of negative-neutral word 
pairings.  The probe followed the neutral word in half of the trials, and followed the 
negative/positive word in the remainder of the trials.  The presentation order of the 
word-pairings was randomised.     
Demographic/Clinical Measures.  In addition to the standardised self report 
measures a number of demographic and clinical measures were also recorded.  
Participants were asked to describe the nature of the self-harm which had resulted in 
their hospital admission and whether they had previously self-harmed (if so, how 
often and by what method).  In addition, participants were asked whether they 
intended to kill themselves at the time of self harming (and whether they had intended 
to kill themselves on previous occasions of self-harm, if applicable).  We employed 
the suicidal intent question from Beck's Suicide Intent Scale (Beck et al., 1974a, b). 
Data from the participants’ medical records at the hospital was used to establish both 
current and previous psychiatric diagnoses.   Finally, at T2 participants were asked to 
report whether they had engaged in any self-harming behaviour since T1 and if so 
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they were asked to provide details regarding how often, how recently and what 
happened on the most recent occasion.   
 
8.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were approached by the researcher in hospital, usually within 24 
hours of admission.  The researcher briefly outlined the nature of the study and details 
of the procedure.  It was emphasised that participation was voluntary and confidential 
and that participants were free to withdraw at any time without given any reason, 
without their treatment protocol being affected in any way.  Consenting participants 
first completed the demographic variables through a semi-structured interview with 
the experimenter.  Next, participants completed the dot-probe task, which was 
presented on a laptop computer on a tray directly in front of participants at their 
hospital bedside.  This was followed by the completion of all self-report measures.  
Participants were given the option of the experimenter reading aloud the self-report 
measures and writing down their responses, with the majority preferring this option to 
completing the self-report measures themselves.   
After completing the first part of the study, participants were contacted again 
eight weeks later using a combination of letters, emails and telephone calls to 
maximise follow-up participation.  At time two, participants re-completed self-report 
measures of hopelessness, depression, anxiety, stress, suicidal thinking and self-
harming behaviour.    A flow chart of the procedure adopted in study four can be seen 
in Figure 8.2.   
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Figure 8.2.  Flow chart of study four procedure 
 
 
8.3.4 Power, sample and analytic strategy 
Linear hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to predict measures 
of distress at T2, whilst binary logistic regression analyses were used to examine 
which variables were associated with self-harming during the follow up period.  Our 
sample of 76 participants at follow up allows for the detection of a medium to large 
sized effect (f 2 = 0.28) with 95% power and a 5% level of significance in an analysis 
with five predictors.       
 
8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Differences in distress between T1 and T2 
As can be seen in Table 8.2, each measure of distress decreased from T1 to 
T2.  Paired t-tests were used to examine change in distress between T1 and T2 and 
revealed that hopelessness (t (75) = 3.12, p <.01), depression (t (75) = 2.52, p<.05), 
and suicidal thinking (t (75) = 3.10, p <.01), but not anxiety (t (75) = 1.41, n.s.), all 
significantly decreased from T1 to T23.   Table 8.1 illustrates the effect sizes for those 
differences in distress between T1 and T2.   
                                                 
3
 Additional analyses were also conducted to examine whether there was any effect of gender on 
changes in distress between T1 and T2.  Repeated measures ANOVAs found no interaction between 
gender and time for any of the measures of distress.   
Time One 
(n=151) 
Dot Probe 
All self-report, demographic 
and clinical measures 
Time Two 
(n=76) 
 
Self-report measures of stress, 
distress and self-harming 
behaviour 
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Table 8.1.  Effect size r for differences in distress between T1 and T2 
Measure of distress Effect size r for change 
between T1 and T2 
Hopelessness 0.21 
Depression 0.17 
Anxiety 0.08 
Suicidal Thinking 0.21 
 
8.4.2 Correlations between variables 
Table 8.2 illustrates the correlations between all variables in addition to means 
and standard deviations.  Brooding was positively correlated with reflection in 
addition to socially prescribed perfectionism and each of the measures of distress and 
stress at T1.  Brooding was also negatively correlated with negative attentional bias.  
Reflection was positively correlated with self-oriented perfectionism and anxiety, 
suicidal thinking and stress, all at T1.  Whilst, self-oriented perfectionism was 
positively correlated with socially prescribed perfectionism and negative correlated 
with goal disengagement.  Socially prescribed perfectionism was positively correlated 
with hopelessness, anxiety and depression, all at T1, in addition to being negatively 
correlated with goal disengagement.  Goal disengagement positively correlated with 
hopelessness at T1 whilst goal reengagement negatively correlated with both 
hopelessness and suicidal thinking at T1.  Positive attentional bias was negatively 
correlated with suicidal thinking at T1.  Each of the measures of distress and stress at 
T1 were positively intercorrelated as were each of the measures of distress and stress 
at T2.  In addition, hopelessness at both time points was positively intercorrelated as 
was suicidal thinking at both times and stress at both times. 
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Table 8.2.  Correlations, mean scores and standard deviations (SD) of measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. -ve Bias  -                  
2. +ve Bias  -.146 -                 
3. Brooding -.172* -.121 -                
4. Reflection -.076 .008 .343** -               
5. Self .027 -.011 .098 .213* -              
6. Social .084 -.088 .193* .010 .241** -             
7. Goal Dis -.077 .063 .134 -.132 -.549** -.181* -            
8. Goal Re -.069 .069 .010 .123 .124 -.075 -.096 -           
9. BHS T1 .006 -.087 .381** .063 -.130 .206* .191* -.302** -          
10. Anx T1 -.025 -.091 .525** .295** .060 .203* .001 .027 .477** -         
11. Dep T1 -.033 -.073 .375** .112 -.042 .216** .098 -.159 .654** .604** -        
12. SPS T1 -.066 -.191* .445** .244** -.006 .151 .009 -.169* .549** .514** .573** -       
13. PSS T1 -.075 -.114 .357** .113** .121 .160 .074 -.086 .479** .499** .554** .434** -      
14. BHS T2 .118 -.004 .110 -.015 -.139 .037 -.052 -.181 .244* .015 .116 .217 .100 -     
15. Anx T2 .137 -.021 .195 .087 .021 .092 -.089 -.047 .112 .207 .065 .173 .012 .684** -    
16. Dep T2 .180 .010 .096 -.050 -.062 .163 -.187 -.052 .184 .103 .185 .143 .108 .818** .694** -   
17. SPS T2 .021 -.062 .174 -.064 -.084 .221 -.198 -.093 .212 .119 .184 .305* .197 .596** .508** .628** -  
18. PSS T2 .173 -.044 .131 .110 -.028 .134 -.102 -.208 .214 .132 .135 .209 .228* .768** .708** .749** .607** - 
Mean Score 19.84 8.33 14.65 11.36 21.62 22.45 2.90 3.06 13.67 14.17 11.97 12.53 11.63 11.32 13.46 10.30 9.04 9.91 
SD 72.40 91.82 3.17 3.32 6.87 7.16 0.90 0.83 5.20 3.45 4.39 6.77 2.74 5.86 4.84 5.16 9.41 3.28 
Note:  -ve Bias =Negative attentional bias; +ve Bias =Positive attentional bias; Self=Self-oriented perfectionism; Social=Socially prescribed perfectionism; Goal Dis=Goal Disengagement; Goal Re=Goal 
Reengagement; BHS T1=Beck Hopelessness Scale T1; Anx T1= HADS Anxiety T1; Dep T1= HADS Depression T1; SPS T1=Suicide Probability Scale T1; PSS T1=Perceived Stress Scale T1; BHS T2=Beck 
Hopelessness Scale T2; Anx T2=HADS Anxiety T2; Dep T2=HADS Depression T2; SPS T2=Suicide Probability Scale T2; PSS T2=Perceived Stress Scale T2 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level, ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
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8.4.3 Moderation Analyses 
A series of multiple hierarchical regression analyses were used to test the 
moderating relationships outlined in the research questions for this study (see section 
8.2.5).  These analyses were used to predict distress at T2 after controlling for initial 
levels of distress (i.e. change in distress between T1 and T2).  Analyses were 
conducted separately to examine moderation in: (i) the self-oriented perfectionism-
distress relationship; (ii) the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship; 
(iii) the brooding-distress relationship and; (iv) the reflection-distress relationship.   
Prior to analysis, predictor variables were centred, as recommended by Aiken 
and West (1991).  In each regression analysis the dependant variable was the measure 
of distress at time two4.  Initial levels of distress were entered in the first step of each 
regression.  Gender was also entered in the first step of each analysis examining a 
component of rumination (to control for the gender bias associated with rumination).  
The second step of each analysis contained the appropriate main effect variables (e.g. 
self-oriented perfectionism and stress).  This was followed by the appropriate 
multiplicative terms in the final step of each analysis to examine the impact of 
moderation (e.g. self-oriented perfection x stress). 
Significant interactions were plotted at high and low levels of each of the 
interaction terms, consonant with Aiken & West (1991).  These interactions were then 
probed post-hoc using simple slope analysis to determine whether either slope 
significantly differed from zero, again consonant with Aiken and West (1991).   
 
                                                 
4
 Missing data mean that the degrees of freedom may differ across analyses.   
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8.4.4 The effect of moderation in the perfection-distress relationship 
8.4.4.1 Stress as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
8.4.4.1.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .73, t 
(74) = 9.07, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .65, t (74) = 7.37, p <.0001), depression (β = .72, t 
(74) = 8.70, p <.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .57, t (74) = 5.68, p <.0001).  
However, stress was not found to moderate the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and any measure of distress.   
 
8.4.4.1.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .75, t 
(74) = 9.47, p<.0001), anxiety (β = .70, t (74) = 8.03, p<.0001), depression (β = .72, t 
(74) = 8.85, p <.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .52, t (74) = 5.50, p <.0001).  
However, stress was not found to moderate the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and any measure of distress.   
 
8.4.4.2 Brooding as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
8.4.4.2.1 Self-oriented perfectionism distress relationship 
Neither self-oriented perfectionism nor brooding, as a main effect, was 
predictive of change in any measure of distress.  However, the interaction between 
self-oriented perfectionism and brooding was predictive of change in anxiety (β =.-
.39, t (74) = -3.18, p<.01) and showed a trend approaching significance to predict 
change in hopelessness (β = -.24, t (74) = -1.91, p = .061) and depression (β = -.25, t 
(74) = -1.96, p = .054).   A plot of the lines of best fit for the interaction between self-
oriented perfectionism and brooding to predict anxiety can be seen in Figure 8.3.  Post 
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hoc examination of this interaction revealed that only the high slope significantly 
differed from zero (β = -.42, t (74) = -2.44, p<.05).  Thus, high brooding was 
associated with increased anxiety for low, compared to high, self-oriented 
perfectionists.   
 
 
Figure 8.3.  Self-oriented perfectionism x brooding to predict change in anxiety 
 
8.4.4.2.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither socially prescribed perfectionism nor brooding was 
predictive of change in any measure of distress.  However, the interaction between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and brooding was predictive of change in anxiety (β 
= -.351, t (74) = -.3.08, p <.01).   A plot of the lines of best fit for this interaction can 
be seen in Figure 8.4.  Post hoc analysis of the interaction found that only the low 
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slope significantly differed from zero (β = .32, t (74) = 2.32, p <.05).  Thus, for low 
levels of brooding, low social perfectionism was associated with lower levels of 
anxiety.   
 
Figure 8.4.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x brooding to predict change in anxiety 
 
8.4.4.3 Reflection as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
8.4.4.3.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
No main or interaction effects of self-oriented perfectionism or reflection were 
found to be predictive of change in any measure of distress.   
 
8.4.4.3.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither socially prescribed perfectionism nor reflection was 
predictive of change in any measure of distress.  However, the interaction between 
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socially prescribed perfectionism and reflection was predictive of change in suicidal 
thinking (β =.-.29, t (74) = -2.54, p <.05).  A plot of the lines of best fit for this 
interaction can be seen in Figure 8.5.  Post hoc analysis of this interaction revealed 
that the low slope significantly differed from zero (β = .48, t (74) = 3.05, p <.005).  
Thus, the low levels of reflection combined with high socially prescribed 
perfectionism was associated with the largest increase in suicidal thinking, whilst low 
reflection combined with low socially prescribed perfectionism was associated with 
the greatest decrease in suicidal thinking.   
 
 
Figure 8.5.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x reflection to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
8.4.4.4 Goal adjustment as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
8.4.4.4.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
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As a main effect, goal disengagement was predictive of change in depression 
(β = -.28, t (72) = -2.07, p <.05) and suicidal thinking (β = -.27, t (72) = -2.10, p <.05).  
However no other main or interaction effects were observed to predict change in other 
measures of distress.   
 
8.4.4.4.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
Neither socially prescribed perfectionism nor goal adjustment as a main effect 
were predictive of change in any measure of distress.  However, the interaction 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and goal disengagement was predictive of 
hopelessness (β =-.33, t (72) = -2.89, p<.01), anxiety (β = -.30, t (72) = -2.57, p <.05) 
and depression (β = -.29, t (72) = -.2.50, p<.05).   Plots of the lines of best fit for these 
interactions can be seen in Figure 8.6, Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8, respectively.  For the 
interaction to predict hopelessness the high slope significantly differed from zero (β = 
-.42, t (72) = -2.63, p<.05), whilst the low slope showed a trend towards significance 
(β = .30, t (72) = 1.89, p = .063).  Only the low slope significantly differed from zero 
in the interactions to predict change in anxiety (β = .37, t (72) = 2.30, p<.05) and 
depression (β = .40, t (72) = 2.51, p <.05).  Thus, low socially prescribed 
perfectionism combined with high goal disengagement was predictive of the greatest 
increase in hopelessness, whilst high socially prescribed perfectionism combined with 
low goal disengagement was predictive of the greatest increase in both anxiety and 
depression.   
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Figure 8.6. Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in 
hopelessness 
 
Figure 8.7.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in anxiety 
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Figure 8.8.  Socially prescribed perfectionism x goal disengagement to predict change in 
depression 
 
8.4.4.5 Attentional bias as a moderator of the perfectionism-distress relationship 
8.4.4.5.1 Self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither self-oriented perfectionism nor positive or negative 
attentional bias were predictive of change in any measure of distress.   However, the 
interaction between self-oriented perfectionism and positive attentional bias was 
predictive of change in suicidal thinking (β =. 28, t (71) = 2.08, p <.05).  Post hoc 
examination of this interaction found that only the low slope significantly differed 
from zero (β = -.36, t (71) = -2.62, p<.05).  Thus, in combination with low self-
oriented perfectionism, low positive attentional bias was associated with increased 
suicidal thinking, whilst in combination with high self-oriented perfectionism, low 
positive attentional bias was associated with decreased suicidal thinking.    
 
  
219 
 
Figure 8.9.  Self-oriented perfectionism x positive attentional bias to predict change in suicidal 
thinking 
 
8.4.4.5.2 Socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither socially prescribed perfectionism nor positive or 
negative attentional bias were predictive of change in any measure of distress.  There 
was a trend towards significance for the interaction between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and positive attentional bias to predict change in hopelessness (β = -.25, 
t (71) = -1.79, p = .079) in addition to a trend towards significance for the interaction 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and negative attentional bias to predict 
change in anxiety (β = .281, t (71) = 1.81, p = .076).   
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8.4.5 The effect of moderation in the rumination-distress relationship 
8.4.5.1 Stress as a moderator in the rumination-distress relationship 
8.4.5.1.1 Brooding-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .77, t 
(75) = 10.06, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .69, t (75) = 8.30, p <.0001), depression (β = .76, 
t (75) = 9.99, p <.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .58, t (75) = 6.06, p <.0001).  
However, no other main or interaction effects were observed.   
 
8.4.5.1.2 Reflection-distress relationship 
As a main effect, stress was predictive of change in hopelessness (β = .76, t 
(75) = 9.96, p <.0001), anxiety (β = .71, t (75) = 8.43, p <.0001), depression (β = .76, t 
(75) = 10.05, p <.0001) and suicidal thinking (β = .53, t (75) = 5.91, p <.0001).  The 
interaction between reflection and stress was predictive of change in suicidal thinking 
(β = -.24, t (75) = -2.56, p <.05).   A plot of the lines of best fit for this interaction can 
be seen in Figure 8.10.  Post hoc analysis of this interaction revealed that only the low 
slope significantly differed from zero (β = .88, t (75) = 2.05, p <.05).  Thus, although 
there was a general trend for high stress in general to be associated with higher levels 
of suicidal thinking, under low levels of stress, high reflection was associated with 
higher suicidal thinking compared to low reflection.   
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Figure 8.10.  Reflection x stress to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
8.4.5.2 Goal adjustment as a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
8.4.5.2.1 Brooding-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither brooding nor goal adjustment was predictive of 
change in any measure of distress.  However, the interaction between brooding and 
goal disengagement was predictive of change in anxiety (β = .31, t (72) = 2.45, p 
<.05).  Post hoc analysis on this interaction revealed that the high slope significantly 
differed from zero (β = .53, t (72) = 2.50, p <.05).  In other words, high goal 
disengagement was associated with higher anxiety when combined with high 
brooding and was associated with lower anxiety in combination with low brooding.   
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Figure 8.11.  Brooding x goal disengagement to predict change in anxiety 
 
8.4.5.2.2 Reflection-distress relationship 
No main or interaction effects were observed to predict change in any measure 
of distress.   
 
8.4.5.3 Attentional bias a moderator of the rumination-distress relationship 
8.4.5.3.1 Brooding-distress relationship 
As a main effect neither brooding rumination nor positive or negative 
attentional bias were predictive of change in any measure of distress.  However, the 
interaction between brooding and negative attentional bias was predictive of change in 
hopelessness (β = -.40, t (72) = -3.03, p <.01), anxiety (β = -.41, t (72) = -3.09, p 
<.01), depression (β = -.42, t (72) = -3.18, p <.01) and suicidal thinking (β = -.51, t 
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(72) = -4.12, p <.0001).   Plots of the lines of best fit for these interactions can be seen 
in Figure 8.12, Figure 8.13, Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.15, respectively.  Post hoc 
analyses revealed that in the interactions to predict hopelessness (β =.51, t (72) = 2.49, 
p <.05), anxiety (β = .59, t (72) = 2.92, p <.01), depression (β = .50, t (72) = 2.55, 
p<.05) and suicidal thinking (β = .671, t (72) = 3.45, p <.001) the low slope 
significantly differed from zero.  Thus low negative attentional bias was associated 
with decreased hopelessness, anxiety, depression and suicidal thinking for individuals 
low in brooding.   However, for those high in brooding, low negative attentional bias 
was associated with increased hopelessness, anxiety, depression and suicidal thinking.   
 
 
Figure 8.12.  Brooding x negative attentional bias to predict change in hopelessness 
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Figure 8.13.  Brooding x negative attentional bias to predict change in anxiety 
 
 
Figure 8.14.  Brooding x negative attentional bias to predict change in depression 
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Figure 8.15.  Brooding x negative attentional bias to predict change in suicidal thinking 
 
8.4.5.3.2 Reflection-distress relationship 
As a main effect, neither reflection nor positive or negative attentional bias 
were predictive of change in any measure of distress.  The interaction between 
reflection and negative attentional bias showed a trend towards significance to predict 
change in anxiety (β = -.24, t (72) = -1.81, p = .074).   
 
8.4.6 Mediation Analyses 
Mediation effects were examined through a series of regression analyses 
following the procedure outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986) and Kenny, Kashy and 
Bolger (1998).  Kenny et al. (1998) define four conditions which must be met for 
mediation: (1) the independent variable must affect the mediator; (2) the independent 
variable must affect the dependant variable; (3) the mediator must affect the 
  
226 
dependant variable when the independent variable is controlled for; (4) for full 
mediation to occur, the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable must be reduced to non-significance after the effect of the 
mediator is controlled for.  Partial mediation occurs when conditions 1-3 are met 
without condition 4.   
Similar to the moderation analyses, we conducted a series of analyses to test 
the research questions for this study outlined in section 8.2.5.  Again similar to the 
analyses examining moderation, the dependent variable in each analysis was distress 
at T2, with initial levels of distress being controlled for in the first step, in order to 
predict change in distress between T1 and T2.  Analyses were conducted separately to 
examine mediation in: (i) the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship; (ii) the 
socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship; (iii) the brooding-distress 
relationship and; (iv) the reflection-distress relationship.   
 
8.4.7 The effect of mediation in the perfectionism-distress relationship 
Neither stress, brooding, reflection, goal adjustment nor attentional bias were 
found to mediate the relationship between either self-oriented or socially prescribed 
perfectionism and change in any measure of distress. 
 
8.4.8 The effect of mediation in the rumination-distress relationship 
Neither stress, goal adjustment nor attentional bias mediated the relationship 
between either brooding or reflection and change in any measure of distress.   
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8.4.9 Factors associated with self-harming behaviour between T1 and T2 
 Thirty-three participants reported self harming behaviour in the following up 
period between T1 and T2 (i.e. 43.4% of those who responded at T2 and 21.9% of the 
initial T1 sample).  These behaviours were classified into different methodologies 
following Hawton, Rodham and Evans (2006), Figure 8.16 illustrates the percentages 
reported for each classification category.  As can be seen from the chart, the most 
frequent self-harming behaviour reported during the follow-up period was self-
poisoning (n=15) followed by self cutting (n=13).  In order to examine whether any of 
the study variables could differentiate those participants who reported self-harming in 
the follow up period from those who did not, we conducted a series of analyses.  First, 
we present correlations between all variables separately for those who self-harmed 
during follow up (self harmers, n=33) and those who did not self harm during the 
follow up period (non self-harmers, n=40).  Second, logistic regression analyses 
examine which of the variables were associated with the occurrence of self-harming 
behaviour between T1 and T2.   Crude odds ratios and confidence intervals were 
obtained from univariate analyses.  Univariate associations were used as a selection 
criteria for inclusion in multi-variate analyses to determine which of the variables was 
most important in predicting self-harming behaviour during the follow up period.   
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Figure 8.16. Pie chart of self-harming behaviour classification 
 
8.4.9.1 Correlations split by self harming behaviour between T1 and T2 
Table 8.3 illustrates the correlations between all variables split according to 
self harming behaviour between T1 and T2, where those who reported self harming 
between T1 and T2 (self-harmers; n=33) were compared with those who reported not 
self-harming between T1 and T2 (non self-harmers; n=40).  A number of key 
differences can be observed in the relationships variables for self-harmers and non 
self-harmers.  For non self-harmers both brooding and reflection were negatively 
correlated with negative attentional bias, however this relationship was not observed 
among the self-harmers.  For the self-harmers brooding was positively correlated with 
each measure of distress at both time points, whilst for the non self-harmers brooding 
was only positively correlated with the measures of distress at T1.  For self-harmers 
negative and positive attentional bias were negatively correlated, however for the non 
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self-harmers no relationship was observed.  For non self-harmers negative attentional 
bias was negatively correlated with brooding and reflection and positively correlated 
with suicidal thinking and stress at T2; however these associations were not observed 
for the self harmers.   Stress at T2 was positively correlated with each measure of 
distress at both times for the self harmers; however for the non self-harmers stress at 
T2 was only positively correlated with distress at T2.   
 
8.4.9.2 Univariate Analyses 
 
Participants who self-harmed between T1 and T2 were significantly younger 
than those who did not (see Table 8.4).  Participants who self-harmed between T1 and 
T2 reported higher levels of both brooding and reflection.  Those who self-harmed in 
the follow up period also reported higher initial levels of anxiety, hopelessness and 
suicidal thinking in addition to greater levels of stress in the period between T1 and 
T2.   
 
 
8.4.9.3 Multivariate analyses 
The multivariate logistic analyses revealed that only levels of stress for the 
period between T1 to T2 was independently associated with self harming during the 
follow up period (see Table 8.5).   
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Table 8.3.  Correlations between variables for participants reporting self-harming between T1 and T2 (lower panel) and participants reporting no self-harm 
between T1 and T2 (upper panel) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. -ve Bias  - .141 -.375* -.419** -.086 .286 -.209 .187 -.039 -.154 -.235 -.317 -.207 .265 .306 .309 .408* .327* 
2. +ve Bias  -.632** - -.086 .111 -.118 .242 .137 -.163 -.026 -.067 .007 -.087 -.068 .026 -.003 .067 -.118 .012 
3. Brooding -.128 .085 - .383* -.022 .000 .308 -.023 .392* .532** .371* .394* .183 -.227 -.019 -.187 -.237 -.215 
4. Reflection .188 .057 .217 - .114 .012 .138 .046 .102 .312 .220 .344* .253 -.171 -.196 -.157 -.155 -.201 
5. Self .094 .054 .077 .458** - .344* -.370* .210 -.276 -.034 -.126 -.037 -.224 -.228 -.013 -.137 -.161 -.066 
6. Social .000 -.136 .110 -.161 .212 - -.237 .140 .011 -.002 -.084 -.090 .040 -.040 .091 .103 .185 .229 
7. Goal Dis -.159 .106 .072 -.324 -.538** -.189 - -.060 .168 .058 .027 .037 .034 -.095 -.201 -.246 -.330* -.054 
8. Goal Re -.223 .319 -.036 .028 .353* .061 -.160 - -.269 .260 -.001 .027 .142 -.031 .052 .144 -.088 -.093 
9. BHS T1 .012 -.016 .419* .018 -.014 .405* .025 -.361* - .549** .588** .574** .450** -.068 .014 -.025 -.102 .026 
10. Anx T1 .185 -.266 .475** .433* .269 .390* -.191 -.015 .485** - .729** .487** .633** -.240 .089 -.070 -.199 -.165 
11. Dep T1 .103 -.135 .438* .007 .005 .366* .050 -.153 .804** .467** - .545** .603** -.260 -.048 -.041 -.212 -.127 
12. SPS T1 .044 -.173 .492** .072 -.123 .303 .087 -.312 .641** .459** .639** - .370* -.081 .039 -.095 -.086 -.104 
13. PSS T1 -.063 -.119 .336 .005 -.290 -.184 .027 -.092 .334 .135 .401* .377* - -.168 -.115 -.028 -.098 .039 
14. BHS T2 .098 -.019 .481** -.048 -.111 .144 .071 -.334 .633** .211 .600** .435* .397* - .677** .825** .703** .789** 
15. Anx T2 .099 .032 .513** .293 .053 .067 .078 -.151 .222 .278 .257 .276 .182 .614** - .708** .679** .721** 
16. Dep T2 .207 -.057 .370* -.152 -.034 .254 -.101 -.235 .394* .174 .482** .252 .220 .757** .593** - .694** .771** 
17. SPS T2 -.098 .036 .407* -.196 -.119 .311 -.075 -.049 .376* .250 .453** .438* .353* .474** .353* .544** - .716** 
18. PSS T2 .185 -.103 .465** .294 -.138 -.013 -.106 -.288 .345* .415* .464** .367* .398* .660** .634** .662** .480** - 
Note:  -ve Bias =Negative attentional bias; +ve Bias =Positive attentional bias; Self=Self-oriented perfectionism; Social=Socially prescribed perfectionism; Goal Dis=Goal Disengagement; Goal Re=Goal 
Reengagement; BHS T1=Beck Hopelessness Scale T1; Anx T1= HADS Anxiety T1; Dep T1= HADS Depression T1; SPS T1=Suicide Probability Scale T1; PSS T1=Perceived Stress Scale T1; BHS T2=Beck 
Hopelessness Scale T2; Anx T2=HADS Anxiety T2; Dep T2=HADS Depression T2; SPS T2=Suicide Probability Scale T2; PSS T2=Perceived Stress Scale T2 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level, ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
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Table 8.4.  Univariate binary logistic regression to predict self harming behaviour between T1 
and T2 (i.e. participants who self harmed between T1 and T2 (n=33) v. participants who did 
not self harm between T1 and T2 (n=40)) 
 N % (N) who self-harmed Odds ratio 95% CI P Value 
Sex:      
Male 26 42.31 (11) 1.00   
Female 47 46.81 (22) .833 .317-2.190 .712 
Age:   Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 41.80 (13.87) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 33.61 (11.39) .950 .913-.989 .012 
Brooding:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 13.48 (3.12) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 15.06 (2.75) 1.206 1.018-1.429 .031 
Reflection:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 10.65 (3.23) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 12.24 (3.38) 1.160 1.001-1.344 .048 
Negative Bias:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 28.58 (76.48) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 8.21   (98.66) .997 .991-1.003 .340 
Positive Bias:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 27.92 (136.91) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 8.25   (73.84) .998 .994-1.003 .475 
Self-oriented perfectionism:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 33 22.49 (6.65) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 39 24.39 (6.27) 1.047 .973-1.127 .216 
Social Perfectionism:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 39 23.28 (7.28) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 23.03 (6.92) .995 .931-1.063 .995 
Goal Disengagement:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 37 2.82 (0.94) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 2.59 (0.84) .749 .439-1.279 .290 
Goal Reengagement:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 37 3.16 (0.85) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 2.93 (0.84) .717 .406-1.267 .253 
Depression T1:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 11.35 (4.66) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 12.55 (4.56) 1.059 .956-1.174 .271 
Anxiety T1:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 13.40 (4.04) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 15.30 (3.15) 1.165 1.010-1.344 .036 
Hopelessness T1:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 12.40 (5.18) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 14.94 (4.29) 1.120 1.010-1.243 .032 
Suicidal Thinking T1:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 9.80 (6.70) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 15.42 (6.73) 1.127 1.047-1.213 .002 
Stress T2:  Mean (SD)    
No DSH between T1 and T2 40 8.75 (3.42) 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 33 11.21 (2.58) 1.317 1.099-1.578 .003 
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Table 8.5.  Multivariate binary logistic regression to predict self harming behaviour between 
T1 and T2 
 Odds ratio 95% CI P Value 
Age:     
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 .959 .908-1.013 .135 
Anxiety T1:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.066 .857-1.325 .565 
Hopelessness T1:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 .975 .825-1.152 .763 
Suicidal Thinking T1:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.062 .943-1.197 .320 
Stress T2:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.435 1.097-1.876 .008 
Brooding:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.079 .837-1.391 .559 
Reflection:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 .975 .791-1.202 .810 
Brooding x Stress:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.038 .966-1.115 .312 
Reflection x Stress:    
No DSH between T1 and T2 1.00   
DSH between T1 and T2 1.051 .963-1.148 .267 
 
8.5 Discussion 
This research aimed to examine whether the variables observed as 
influencing both the perfectionism-distress relationship and the rumination-distress 
relationship, in studies one and three, were replicable in a clinical, parasuicide 
sample.   A further aim was to establish whether the individual difference variables 
measured throughout this thesis were predictive of self-harming behaviour.  The 
extent to which our hypotheses are supported and how our findings can be usefully 
integrated with previous research in this field, are discussed below.    
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8.5.1 The effect of stress on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
Contrary to our initial hypotheses, perceived stress did not mediate or 
moderate the relationship between self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism 
and any measure of distress.  Thus, in our clinical, parasuicide sample, perceived 
stress did not amplify the negative consequences of either socially prescribed or 
self-oriented perfectionism, nor did socially prescribed perfectionism generate 
increased levels of perceived stress.  These findings are in contrast to similar 
research conducted using student populations (e.g. Hewitt & Dyke, 1986, Flett et 
al., 1995; Chang & Rand, 2000, studies one and three in this thesis).  This suggests 
that the discrepancy may be explained by differing characteristics between the 
student and the clinical populations.  One possible explanation is that the average 
levels of perceived stress in the clinical population were so great, that the distinction 
between high and low levels of stress (calculated at one standard deviation above 
and below the mean), no longer had any additional influence on the experience of 
distress.  Unfortunately, in the present study we used a brief 4-item version of the 
Perceived Stress Scale, whilst in the student population studies we used the longer 
14-item version of the same scale.  This prevents us from accurately comparing 
average perceived stress levels between the clinical and student populations to test 
this explanation further.    
 
8.5.2 The effect of rumination on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
As predicted, brooding moderated the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, such that for individuals low on brooding, 
low socially prescribed perfectionism was associated with lower levels of anxiety, 
whilst high socially prescribed perfectionism was associated with higher levels of 
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anxiety.  However, for individuals high on brooding there was no difference in 
anxiety between high and low social perfectionists.  This highlights the powerful 
effect of brooding, as socially prescribed perfectionism only had an impact on 
distress for those with low levels of brooding.  High brooders experienced increased 
anxiety regardless of whether they were high in socially prescribed perfectionism.   
To the author’s knowledge, the only other research which has previously examined 
the moderating effect of brooding on the perfectionism-distress relationship is study 
three in this thesis, where high brooding amplified the negative consequences of 
socially prescribed perfectionism on anxiety, dysphoria and suicidal thinking.  Thus, 
in a student sample the combination of high brooding and high socially prescribed 
perfectionism was associated with the largest increase in distress.  As high and low 
levels of brooding are calculated at one standard deviation above and below the 
mean for an individual sample, the difference between the student and clinical 
samples may be a consequence of the lower brooding scores overall in the student 
sample – meaning that high brooding in the students, was lower than high brooding 
in the clinical patients.  The present results indicate that in a clinical sample, 
although socially prescribed perfectionism amplifies the experience of anxiety, this 
effect is only significant in individuals with low levels of brooding and generalises 
to fewer measures of distress than in a student population.    
Brooding also moderated the relationship between self-oriented 
perfectionism and anxiety (and showed a non-significant trend to do the same for 
hopelessness and depression), such that for individuals who were high brooders, 
high self-oriented perfectionism was beneficial in reducing distress.  Previous 
research using student populations did not find rumination, nor brooding or 
reflection separately, to moderate the self-oriented perfectionism-distress 
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relationship.  However, the previous research examining the self-oriented 
perfectionism-distress relationship in general has produced less consistent findings 
than the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship (e.g. Hewitt & Flett, 
1991; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003) and this may account for the failure of the 
previous studies in this thesis to find a moderating effect of rumination (or 
specifically brooding) on the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship.  The 
current findings indicate that self-oriented perfectionism is beneficial in reducing 
anxiety, but only for those high in brooding.   One explanation for the previous 
inconsistency of findings regarding the adaptive or maladaptive consequences of 
self-oriented perfectionism is that much of the research in this area failed to 
consider the impact of brooding on the self-oriented perfectionism distress 
relationship.   
Consistent with our predictions, reflection moderated the relationship 
between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal thinking.  However the 
direction of this relationship differed from our predictions, with low levels of 
reflection exacerbating the negative consequences of socially prescribed 
perfectionism on suicidal thinking.  In study three of this thesis, socially prescribed 
perfectionism interacted with reflection such that reflection increased the negative 
consequences associated with socially prescribed perfectionism, whilst in the 
current study the opposite pattern was observed.   This differing effect of reflection 
in the socially prescribed perfectionism-distress relationship may be attributable to 
the differing relationship observed between reflection and distress in general within 
our clinical study.  In line with previous research conducted with populations who 
have previously engaged in suicidal behaviour (as opposed to suicide ideation only) 
(Crane et al., 2007), we found a protective effect of reflection (see section 8.5.5 for 
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details).   The present finding appears to be consistent with this notion, as high 
levels of reflection attenuated the negative consequences of socially prescribed 
perfectionism on distress.  This is compatible with the notion that reflection may 
represent the adaptive component of rumination.      
Neither brooding nor reflection mediated the relationship between either 
self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  Previous research in 
this area has yielded mixed results with some support for both brooding and 
reflection to either fully or partially mediate the relationship between perfectionism 
and distress (O’Connor et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008).  However, study three of 
this thesis found no mediating effect of brooding or reflection in the relationship 
between either self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  The 
present results support the findings of study three in this thesis and extend these to a 
clinical population.  Thus, neither self-oriented nor socially prescribed 
perfectionism generated reflective or brooding thinking within our clinical sample.    
 
8.5.3 The effect of goal adjustment on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that goal adjustment would moderate the relationship 
between both self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  
Consistent with this, goal disengagement moderated the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and hopelessness, anxiety and depression.  Thus, 
for individuals with high levels of socially prescribed perfectionism, the ability to 
disengage from unattainable goals was associated with less distress.   This finding is 
in support of the previous findings of both study one and study three in this thesis 
(see sections 5.4.7.2.2, 5.4.8.2.2 and 7.4.4.5.2) and further extends these findings to 
a clinical, parasuicide population.   
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However, contrary to our hypotheses, goal disengagement did not moderate 
the self-oriented perfectionism-distress relationship.  We previously found that goal 
disengagement moderated the relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and 
distress (see sections 5.4.7.2.1, 5.4.8.2.1 and 7.4.4.5.1), where an inability to 
disengage from unattainable goals, combined with high self-oriented perfectionism 
was associated with increased distress, in student population samples.   The 
relationship was not replicated in the present clinical sample.   This finding further 
serves to highlight the critical role of socially prescribed perfectionism in a clinical, 
parasuicide sample, as the ability to disengage from unachievable goals was not 
differentially associated with distress for self-oriented perfectionists, only socially 
prescribed perfectionists.  Thus, the ability to disengage from unattainable goals 
which are perceived to be set for an individual by others may be more valuable than 
the ability to disengage with unattainable self-set goals, in a clinical population.   
As hypothesised, goal adjustment was not found to mediate the relationship 
between either self-oriented or socially prescribed perfectionism and distress.  This 
indicates that perfectionistic thinking did not result in changes to goal adjustment, 
which could then, in turn, alter levels of distress.   
 
8.5.4 The effect of attentional bias on the perfectionism-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that positive attentional bias would moderate the effect of 
socially prescribed perfectionism on distress, such that increased positive attentional 
bias, combined with high socially prescribed perfectionism would be predictive of 
higher levels of distress.  This hypothesis was partially supported by a non-
significant trend for positive attentional bias to moderate the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and hopelessness.  Although positive attentional 
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biases are often considered to be beneficial (e.g. McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Suslow et 
al., 2001), the current findings are in line with the results of study one of this thesis.  
Consequently our data extend our previous findings to a clinical, parasuicide sample 
and lend support to the idea that there is something inherent to social perfectionists 
which results in positive attentional bias being associated with increased 
hopelessness.  As social perfectionists consistently evaluate themselves as failing to 
achieve standards set for them by others, it may be that positive stimuli are viewed 
in the context of something which they are also lacking or failing to achieve (e.g. 
the word ‘happy’ is interpreted as something which they have failed to achieve) and 
this in turn, increases their feelings of hopelessness.  
In addition, we also found that positive attentional bias moderated the 
relationship between self-oriented perfection and suicidal thinking such that higher 
levels of positive attentional bias were associated with increased suicidal thinking in 
high self-oriented perfectionists, whilst the opposite trend was observed for low 
self-oriented perfectionists, with lower levels of positive attentional bias being 
associated with increased suicidal thinking.  Again, this may be explained by the 
excessive concern with standards and failure which is characteristic of 
perfectionism in general.  Self-oriented perfectionists are overly concerned with 
failing to achieve goals and targets which they have set themselves, so again they 
may interpret positive stimuli as something which they have also failed to achieve.   
 There was also a non-significant trend for negative attentional bias to 
moderate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety, 
where high negative attentional bias combined with high socially prescribed 
perfectionism was associated with increased anxiety.  Thus, for social perfectionists 
– whom by definition are excessively concerned with failing to meet the high 
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expectations of others – a tendency to selectively attend to negative as opposed to 
neutral stimuli exacerbates their experience of distress.   
Consistent with the findings of study one in this thesis, attentional bias did 
not mediate the relationship between perfectionism and distress, suggesting that 
perfectionism in itself does not alter an individuals pattern of attention, resulting in 
altered levels of positive or negative attentional bias.   
 
8.5.5 The effect of stress in the rumination-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that perceived stress would moderate the relationship 
between both brooding and reflective rumination and distress.  This hypothesis was 
partly supported, in that perceived stress moderated the relationship between 
reflection and suicidal thinking.  However the direction of this relationship was the 
opposite to that which was hypothesised, with higher stress, combined with higher 
reflection being predictive of lower suicidal thinking.  Study three in this thesis 
found that high perceived stress, combined with high reflection was predictive of 
increased suicidal thinking in a student sample.  However the current findings 
suggest a beneficial effect of reflection under the experience of stress, in a sample of 
clinical participants.  The present results would fit with the notion that reflection is 
the more adaptive component of rumination (as highlighted by only concurrent 
associations with distress in Treynor et al.’s (2003) initial study – see section 2.2.1.1 
for a more detailed explanation).  Previous evidence regarding the nature of any 
association between reflection and suicidality has been mixed with some researchers 
finding a positive association with suicidal thinking (Miranda et al., 2007), whilst 
others found no association (O’Connor & Noyce, 2008).  However, to our 
knowledge, the only other study to examine reflection and suicidality in the context 
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of persons who had actually engaged in suicidal behaviour (as opposed to suicidal 
thinking only), used a case control design and found that never suicidal individuals 
had higher levels of reflection than individuals who had previously engaged in 
suicidal behaviour (Crane et al., 2007).  Thus, the previous clinical evidence lends 
support to the current findings of a protective effect of reflection – albeit in the 
present research this protective effect is only observed in the context of increased 
levels of perceived stress.   
Contrary to our initial hypotheses, perceived stress did not moderate the 
relationship between brooding and any measure of distress.   This indicates that the 
impact of brooding on distress was not further exacerbated by the experience of 
perceived stress.  Previous research has found that perceived stress amplifies the 
effect of rumination as a whole on distress (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005, 2008a).  
In addition, study three of this thesis examined brooding specifically and found that 
both perceived stress and stressful life events moderated the relationship between 
brooding and distress.  However, these previous findings have all used student 
populations, which indicates that the discrepancy with the current results may 
reflect a difference between the characteristics of the populations under study.  
Certainly the clinical population report higher mean levels of both brooding and 
rumination than the student samples – possibly the effects of brooding are only 
amplified by stress until brooding reaches a critical level above which the effects are 
no longer amplified.   Another potential explanation, as noted above, is that levels 
of perceived stress in the clinical sample may be so high that the distinction between 
high and low stress (at one standard deviation above and one standard deviation 
below the mean) may not have a differential impact on the effects of brooding on 
distress.     More research is required to examine both of these possibilities further.   
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In addition, contrary to our initial hypotheses, perceived stress did not 
mediate the relationship between brooding and any measure of distress.  Previous 
research in study three of this thesis found that perceived stress mediated the 
relationship between brooding and both depression and suicidal thinking.  However, 
we were unable to replicate this result in the current study.   It is possible that our 
failure to find a mediating effect of stress is a consequence of a ceiling effect in our 
data, where engaging in brooding did not generate more stress, as participants were 
already experiencing a high level of perceived stress.    
 
8.5.6 The effect of goal adjustment in the rumination-distress relationship 
We hypothesised that goal adjustment would not mediate the impact of 
either brooding or reflection on distress and this was confirmed.  In addition, we 
hypothesised that goal disengagement would moderate the relationship between 
reflection and distress.  However, whilst we found that goal disengagement 
moderated the relationship between brooding and anxiety; no moderating effect of 
goal disengagement on relationship between reflection and any measure of distress 
was observed.  In study one of this thesis, we found goal disengagement moderated 
the relationship between rumination as a whole with hopelessness and suicidal 
thinking (see sections 5.4.9.2 and 5.4.10.2).   This was complemented by the 
findings of study three of this thesis, where we found a trend approaching 
significance for goal disengagement to moderate the relationship between reflection 
and suicidal thinking (see section 7.4.5.3.2).  These findings led us to conclude that 
goal disengagement affected the reflective, as opposed to the brooding, component 
of rumination.  Given reflection involves thoughts about problem solving, then this 
interpretation seemed plausible.  However, the present findings contrast with our 
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earlier conclusions, as for individuals with high goal disengagement (e.g. 
individuals who were able to disengage from unattainable goals), increased anxiety 
was reported by those who also had higher levels of brooding.  In contrast, for 
individuals with low goal disengagement, no difference in anxiety was observed 
between high and low brooding.  Thus, the ability to disengage from unattainable 
goals, combined with a tendency to compare one’s current situation with another 
unachieved benchmark, resulted in increased anxiety.  Intuitively, this finding 
makes sense, as a high tendency to disengage from unachievable goals combined 
with a tendency to repetitively think about how one’s present situation compares 
unfavourably with an ideal standard, could amplify the experience of distress by 
increasing focus on failure to achieve another goal.   Therefore, it seems possible 
that goal disengagement may impact on the relationship between both reflection and 
brooding and distress.   
Our failure to find an impact of goal disengagement in the reflection-distress 
relationship in the current clinical sample may reflect the difference in the impact of 
reflection on distress in the clinical sample, compared with student samples.  As 
noted above, the adaptive or maladaptive qualities of reflection have been 
previously debated in the literature; however previous research using individuals 
who have engaged in suicidal behaviour suggests a protective effect of reflection 
(however, this has not been noted in general population or student samples).  If 
reflection does have a protective effect in a parasuicide sample, then this could 
explain why its effects were not moderated by goal disengagement in the current 
study, but they were previously in our non-clinical sample.   
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8.5.7 The effect of attentional bias in the rumination-distress relationship 
We made no specific directional hypotheses regarding the effect of 
attentional bias in the rumination-distress relationship due to a lack of research in 
this area.  Negative attentional bias was found to moderate the relationship between 
brooding and each measure of distress, such that for individuals high on negative 
attentional bias, there were no differences in distress between high and low 
brooders.  However, for individuals low in negative attentional bias, high brooding 
was associated with increased distress.  Thus, the absence of both brooding and 
negative attentional bias was associated with the lowest levels of each measure of 
distress.  In addition, high brooding had the greatest detrimental impact on distress 
for individuals with lower levels of negative attentional bias.    This illustrates the 
powerful effect of negative attentional bias, as brooding only further amplified the 
experience of distress in those individuals with low negative attentional bias.   
A similar non-significant trend was observed for negative attentional bias to 
moderate the relationship between reflection and anxiety, where although there was 
an overall trend for high negative attentional bias to be associated with increased 
anxiety, for individuals with low negative attentional bias, low reflection was 
associated with less anxiety.  The other findings relating to reflection, in this clinical 
study, have suggested a possible protective effect of reflection.  However, the 
current finding indicates that this protective effect of reflection may not generalise 
to individuals with low levels of negative attentional bias.  One possible explanation 
for this finding relates to the content of self-focussed thinking.  Reflection can be 
thought of as self-focussed thinking with a problem solving orientation; therefore it 
is possible that for individuals who focus more on negative stimuli, reflection can 
result in increased problem solving which, in turn, decreases distress.  However, by 
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not attending to negative stimuli, individuals are less likely to engage reflective 
problem solving, meaning distress may increase.   
 
8.5.8 Predicting self-harming behaviour between T1 and T2 
Much of the previous work examining the role of cognitive and personality 
variables in psychological distress has focussed on their role in predicting 
concurrent or prospective levels of distress reported through standardised 
questionnaire measures.  In the present research, our prospective design allowed us 
to examine whether these individual difference variables were also associated with 
participants’ reports of self harming behaviours during the follow up period.  As 
hypothesised, higher initial levels of anxiety, hopelessness and suicidal thinking, 
were univariately associate with self-harming behaviour in the follow up period.  In 
addition, again consistent with our hypotheses, increased levels of brooding, 
reflection and perceived stress (for the period between T1 and T2) were univariately 
associated with self-harming behaviour in the follow up period.  However, 
multivariate analysis revealed that perceived stress during the follow up period was 
the factor most associated with self-harming between T1 and T2.  This indicates that 
although both brooding and reflection were univariately associated with self-
harming behaviour, the effect of perceived stress was stronger.  This finding 
illustrates that brooding and reflection were associated with both changes in distress 
over time (as measured by standardised self-report measures) and self reported self-
harming behaviour.  However, socially prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism 
were only associated with changes in distress over time.  This highlights the 
importance of ruminative thinking in the context of suicidal behaviour.   
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8.5.9 Limitations 
A number of limitations in the current study need to be highlighted.  First 
our use of the brief (4-item) Perceived Stress Scale, differed from the other non-
clinical studies in this thesis where the 14-item measure was employed.  We initially 
selected the shorted version of the scale to use in a clinical sample in an attempt to 
reduce the burden of participation for our hospital patient sample and to reduce 
overall participation time to enable the study to better fit in with routine hospital 
care.  Although the 14-item and the 4-item versions are well correlated, they do not 
allow a direct comparison between levels of perceived stress between the clinical 
and student populations.  Future research in this area should use comparable 
measures of perceived stress in both clinical and student populations. 
Second, there was a high rate of attrition between T1 and T2 (47.2% of the 
sample did not complete T2 measures).  There are numerous difficulties associated 
with following up a clinical population of this nature and the follow-up rate in the 
present research is favourable in comparison to other research in this area (e.g. 
O’Connor, Armitage and Grey, 2006).  In addition, although participants who 
completed T2 measures were significantly older than those who did not, they did 
not differ on any other demographic variable.   
Third, it could be argued that three of our measures do not meet Nunnally’s 
(1978) criteria for internal validity (measures of reflection, other-oriented 
perfectionism and perceived stress (at T1)).  Arguably, however, this reduced 
reliability decreases the likelihood of detecting relationships between variables; 
hence those relationships which are observed are likely to be more robust.  In 
addition, previous research has indicated each of these measures to be valid and 
reliable (e.g. Treynor et al., 2003; Enns, Cox & Clara, 2002; Cohen et al., 1983).    
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Fourth, the reliance on self-report measures could mean that social 
desirability influenced our findings.  However, in the standardised self-report 
measures of distress, given interaction effects emerged from the data, it is unlikely 
that social desirability confounded these results.  However, no interaction effects 
emerged in the self-report measure of self-harming behaviour during the follow up 
period, therefore it is possible that these findings could have been influenced by 
social desirability.  Future research should aim to replicate these findings using an 
objective measure of self-harming behaviour during the follow-up period – such as 
patient medical records.   
 
8.5.10 Conclusions and implications 
Despite the limitations noted above, there are a number of conclusions 
which can be drawn from this research and these lead to a number of implications.  
First, this research highlights the interactive nature of individual difference variables 
in the prediction of distress and suicidal thinking.  In particular, we found a series of 
moderating effects in the relationship between both perfectionism and rumination 
and a number of forms of distress.  Thus, future research must consider these 
interactive possibilities as opposed to examining variables in isolation.     
Second, the nature of the relationships between the individual difference 
variables studied throughout this thesis has varied between student participant 
samples and a clinical parasuicide sample.  This may be a consequence of clinical 
populations experiencing higher levels of distress and having higher levels of the 
individual difference variables under study (i.e. the clinical sample may have been 
further along a continuum than the students).  Nonetheless, these differences raise 
the obvious implication that future research should ensure that relationships are 
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tested in the appropriate population for a particular intervention, as any effects may 
not always be generalised beyond the population under study.   
Third, by focussing on potentially modifiable cognitive individual difference 
variables, we highlight a number of key areas for interventions aimed at reducing 
psychological distress and suicidal thinking to target.  This is timely given recent 
developments in cognitive behavioural therapy targeting the reduction of ruminative 
thinking (Watkins et al., 2007).     
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9      General Discussion 
9.1 Overview 
This final chapter aims to summarise the findings of the four studies that 
comprise this thesis and usefully integrate them into theoretical frameworks.  In 
addition, the findings are also discussed in relation to their relevance for the 
development of therapeutic interventions.  Limitations of this thesis overall are then 
highlighted before a discussion of directions for future research.  Finally, a brief 
summary of what this thesis adds to the literature is provided.   
 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
The four studies that comprise this thesis had three main aims:  First, to 
examine the role of stress, rumination, goal adjustment and attentional bias in the 
relationship between perfectionism and distress; Second, to examine the role of 
stress, goal adjustment and attentional bias in the relationship between rumination 
and distress and; Third, to examine the possibility of causal relationship between 
rumination and attentional bias.   The findings of this research with regards each of 
these aims is summarised below.   
 
9.2.1 The role of stress, rumination, goal adjustment and attentional bias in the 
relationship between perfectionism and distress. 
The results of the present thesis indicated that stress (both perceived stress 
and stressful life events) mediated the relationship between socially prescribed 
perfectionism and distress (Studies 1 and 3, sections 5.4.13.1.2 and 7.4.8.1.2).  
Perceived stress also moderated the relationship between socially prescribed 
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perfectionism and distress (Studies 1 and 3, sections 5.4.8.1.2, 5.4.7.1.2 and 
7.4.4.1.2), whilst both perceived stress and stressful life events moderated the 
relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and distress (Studies 1 and 3, 
sections 5.4.7.1.1, 5.4.8.1.1, 7.4.4.1.1 and 7.4.4.2.1).  These findings were not 
replicated in a clinical population (Study 4), possibly due to a ceiling effect in the 
measure of stress (see section 8.5.1 for a more detailed discussion).   
Rumination was found to both mediate and moderate the effects of socially 
prescribed perfectionism on psychological distress and suicidal thinking (Study 1, 
sections 5.4.7.3.2 and 5.4.8.3.2).  The brooding component of rumination was found 
to moderate the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and a range 
of measures of distress (Study 3, section 7.4.4.3.2, Study 4, section 8.4.4.2.2).  The 
reflective component of rumination was found to moderate the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety (Study 3, section 7.4.4.4.2) and 
suicidal thinking (Study 4, section 8.4.4.3.2).  However, the moderating effect of 
reflection in the clinical sample in Study 4, was in the opposite direction to the 
findings from the analogue studies, consistent with the notion of a protective effect 
of reflection in a population who have engaged in suicidal behaviour (Crane et al., 
2007) (see sections 8.5.2 and 8.5.5 for a more detailed discussion).        
No mediating effect of goal adjustment in the perfectionism-distress 
relationship was observed in any of the studies in this thesis.  Goal reengagement 
moderated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal 
thinking (Study 1, section 5.4.8.2.25.4.8.2.2).  Whilst goal disengagement 
moderated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and a range of 
measures of distress (Studies 1, 3 and 4, sections 5.4.7.2.2, 5.4.8.2.2, 7.4.4.5.2 and 
8.4.4.4.2).  Goal disengagement also moderated the self-oriented perfectionism-
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distress relationship in the analogue studies only (Studies 1 and 3, sections 5.4.7.2.1, 
5.4.8.2.1 and 7.4.4.5.1).   
Positive attentional bias moderated the relationship between socially 
prescribed perfectionism and hopelessness (Studies 1 and 4, sections 5.4.7.4.2 and 
8.4.4.5.2).  Positive attentional bias also moderated the relationship between self-
oriented perfectionism and suicidal thinking, in the clinical sample only (Study 4, 
section 8.4.4.5.1).  Additionally, again in the clinical sample only, there was a non-
significant trend for negative attentional bias to moderate the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and anxiety (Study 4, section 8.4.4.5.2).   
 
9.2.2 The role of stress, goal adjustment and attentional bias in the rumination-
distress relationship 
Perceived stress moderated the relationship between rumination and suicidal 
thinking (Study 1, sections 5.4.9.1 and 5.4.10.1).  In addition, perceived stress also 
fully or partially mediated the relationship between rumination and a range of 
measures of distress (Study 1, section 5.4.16.1).  With regards to the components of 
rumination, perceived stress and stressful life events moderated the relationship 
between brooding and distress (Study 3, section 7.4.5.1.1 and 7.4.5.2.1).  In 
addition, perceived stress also mediated the relationship between brooding and 
distress (Study 3, section 7.4.9.1.1).  Perceived stress was found to moderate, but 
not mediate, the relationship between reflection and distress in both the analogue 
and clinical studies (Studies 3 and 4, sections 7.4.5.1.2 and 8.4.5.1.2).  However, 
again the direction of this relationship differed between samples, as the protective 
effect of reflection was only apparent in the clinical population.   
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Goal adjustment did not mediate the rumination-distress relationship in any 
of the studies in this thesis.  However, goal disengagement moderated the 
relationship between rumination and hopelessness and suicidal thinking (Study 1, 
sections 5.4.9.2 and 5.4.10.2).  Goal disengagement also showed a non-significant 
trend to moderate the relationship between reflection and suicidal thinking (Study 3, 
section 7.4.5.3.2).   Goal disengagement also moderated the relationship between 
brooding and anxiety in the clinical sample only (Study 4, section 8.4.5.2.1).   
Finally, neither positive nor negative attentional bias moderated or mediated 
the rumination-distress relationship in the analogue samples.  However, in the 
clinical participants, negative attentional bias moderated the relationship between 
brooding and each measure of distress (Study 4, section 8.4.5.3.1).  A non-
significant trend for negative attentional bias to moderate the relationship between 
reflection and anxiety was also observed in the clinical sample (Study 4, section 
8.4.5.3.2) 
 
9.2.3 Causal relations between rumination and attentional bias 
Study one found that inducing rumination increased positive attentional bias, 
whilst inducing distraction decreased positive attentional bias – indicating a causal 
relationship between rumination and positive attentional bias (section 5.4.4).  Study 
two aimed to examine the possibility of causation in the relationship between 
rumination and attentional bias in the opposite direction, by attempting to 
manipulate positive and negative attentional biases through a modified version of 
the dot-probe.  However, we were unable to successfully manipulate attentional 
biases (sections 6.3.4.3 and 6.4.3.3), meaning the possibility of a causal relationship 
between attentional biases and rumination could not be directly tested.   
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9.3 Theoretical Context 
Having summarised the key findings of this research, discussion now moves 
to place these findings within a wider theoretical context.  This thesis provided 
evidence of a number of individual difference risk factors for suicidal behaviour and 
psychological distress.  Thus, our results sit best within a biopsychosocial 
conceptualisation of suicidal behaviour, where suicide is viewed as a behaviour 
resulting from a number of risk factors, as opposed to the consequence of mental 
illness alone.  What is apparent from the findings of this thesis is the interactive 
nature of the individual difference variables under study.   This section will attempt 
to explain these interactions with the theoretical context of four interactive models 
of suicidal behaviour: diathesis-stress models, Escape Theory, the Interpersonal 
Model and the Cry of Pain hypothesis.    
 
9.3.1 Diathesis-stress models 
The results of the present thesis provide some support for a diathesis-stress 
conceptualisation of suicidal behaviour – that is, that given the presence of a 
particular vulnerability (or diathesis); the experience of stress will increase 
suicidality.  Evidence from the analogue studies in this thesis (Studies 1 and 3, 
Chapters 5 and 7) lend support to diathesis-stress conceptualisations of the 
relationship between both self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and 
suicidal thinking, indicating that the experience of perceived stress in individuals 
high in socially prescribed or self-oriented perfectionism was associated with 
increased suicidal thinking.  However, evidence from the clinical study (Study 4, 
Chapter 8) was not consistent with these findings, as no moderating effect of stress 
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was found.  It is possible that failure of the clinical study to detect a moderating 
effect of stress may have been a consequence of a ceiling effect in the stress 
measure.  Unfortunately, as a shorter measure of perceived stress was used in the 
clinical studies, we were unable to directly compare whether clinical participants 
were reporting higher perceived stress levels.   
This thesis also provides some evidence to support a diathesis-stress 
conceptualisation of the relationship between rumination and both suicidal thinking 
and psychological distress.  The results of the analogue studies revealed that the 
negative consequences of rumination on suicidal thinking were amplified by the 
experience of perceived stress, as were both brooding and reflection separately.  
However, again these findings were not confirmed in the clinical sample.  The 
results of the clinical study suggest that under stress, reflection may indeed have a 
protective effect and be associated with lower levels of suicidal thinking.  This 
notion of a protective effect of reflection has previously been demonstrated in a 
population which included individuals who had previously engaged in suicidal 
behaviour (Crane et al., 2007) and sits well with the idea that reflection, as an 
attempt to engage in problem-solving, may represent the adaptive component of 
rumination.  However, the present findings raise the obvious question of why 
reflection in combination with stress appears to be associated with increased 
suicidal thinking in student populations and decreased suicidal thinking in a clinical 
population.  As noted above, it is unfortunate that the measure of perceived stress 
differed between the clinical and analogue studies as it would be useful to compare 
the levels of stress reported by the two differing populations to help explain the 
difference in findings.  An examination of the mean scores for reflection and 
brooding across the two populations reveals that the clinical sample have higher 
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mean scores for both brooding and reflection so one possibility is that reflective 
thinking does not have a beneficial impact on suicidal thinking until it reaches a 
particular levels.  After reviewing the evidence in this area, Nolen-Hoeksema and 
colleagues (2008) suggest that reflection may have distressing short term effects, 
but adaptive consequences over the long term.  It is possible that our results are 
related to this temporal difference where participants in the clinical study have been 
experiencing the effects of reflection for a longer period and are now encountering 
the longer term adaptive consequences, in contrast to the analogue populations.  
However, these explanations are purely speculative at present and future research is 
necessary to try to elucidate why there appear to be differences between the clinical 
and analogue samples.  
Nonetheless, this thesis provides evidence from analogue studies in support 
of a diathesis-stress conceptualisation of the relationship between both 
perfectionism and rumination and suicidal thinking.  This indicates that the presence 
of perfectionism or rumination per se is not necessarily associated with suicidal 
thinking, rather the combination of these individual difference vulnerabilities when 
an individual experiences what they perceive to be a stressful situation, which is 
associated with increased suicidal thinking.  These findings also raise implications 
for Response Styles theory, as the present results lend support to the notion of 
‘stress reactive rumination’ (Robinson & Alloy, 2003), suggesting that Response 
Styles theory may need to incorporate the role of stress in the relationship between 
rumination and distress.  At present Response Styles theorists argue that, rather than 
rumination increasing in response to stress, the opposite effect occurs whereby 
rumination increases the experience of stressful situations by altering instrumental 
behaviours (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  Some evidence of this mediating impact 
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of stress in the relationship between rumination and distress was found across the 
analogue studies in this thesis.  However, the diathesis-stress models of the 
relationship between rumination and distress, also observed in the current thesis 
illustrate that stress can also have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
rumination and distress, which is not currently accounted for by Response Style 
theory.  In order to further examine this issue it would be interesting for future 
research to employ experimental methods to determine the direction of causation 
between rumination and stress.    
 
9.3.2 Escape Theory 
Escape Theory (Baumeister, 1990) posits that suicidal behaviour is often a 
means to escaping painful self-awareness.  Escape Theory also proposes that this 
negative self-awareness in the first place, results from falling short of expectations 
in a stressful situation and then attributing the blame for this internally.  A key 
component of perfectionism is that an individual consistently feels they have failed 
to achieve necessary goals or standards, thus perfectionists are consistently falling 
short of their own (or their perception of others’) unrealistically high standards, for 
which they blame themselves.  Throughout this thesis we found that both socially 
prescribed and self-oriented perfectionism were associated with increased suicidal 
thinking, lending support to Escape Theory.  We also found that these negative 
consequences of perfectionism were often enhanced in combination with high 
stress, providing further support for Escape Theory.   
Our findings with regard to rumination are also consistent with Escape 
Theory.  Ruminative thinking results in increased focus on one’s thoughts and 
feelings and this negative self-focus is associated with increased levels of suicidal 
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thinking.  Thus, rumination may be analogous to Baumeister’s notion of painful 
self-awareness.  Our findings that rumination can enhance the negative 
consequences of perfectionism on distress, also lends support to Escape Theory, as 
the theory argues that negative self awareness results from stressful situations in 
which an individual falls short of expectations and attributes the blame for this 
shortfall internally.   
 
9.3.3 Interpersonal Model 
Our results may also provide some support for Joiner’s Interpersonal Model, 
which identifies three factors necessary for suicide to occur.  One such factor is the 
notion of ‘thwarted belongingness’ where an individual feels somewhat isolated or 
disconnected from society.  It seems likely that as ruminative thinking results in 
increased focus on the self, an individual is likely to feel more isolated and alone.  
Socially prescribed perfectionism may also impact on ‘thwarted belongingness’ as 
social perfectionists consistently feel they have failed to achieve the standards 
which others hold for them and this may result in an increased perception of being 
isolated. 
Socially prescribed perfectionism may also contribute to the second 
component of the Interpersonal Model, ‘perceived burdensomeness’.   It seems 
plausible that persistent feelings of failure to achieve the high standards of others’, 
is likely to make an individual feel more and more of a burden to others, which can 
result in the eventual thought that other people would be better off without them.    
Finally, it is also possible that some of the variables examined in this thesis 
may also impact on the final component of Interpersonal Model, ‘acquired 
capability’.  Joiner and colleagues have suggested that ‘acquired capability’ is 
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desensitisation to pain, which is usually a consequence of repeated self-injury.  
However, they acknowledge that this ‘acquired capability’ may not always require 
repeated physical injury, instead it may also result indirectly as a consequence of 
repeated exposure to pain or provocation (Stellrecht et al, 2006).  It is probable that 
the repetitive nature of ruminative thinking, in response to negative mood, will 
result in increased exposure to cognitive pain.  In addition, biases in attention 
towards negative stimuli in the environment are also likely to enhance an 
individual’s perception of pain.  Thus, both rumination and negative attentional bias 
may serve to enhance the ‘acquired capacity’ component of the Interpersonal 
Model.    
The interactive nature of our findings provide further support for the 
Interpersonal Model, as our results indicated that the experience of more than once 
of the individual difference variables often amplified the experience of suicidal 
thinking.  This is consistent with the notion that each of the components of the 
Interpersonal Model must be present to result in death by suicide.   
 
9.3.4 Cry of Pain hypothesis 
The findings of the present thesis can also be considered in relation to the 
Cry of Pain hypothesis, which is another diathesis-stress perspective, explaining 
suicidality in terms of a situation which an individual perceives to be defeating, 
inescapable and with no opportunity for rescue (see Figure 1.1).  According to this 
hypothesis, when an individual encounters such a scenario a psychobiological 
helplessness is activated, which results in the impulse to escape the situation 
through engaging in suicidal behaviour.  However, the model also acknowledges the 
role that individual difference variables may play at each of the stages, as the 
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interpretation of a situation as defeating, inescapable and without rescue can be 
influenced by a number of individual difference factors.   
Perfectionism, in particular socially prescribed perfectionism, can influence 
an individual’s feelings regarding defeat and inescapability of a particular situation.   
Perfectionists, by definition, are excessively concerned with failing to achieve 
standards (whether set by themselves or others).  This concern with failure can 
result in enhanced perceptions of defeat (as perfectionists often feel they have failed 
to achieve a particular standard).  Socially prescribed perfectionism may also 
influence perceptions regarding the escapability of a situation, as socially prescribed 
perfectionists are used to feeling that goals and targets are set for them by others, 
meaning they are less in control of particular situations.  Perfectionism is also likely 
to influence perceptions of rescue, as perfectionism is associated with poorer social 
relationships (e.g. Shahar, 2001) and lower levels of perceived social support 
(Mongrain, 1998; Priel & Shahar, 2000).   
Rumination, particularly brooding rumination, can also enhance perceptions 
of defeat and inescapability.  Brooding thoughts involve comparing a current 
situation with an unachieved benchmark, without moving into active problem 
solving.  Consequently, brooders are likely to repeatedly focus on a situation which 
they are unhappy with, without generating possible solutions to resolve the situation 
– meaning they are at increased risk of perceiving a situation as defeating with no 
opportunity for escape.   
Attentional biases affect the way an individual views the world and as such 
are likely to influence perceptions of defeat, escape and rescue.  Attentional bias can 
be thought of as a change in the orientation of one’s attention to a particular feature 
or class of features in the environment.  Thus negative attentional bias results in an 
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increasing tendency to focus on negative stimuli in the environment, which is likely 
to increase perceptions of defeat and feelings that a situation is inescapable and that 
rescue will not be forthcoming.   
Goal adjustment is also likely to influence perceptions of defeat.  Goal 
adjustment occurs in situations where an individual encounters an unachievable goal 
– hence they are likely to feel defeated.  Goal disengagement refers to the ability to 
disengage from that unattainable goal (i.e. disengage from the defeating situation), 
whilst goal reengagement refers to the ability to reengage with a new goal following 
a threat to goal pursuit (i.e. being able to reengage with a new goal following a 
defeating situation).  Thus, both goal disengagement and goal reengagement are 
individual difference variables which may be beneficial when defeating situations 
are encountered.   
Thus, each of the individual difference variables studied in this thesis could 
influence perceptions of at least one component of the Cry of Pain hypothesis.  
Crucially, what the results of this thesis emphasise, is that these individual 
difference variables are interactive and that in combination, they may further 
enhance perceptions of defeat, inescapability and no prospect of rescue.  For 
example, in addition to the interactive nature of the diathesis-stress relationships 
noted above, the combination of socially prescribed perfectionism and low levels of 
goal disengagement was associated with increased suicidal thinking and 
psychological distress in both the analogue and clinical studies in this thesis (Study 
1, Study 3 and Study 4).  This illustrates that the ability to disengage from 
unattainable goals was able to attenuate some of the negative consequences 
normally associated with socially prescribed perfectionism.  Other interactive 
combinations were more detrimental, for example, brooding exacerbated the 
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negative consequences of socially prescribed perfectionism (Study 3, section 
7.4.4.3.2).  These interactive findings illustrate that in combination, individual 
difference factors, may have differing impacts on suicidal thinking and 
psychological distress, thus it is important that these possible interactive effects are 
examined in the Cry of Pain hypothesis, as it is likely that whilst one factor may 
influence perceptions of defeat, escape or rescue – this relationship could be altered 
(either exacerbated or attenuated) in the presence of another individual difference 
factor.   
 
9.4 Therapeutic Interventions 
As noted earlier, suicide is a complex problem associated with numerous 
risk factors (see Chapter 1), therefore any intervention aimed at dealing with the 
problem, will necessarily be a complex intervention with numerous components (for 
a review of available psychosocial and pharmacological interventions see Hawton, 
Townsend, Arensman, Gunnell, Hazell, House & van Heeringen, 1999).  The 
present research highlights the interactive nature of the individual difference risk 
factors for suicide, further supporting the notion of a complex intervention.  The 
present results indicated a number of possible components to be included in any 
complex intervention.   
First, interventions aimed at reducing ruminative thinking, particularly 
brooding could be beneficial in reducing distress.  Recent work has provided 
preliminary evidence that rumination focussed cognitive behavioural therapy can be 
used to reduce ruminative thinking and promote more helpful styles of thinking 
(Watkins et al., 2007).   
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A second component in an intervention aimed at reducing suicidal thinking 
would be one which aimed to reduce perfectionism, particularly socially prescribed 
perfectionism.   Limited research has examined therapeutic interventions to reduce 
perfectionism.  However this has mainly focussed on ‘clinical perfectionism’ which 
does not directly map on to any the dimensions of perfectionism outlined by Hewitt 
and Flett (1991), but involves dysfunctional, self set, high standards which are 
pursued regardless of the adverse consequences (Shafran, Cooper & Fairburn, 
2002).  Evidence from a single case study (Shafran, Lee & Fairburn, 2004) and a 
preliminary randomised controlled trial (Riley, Lee, Cooper, Fairburn & Shafran, 
2007) suggests that cognitive behavioural therapy can reduce levels of clinical 
perfectionism.  To date, interventions to reduce socially prescribed perfectionism 
are less readily available; however the findings from the present thesis indicate that 
this may be an important component to any complex intervention for individuals at 
risk of suicidal behaviour.   
An additional factor highlighted by this research as a desirable component of 
a complex intervention to target suicidal thinking and psychological distress is 
attentional bias.  The present results indicate it would be desirable to modify both 
positive and negative attentional biases.  Some success in modifying negative 
attentional biases has been reported both in and outside the laboratory (e.g. 
MacLeod et al., 2002; MacLeod et al., 2007).  Although these effects were not 
replicated in the present thesis (Study 2), attentional bias training remains a possible 
method for altering attentional biases in at risk individuals.   
The present research also illustrated an additional aim of any complex 
intervention designed to reduce suicidal thinking and psychological distress would 
be to address goal adjustment.  At present, the author is not aware of any therapy 
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which is explicitly focused on modifying goal adjustment; however the findings of 
this thesis indicate that improving goal adjustment, particularly the ability to 
disengage from unattainable goals, would be beneficial. 
This thesis highlights the reduction of stress as final component which 
would be beneficial to include in any complex intervention aimed at tackling 
suicidal behaviour and psychological distress.  The diathesis-stress findings in this 
thesis indicate that the inclusion of stress management techniques would be 
beneficial to any complex intervention.   
 
9.5 Limitations 
The use of a number of self-report measures in studies through out this 
thesis is one possible limitation of this research.   Self-report measures have 
previously been criticised as being susceptible to the influence of social desirability, 
where participants respond in a manner which they believe is expected of them, 
rather than providing an accurate representation of their experiences or feelings.  
Although indexes of social desirability are available, we did not include one in any 
of the studies in this thesis, in an attempt to reduce the burden on participants.  
Instead, attempts to minimise the effects of social desirability were made through 
emphasising the confidentiality and anonymity of the research and highlighting that 
there were no right or wrong answers to any of the questions.  Given that interaction 
effects emerged from the data, it seems unlikely that social desirability confounded 
our results.   
A further limitation of the repeated use of self-report measures is the issue of 
shared method variance.   Shared method variance refers to the possibility of finding 
an association between two variables simply because of similarities in the way in 
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which they were measured.  Self-report measures were necessary in this research to 
allow us to include a large number of participants, within a limited timescale, 
however unfortunately this does leave our findings open to the criticism of shared 
method variance.     
 A number of findings in this research were correlational in nature, meaning 
that causation cannot be directly inferred.  Nonetheless, we attempted to strengthen 
these correlational findings through a prospective design where associations with 
distress were examined across time points, after controlling for initial levels of 
distress.  It was possible to examine causation in studies one and two where the 
impact of manipulating rumination on attentional bias (and vice versa) was 
examined.  However, it was not possible to employ this experimental procedure to 
examine the causal nature of every relationship, as not all of the individual 
difference variables could be readily manipulated.     
 
9.6 Future Directions for Research 
The numerous interactive effects observed in this thesis highlight the 
importance of not considering sole individual risk factors in isolation.  It is 
acknowledged that there are potentially many more interactive effects; however it 
was beyond the scope of this thesis to consider every individual difference.  Indeed, 
it has previously been argued that it would be impossible to develop a model of 
suicidal behaviour which encompassed all possible risk factors (O’Connor, 2003).  
However, future research in this area should aim to bear in mind the possible effects 
that one variable may have on another and, where possible, this should be 
examined.  
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In addition, the results of the clinical study in the present thesis indicate that 
although some of the relationships observed in the research using an undergraduate 
population were replicable, this was not the case for all relationships.  Although 
undergraduate populations are reporting increasing levels of distress (Furr et al., 
2001), meaning there can be merit in examining this population in its own right, it is 
also important that future research ensures that the population under study is the 
appropriate population for the particular research (i.e. for the development of an 
intervention for use with individuals presenting to hospital with self-harm, it is 
important that the population includes individuals who have presented to hospital 
with self-harm).   
In the present thesis, attempts to manipulate both positive and negative 
attentional biases were unsuccessful; however previous research by MacLeod and 
colleagues has successfully manipulated negative attentional bias (e.g. MacLeod et 
al., 2002; MacLeod et al., 2007).  The present research highlights the potential 
benefits of a computer based task capable of modifying both positive and negative 
attentional biases.  Thus, this would seem an important direction for future research 
to focus, with the aim of developing a methodology which can consistently 
manipulate attentional biases.   
 
9.7 What did this thesis add:  A brief summary 
This thesis aimed to examine the impact of individual difference variables in 
suicidal thinking and psychological distress.  In particular, focussing on the 
mediating or moderating role of a number of cognitive and personality variables in 
the established relationships with distress previously observed for both 
perfectionism (socially prescribed and self-oriented) and rumination.  The results of 
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this thesis confirmed the mediating and moderating influences in both the 
perfectionism-distress relationship and the rumination-distress relationship, 
highlighting the interactive nature of these variables.  This thesis, examined a 
number of relationships for the first time, including the role of attentional biases in 
the relationships between both perfectionism and distress and rumination and 
distress and the role of goal adjustment in the relationship between rumination and 
distress.    By examining these relationships in series of studies, using both analogue 
and clinical samples this thesis provides a strong evidence base for future research 
to build on.  Additionally, this thesis empirically examined the causal role of 
rumination in attentional biases and provides tentative evidence of a causal link 
between rumination and positive attentional bias.   
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ABSTRACT 
Rumination has been persistently implicated in the etiology of hopelessness and 
depression: proximal predictors of suicidality.  As a result, research has started to 
examine the role of rumination in suicidality.  This systematic review aims to: (i) 
provide a concise synopsis of the current progress in examining the relationship 
between rumination and suicidality; and (ii) highlight areas for future research.  To this 
end, a search of the international literature was conducted using the three main 
psychological and medical databases (Psych Info [1887-October 2007], Medline [1966-
October 2007] and Web of Knowledge [1981-October 2007]).  Eleven studies were 
identified providing evidence, with one exception, of a relationship between rumination 
and suicidality.  This systematic review has highlighted a considerable dearth of studies, 
specifically of case-control and prospective, clinical studies, in the worldwide literature. 
Key areas for future research are discussed.  
 
KEYWORDS:  Rumination; response style; suicide; systematic review
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The reduction of suicide is a public health priority for both the UK and US governments 
(Dept. of Health, 2002; US Public Health Service, 1999) and past suicidal behavior is 
the best predictor of completed suicide (e.g. O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  Consequently, 
research aimed at reducing the incidence of suicide often focuses on individuals who 
engage in suicidal ideation or suicidal behavior to help identify predictors of completed 
suicide.  
Research into the predictors of suicide often utilizes psychological diathesis-
stress models to explain the suicidal mind (e.g. O’Connor & O’Connor, 2003).  
Diathesis-stress models are founded on the premise that predisposing (cognitive) 
vulnerabilities, when activated by stress, predict suicidal behavior.  To this end, a 
number of vulnerabilities have been identified in the psychopathology literature, 
including hopelessness (Beck, Steer, Kovacs & Garrison, 1985), dichotomous thinking 
(Litinsky & Haslam, 1998), impaired problem solving (Pollock & Williams, 2004), 
overgeneral autobiographical memory (Williams, 1996), impaired positive future 
thinking (O’Connor et al., 2004) and perceived burdensomeness (Joiner et al., 2002).  
However, this review will focus on one such vulnerability factor:  rumination.   
Rumination, broadly defined as enduring, repetitive, self-focused thinking which 
is a frequent reaction to depressed mood (Rippere, 1977), has been frequently 
associated with the proximal predictors of suicidality: depression and hopelessness.  
Rumination has been persistently linked with depression.  For example, rumination has 
been implicated in the onset of depression (Robinson & Alloy, 2003) and has been 
shown to be predictive of the maintenance of depression, even after twelve months 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride & Larson, 1997). Recent research has also linked 
rumination to hopelessness (Lam, Schuck, Smith, Farmer, & Checkley, 2003).  
Furthermore, experimental research has highlighted the association between rumination 
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and impaired problem solving ability (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005), a characteristic also observed in 
suicidal individuals (Pollock & Williams, 2004).  It is therefore unsurprising that, 
during the last decade, the relationship between rumination and suicidality has 
generated research attention.  This review, therefore, examines those studies which 
investigate the relationship between rumination and suicidality.    
Rumination 
Although various definitions of rumination have been suggested (Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 2004), a prominent theory has been proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema and 
colleagues: The Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  In short, Nolen-
Hoeksema argues that rumination is the tendency to respond to distress by focusing on 
the causes and consequences of one’s problems without moving into active problem 
solving.  Indeed, the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ: Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) has been developed to measure ruminative response style.  When the 
scale was first developed, the ruminative component was usually operationalized on its 
own as a 22-item measure.  However, in recent years, there have been concerns that the 
RSQ may be contaminated by items which are, in effect, assessing depressive 
symptoms rather than rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  This 
led to re-analysis of the RSQ and (i) the subsequent removal of those items most closely 
associated with depression and (ii) the proposal that two components of rumination can 
be distinguished: reflection and brooding (Treynor et al., 2003).  Reflection refers to 
self-focus aimed at problem solving in response to depressed mood.  In contrast, 
brooding refers to ruminations comparing one’s present situation with another 
unachieved benchmark.    
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Aside from Nolen-Hoeksema’s work, a number of other definitions of 
rumination have emerged recently.  For example, Conway and colleagues (2000) 
proposed a definition of rumination which describes sadness focused rumination.  
According to this perspective, rumination reflects repetitive thinking about one’s current 
feelings of sadness and the situation(s) which led these feelings to arise.   These 
ruminative thoughts do not stimulate individuals to change their present circumstances 
and, unlike Nolen-Hoeksema’s theory, these ruminations are not disclosed to others 
(Conway, Csank, Holm & Blake, 2000).  Rumination on sadness is measured by the 
Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS).   
Another definition of rumination focuses on stress-reactive rumination 
(Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  Stress-reactive rumination refers to ruminations following a 
stressful event, as opposed to rumination in response to depressed mood, as proposed by 
Nolen-Hoeksema.  The content of stress-reactive ruminations focuses on negative 
inferences about a stressful event (Spasojević, Alloy, Abramson, Maccoon & Robinson, 
2004).  Stress-reactive rumination is highly correlated with Nolen-Hoeksema’s response 
styles rumination (or depressive rumination); however, despite this overlap, there are a 
number of distinctions between the two conceptualizations (Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  
The main point of contention is that Nolen-Hoeksema posits that depressive rumination 
contributes to the maintenance of depressive symptoms after onset, whilst Robinson and 
Alloy argue that stress-reactive rumination influences the onset of depressive symptoms.  
The notion of stress-reactive rumination fits with diathesis-stress conceptualizations of 
the relationship between rumination and distress (e.g. Morrison & O’Connor, 2005).  
Stress-reactive rumination is measured by the Stress-Reactive Rumination Scale (Alloy, 
Abramson, Hogan, Whitehouse, Rose et al., 2000).   
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Beyond the theoretical and conceptual developments, the present article is 
important in establishing the clinical implications of a rumination-suicidality 
relationship.  These would be particularly timely given the recent development of 
therapeutic techniques to modify rumination, thereby reducing suicidal risk (Watkins, 
Scott, Wingrove et al., in press). To summarize, we conducted a systematic review of 
the international literature to determine the nature of the relationship between 
rumination and suicidality.   
METHOD 
The three main psychological and medical databases, Psych Info (1887-October 
2007), Medline (1966-October 2007) and Web of Knowledge (1981-October 2007) 
were reviewed to determine appropriate papers for selection, consistent with O’Connor 
(in press).  Key word searches using the following terms were employed:  (i) suicid* 
and rumin*; (ii) self-harm and rumin*; self injur* and rumin*; (iv) parasuicid* and 
rumin*.  The abstracts of all studies generated by these searches were read by the first 
author to select appropriate studies which met the inclusion criteria.  These criteria 
were: (i) Only original and published journal articles were included in the review; (ii) 
the research must include a measure of rumination; (iii) the suicidal ideation and/or 
behavior of participants must have been chronicled for participants; (iv) the relationship 
between rumination and suicidal ideation and/or behavior had to be detailed in the study 
and; (v) the study must have been written in English. To ensure that other relevant 
studies were not missed, the reference sections of all studies were hand searched and 
followed up. 
The search processes yielded eleven papers which met the eligibility criteria for 
inclusion in the review.  These papers are presented in the proceeding sections using a 
framework similar to Speckens and Hawton (2005): (i) Cross-sectional studies 
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examining the role of rumination in suicidal ideation / behavior; (ii) case-control studies 
comparing groups of individuals with suicidal behavior/ideation with control groups of 
clinical patients or non-clinical controls; (iii) longitudinal/prospective studies of 
rumination as a prospective predictor of suicidal ideation / behavior.   
RESULTS 
Cross-sectional Studies 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Around half of the studies (n=5) were cross-sectional (see Table 1) and three of 
these studies (Lyness, Conwell, King, Cox & Caine, 1997; Simon, Pollack et al., 2007; 
Ahrens & Linden, 1996) were conducted with adult psychiatric patients presenting with 
a range of clinical diagnoses (major depression; bipolar depression and; schizophrenia 
and affective disorders, respectively).  The remaining cross-sectional studies sampled 
from the general population (Fairweather, Anstey, Rodgers, Jorm & Christensen, 2007) 
and college students (Eshun, 2000).    
Although three of the cross-sectional studies (Simon et al., 2007; Eshun, 2000; 
Fairweather et al., 2007) measured rumination via the rumination subscale of the 
Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), they used different 
versions of the scale.  Simon and colleagues (2007) used the 22-item measure and 
Eshun (2000) used the 36-item measure, whilst Fairweather and colleagues do not 
report the number of items they used.  Nonetheless, all three studies found ruminative 
response style significantly predicted suicidal ideation, despite employing different 
measures of ideation.  First, Simon and colleagues used the Suicide Behaviors 
Questionnaire (SBQ; Addis & Linehan, 1989; Linehan & Addis, 1990) which is a self-
report measure of past suicide ideation, future suicide ideation, past suicide threats, 
future suicide attempts and the likelihood of dying in a future suicide attempt.  In Simon 
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et al.’s sample of 98 outpatients diagnosed with bipolar depression, ruminative response 
style was predictive of total SBQ score, as well as those SBQ scores pertaining to 
present (as opposed to previously experienced) levels of suicidality, after controlling for 
age, gender, bipolar subtype and current bipolar status.  Simon et al. also found the 
same pattern of results when the analyses were conducted separately for males and 
females.  In contrast, Eshun (2000) utilized the Adult Suicide Ideation Questionnaire 
(ASIQ; Reynolds, 1991) which assesses suicide ideation and behaviors in the preceding 
month.  Ruminative response style was predictive of ASIQ scores in both the American 
(n=105) and Ghanaian (n=89) college students sampled in this study, after controlling 
for sex.   Finally, Fairweather and colleagues (2007) assessed suicide ideation through 
response to one item “In the last year, have you ever thought about taking your own 
life?” (p.131.) (Lindelow, Hardy & Rogers, 1997), from which general population 
participants were dichotomized as suicide ideators or non-ideators.  Rumination was 
found to be predictive of suicide ideation in the sample as a whole (n=7485) and in each 
of the three age cohorts in this study. 
The two remaining cross-sectional studies each employed different measures of 
rumination. Ahrens and Linden (1996) defined rumination as ‘an endless preoccupation 
or incessant concern with unpleasant thoughts’ (p.84) and measured it using the 
Association for Methodology and Documentation in Psychiatry (AMDP) system (Guy 
& Ban, 1982; Helmchen, 1985) which provides a dichotomous psychopathological 
assessment of 100 symptoms and 31 somatic signs.  The AMDP system was also used 
to provide dichotomous ratings of suicidality which comprised ‘severe suicidal 
intention, plans, preparations and/or attempts’ (p.80) (Ahrens & Linden, 1996).  Inter-
rater reliability of the suicidality rating was not directly reported in this study, however 
the authors stated that inter-rater reliability training was conducted on a monthly basis.  
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Nonetheless, rumination was found to be predictive of suicidality in both inpatient 
samples:  those diagnosed with affective disorders (n=1920) and those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (n=2383).   
In the final cross-sectional study, Lyness and co-workers (1997) used a much 
broader definition of rumination in their sample of 124 older adult inpatients diagnosed 
with major depression.  Rumination was defined, consistent with Nelson and Mazure 
(1985), as a propensity to ‘dwell on one idea to the exclusion of other thoughts’ (p.274).  
Observed ruminative thinking was then rated by researchers using a dichotomous scale.  
Reliability of these ratings was reported for observations of 7 patient interviews, with 
mean (SD) agreement at 89.5% (13.8%). Semi-structured interviews determined suicide 
ideation using one item from the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (Williams, 
1988). Chi-square was used to examine differences between the proportion of 
ruminators and non-ruminators reporting suicidal ideation.  No significant difference 
was found (however the different proportions were not reported).    
Case-Control Studies 
Only one case-control study met the criteria for inclusion (Crane, Barnhofer & 
Williams, 2007) (see Table 1).  Crane and colleagues recruited community volunteers 
who had previously experienced depression.  Participants were divided into three 
groups: (i) those who had never been suicidal (n=11); (ii) previous suicide ideators 
(n=11) and; (iii) previous suicide attempters (n=10).   
Crane and colleagues measured rumination through Nolen-Hoeksema’s 22-item 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1990), examining the 
brooding and reflective components separately.  Suicidality was determined through the 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998) which assessed 
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prior depression and suicidality.  Eight of these interviews were reviewed by a separate 
clinical psychologist and diagnoses were consistent for each case across raters.   
 Initial analyses found that no difference between groups on total RRS 
score.  However, the never suicidal group had significantly higher levels of reflection 
than the suicide attempters and a similar (although non-significant) trend was observed 
between the never suicidal and the suicide ideators.  No difference was observed on 
brooding ratings between the groups.  Crane and colleagues also examined the balance 
of brooding compared to reflection scores within each group and found that suicide 
attempters had significantly higher scores for brooding items compared to reflective 
items.  In contrast there was a trend approaching significance for the never suicidal 
group to have higher scores for reflective as opposed to brooding items.  No difference 
between average scores for brooding compared to reflective items was observed for the 
suicide ideator group.      
Longitudinal/Prospective Studies 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Five longitudinal/prospective studies met the criteria for inclusion (Smith, Alloy 
& Abramson, 2006; O’Connor, O’Connor & Marshall, 2007; O’Connor & Noyce, 2007; 
Morrison & O’Connor, 2007; Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007) (see Table 2).  Three 
of the studies employed samples of college students.   Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2007) and O’Connor and Noyce (2007) recruited (i) an adult community sample and 
(ii) a mixed community and college student sample, respectively.  Smith and colleagues 
(2006) tracked 138 college students over a 2.5 year period with information on 
suicidality and hopelessness being collected approximately every six weeks.  O’Connor 
and colleagues (2007) followed up 151 participants over an eight week period with 
measures of rumination collected at the start of the study and measures of suicidality 
  
292 
and hopelessness being collected at time two.  O’Connor and Noyce (2007) recruited 
153 participants who completed measures of rumination and suicidal ideation at time 
one and a measure of suicidal ideation at time two, approximately three months later.  
Morrison and O’Connor (2007) measured rumination, hopelessness and suicidal 
ideation at time one, followed by hopelessness and suicidal ideation at time two, 
approximately three weeks later in a sample of 73 participants.  Miranda and Nolen-
Hoeksema (2007) included 1134 participants in their study in which measures of 
rumination and suicidal ideation were taken at baseline and again at a one year follow 
up.    
All studies conceptualized rumination in accordance with Response Styles 
Theory, however, a variety of different measures were employed.  Both Miranda and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2007) and O’Connor and Noyce (2007) used the 22-item Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS).  Smith and co-workers (2006) also employed the RRS, however 
they only used 21-items.  Morrison and O’Connor (2007) used the short form 10-item 
measure of the RRS.  Whilst O’Connor et al. (2007) only focused on the brooding 
component of rumination, using a 5-item measure derived from Treynor et al. (2003).   
A variety of measures of suicidality were also utilized across the studies.  In 
Smith et al.’s (2006) study, suicidal ideation and behavior were measured in two ways.  
First, a composite score of the suicide item from the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) and the two suicide related items from the Symptom 
Check-List-90 (Derogatis, 1977) was calculated.  Participants completed this measure 
every six weeks, retrospectively for each two-week period in the 2.5 year follow up and 
the average score for each individual across this period was used.  Second, diagnostic 
interviews using the suicide items from the Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia – Change (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978) were conducted every 6 weeks.  
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This clinical interview was modified to provide a measure of the presence and duration 
of suicidal thoughts as well as any suicide attempts (Smith et al., 2006).  Participants 
reporting any clinically significant suicide ideation across the 2.5 years of the project 
were dichotomized as suicide ideators – yes or no.  The number of days, during which 
participants reported suicidal feelings in diagnostic interviews, were summed to provide 
an index of the duration of suicidal ideation. Similarly, Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema 
also employed a composite measure of suicide ideation:  The Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1997) and the suicide 
item of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Beck, 1972) were used to 
measure suicide ideation in the past month at both baseline and follow-up.  Again this 
information was used to dichotomize participants as suicide ideators or non-ideators.  In 
contrast, the remaining three studies (O’Connor et al., 2007; O’Connor & Noyce, 2007) 
and Morrison & O’Connor, 2007) all measured suicidal ideation via the 8-item subscale 
of the Suicide Probability Scale (Cull & Gill, 1982). This assesses suicidal cognitions, 
negative affect and plans of suicide in the preceding week.   
Smith and colleagues (2006) found that rumination, after controlling for sex, 
age, ethnicity and cognitive risk for depression (determined by negative inferential style 
and dysfunctional attitudes), was not significantly associated with the presence or 
absence of suicidal thinking rated from the diagnostic interview.  However, again after 
controlling for sex, age, ethnicity and cognitive risk, rumination was significantly 
associated with both the composite self-report score of suicide ideation and the duration 
of suicide ideation.  Of particular interest, formal mediation analyses showed that 
rumination mediated the relationship between cognitive risk and suicide ideation.  
Furthermore, hopelessness partially mediated the relationship between rumination and 
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suicide ideation (composite measure) and fully mediated the link between rumination 
and the duration of suicide ideation.    
Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema (2007) found that after controlling for 
demographic variables and initial distress, both brooding and reflective rumination were 
significant predictors of suicide ideation one year later.  Additional analyses, also 
controlling for depression at follow-up, examined whether the relationship between 
rumination and suicide ideation resulted from the impact of brooding or reflection on 
future experiences of depressive symptoms.  This was found to be the case for brooding, 
but not reflective rumination, thus the relationship between brooding and suicidal 
ideation was mediated by the effect of brooding on future depression.    
O’Connor and colleagues (2007) found brooding rumination predicted suicidal 
ideation eight weeks later.  In addition, they also found that brooding rumination 
partially mediated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and 
suicidal ideation and fully mediated the relationship between self-oriented perfectionism 
and suicidal ideation.   
 O’Connor and Noyce (2007) found brooding, but not reflection, 
significantly predicted suicide ideation at time two, after controlling for demographic 
variables and initial suicidal ideation.  In addition, brooding was also found to fully 
mediate the relationship between self-criticism and suicidality. 
 Morrison & O’Connor (2007) found that the interaction between 
rumination and stress significantly predicted suicide ideation at time two after 
controlling for initial levels of distress.   
DISCUSSION 
With one exception, all of the studies reported herein found rumination to be 
associated with suicidal ideation and/or behavior.  Significantly, each of the studies 
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which defined rumination according to response styles theory found that rumination was 
associated with suicidality despite different methodologies, samples and measures of 
suicidal ideation and/or behavior.   
Measuring rumination  
In addition to the fact that there were only a small number of studies eligible for 
inclusion in this review, it is unfortunate that most of the studies employed different 
measures of rumination.  What is more, although the majority of the studies (O’Connor 
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2003; Eshun, 2000; Simon et al., 2007; Fairweather et al., 
2007; Morrison & O’Connor, 2007; O’Connor & Noyce, 2007; Miranda & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2007; Crane et al., 2007) measured rumination via the Response Styles 
Questionnaire, five different versions of this scale were employed. Consequently, this 
hinders comparison between studies as the longer version of the questionnaire contained 
more items which may be interpreted as “automatic negative thoughts” as opposed to 
the key features of a ruminative response style (Nolen-Hoeksema, personal 
communication).   
Indeed, the RSQ has recently been criticized, with some authors arguing that it is 
contaminated with items reflecting depression as opposed to rumination (e.g. Conway, 
Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000).  Four studies in this review address this potential 
criticism by examining the sub-components of rumination (brooding and reflection) not 
contaminated by depressive content (see Treynor et al., 2003), with varying results.  
O’Connor and colleagues (2007), Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema (2007) and O’Connor 
and Noyce (2007) all found brooding rumination to be associated with suicidality.  
O’Connor and colleagues (2007) did not measure reflective rumination, so can offer no 
insight into any relationship between the two. Whilst Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema 
found reflective rumination was predictive of suicidality, O’Connor and Noyce did not 
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find this relationship.  Nonetheless, the latter authors’ data were not incompatible with 
Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema’s findings and it may be that the large sample size 
employed by Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema allowed the detection of a small effect 
which O’Connor and Noyce did not have the power to detect (O’Connor & Noyce, 
2007).    
The only case-control study in this review (Crane et al., 2007) provides 
interesting and unique data on reflection.  These authors found significantly higher 
levels of reflection reported by never suicidal individuals compared to those who had 
previously attempted suicide.  This suggests a protective effect of reflective rumination, 
not observed in any of the other research.  One possible explanation for this finding is 
that in Crane and colleagues’ research, the protective effect is found in the comparison 
between the never suicidal and the previous attempters groups.  None of the other 
studies in the review examined the components of rumination in relation to suicidal 
behavior, instead focusing on ideation only.  A further explanation concerns the 
measurement of suicidality, whilst Crane et al.’s research centers on previously 
experienced suicidal ideation and behavior, Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema’s and 
O’Connor and Noyce’s research both focus on prospective and current suicide ideation.  
It may be that any relationship between rumination and suicidality varies as a function 
of current suicide status (O’Connor & Noyce, 2007), this would be an interesting area 
for future research to address.   
 The two studies which did not use the Ruminative Response Scale to 
determine rumination (Ahrens & Linden, 1996; Lyness et al., 1997) failed to provide a 
detailed theoretical rationale for their definition of rumination.  Furthermore, they each 
dichotomized participants into either ‘ruminators’ or ‘non-ruminators’ which may be a 
somewhat artificial distinction and, at the very least, reduces the sensitivity of the 
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measures.  In addition, Ahrens & Linden’s (1996) definition of rumination as an 
‘endless preoccupation or incessant concern with unpleasant thoughts’ (p.84), suggests 
that ruminative thinking need not focus on the self to be included in this definition.  As 
a result, we believe that such a definition is inherently problematic.  Lyness and 
colleagues’ definition is broader still: a propensity to ‘dwell on one idea to the exclusion 
of other thoughts’ (p.274).  This latter definition suggests again that the ruminations 
need not be self-focused.  In addition, thoughts focusing on a positive or happy thought 
or idea would also be coded as ruminative thinking in Lyness et al.’s study.  
Unfortunately, neither Ahrens & Linden nor Lyness and colleagues gave examples of 
ruminative thinking, nor specific details of how rumination was determined within their 
psychiatric assessment.  Consequently, it is difficult to make a judgment about the 
validity of these methods of assessment. Finally, given that the all-encompassing 
definition of rumination used by Lyness and colleagues does not exclude people who 
ruminate over positive thoughts or ideas, it is perhaps unsurprising that this is the only 
study in the review which found no relationship between rumination and suicidality.   
 In short, this review highlights the paucity of research employing 
conceptualizations of rumination apart from Nolen-Hoeksema’s.  For example, none of 
the studies examined the relationship between the Rumination on Sadness Scale or the 
Stress-Reactive Rumination Scale and suicidality; clearly there is an urgent need for 
future research to address this dearth.   
Measuring suicidality 
Eight out of the eleven studies in this review employed different measures of 
suicidality, and with only two exceptions, all employed only one index of suicidality.  
Smith et al. (2006) and Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema (2007), were the only studies to 
supplement their self-report measure with a clinician rating of suicidal ideation.  Ahrens 
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and Linden (1996), Lyness and colleagues (1997), Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema, 
(2007) and Fairweather and colleagues (2007) all dichotomized participants as 
‘suicidal’ or ‘non-suicidal’ according to psychiatric assessment, interview or self-report.  
This dichotomy results in an artificial distinction, for example Ahrens and Linden only 
classified participants as ‘suicidal’ if they displayed ‘severe suicidal intention, plans, 
preparations and/or attempts’ (p.80).  However, this implies that individual’s displaying 
‘moderate’ suicide intention would have been classified as non-suicidal.  No working 
definition is given to explain how ‘severe’ suicide intentions were distinguished from 
lesser intentions.  Indeed, for the most part, the assessment of suicidality in the papers 
reviewed would not have met the standards outlined in O’Carroll et al.’s (1996) classic 
‘Tower of Babel’ paper.  In short, lethality and intent should be routinely assessed. 
Disappointingly, only one case-control study, where levels of rumination were 
compared in suicidal individuals versus matched controls, was identified in this review 
(Crane et al., 2007).  However, as noted previously, Crane et al’s study relied on recall 
of previously experienced suicidal ideation and behavior as opposed to current ideation 
or behavior meaning their results may have been affected by memory biases or 
distortions.  More research using case-control methodology with actively suicidal 
participants would help to address the weaknesses associated with the correlational 
designs employed by the majority of studies under review.  Furthermore, none of the 
longitudinal studies employed a clinical participant group – therefore caution is required 
until the rumination-suicidality relationship is demonstrated prospectively with a 
clinical population.   
Sex Differences 
Previous research has highlighted sex differences in rumination, with females 
being more likely to have a ruminative response style (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Nolen-
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Hoeksema, Larson & Grayson, 1999).  Nonetheless, there was no evidence of a sex 
difference in any of the studies under review. However, Ahrens and Linden (1996), 
Lyness et al. (1997) and Morrison and O’Connor (2007) did not report the effect of sex 
on their analyses, nor did they report the proportion of persons classified as ruminators 
by sex.  Although O’Connor and colleagues (2007) found no sex differences in 
brooding rumination scores, they did not run the analyses separately for males and 
females nor did they control for sex in their analyses (Study 2).  Fairweather and 
colleagues (2007) found no interaction between sex and rumination, so they did not 
conduct their analyses separately for males and females.  Simon and colleagues (2007) 
were the only study to run analyses separately for males and females and they found no 
sex differences in the rumination-suicidality relationship.  Crane et al. matched groups 
with regards to sex , whilst Eshun (2000), Smith et al. (2006), Miranda and Nolen-
Hoeksema (2007) and O’Connor and Noyce (2007) all controlled for sex in their 
regression analyses; however none of these studies reported analyses separately for 
males and females.  Given previous research suggests that sex differences in rumination 
may explain differences in the prevalence of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999), 
future work should examine whether any observed relationships between rumination 
and suicidality hold for both males and females.    
Theoretical Context 
Much of the research in this review was atheoretical in focus and made no 
attempt to map findings onto theoretical accounts of suicidal behavior.  Only Smith et 
al. (2006) and O’Connor and colleagues placed their research in a theoretical 
framework.  Smith and colleagues examined rumination in the context of Attention 
Mediated Hopelessness Theory (AMHT: MacCoon, Abramson, Mezulis, Hankin & 
Alloy, 2005).  This theory posits that the difference between sought after outcome and 
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actual outcome, following a negative life event, triggers attention towards this 
discrepancy, in an attempt to decrease or resolve it.  However, cognitive vulnerabilities 
can hinder this process of resolving or decreasing discrepancies and in these instances, a 
repetitive cycle of focusing on the discrepancy occurs – analogous to rumination.  This 
cycle is predicted to increase hopelessness which in turn, increases suicidal ideation.  
Smith and colleagues found that, as predicted by AMHT, hopelessness mediated the 
relationship between rumination and the duration of suicidal ideation, in addition to 
partially mediating the relationship between rumination and self-reported suicidal 
ideation.   
O’Connor et al. (2007) examined rumination as a mediator between 
perfectionism and suicidality.  Despite the current debate as to the specific dimensional 
nature of perfectionism (see O’Connor, in press), accumulating evidence suggests a 
relationship between perfectionism and suicidality (e.g. Hunter & O’Connor, 2003).  As 
a result, O’Connor et al. (2007) examined rumination as a potential mechanism to 
explain the deleterious effects of perfectionism in suicidality.  Their results supported 
this interpretation, as brooding rumination partially mediated the relationship between 
socially prescribed perfectionism and suicidal ideation and fully mediated the 
relationship between self-oriented perfectionism and suicidal ideation.  In a similar vein, 
O’Connor and Noyce examined rumination as a mechanism explaining the role of self-
criticism in suicidality.  Again their results support this interpretation with brooding 
fully mediating the link between self-criticism and suicide ideation.  The relevance of 
these findings is discussed in relation to the Cry of Pain model (Williams, 2001) which 
posits that feelings of both defeat and entrapment are precipitants to suicidal behavior.  
These authors suggest that self-criticism, or perfectionism may result in heightened 
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perceptions of defeat, whilst brooding amplifies the feeling that a particular situation is 
inescapable.   
Finally, Morrison & O’Connor (2007) place their data in the context of 
diathesis-stress conceptualizations of cognitive theory, which posit that cognitive 
vulnerabilities remain dormant until activated by stress.  This diathesis-stress hypothesis 
is supported by their data where the interaction between rumination and stress was 
predictive of suicidal ideation, as opposed to the direct effect of rumination.   
Conclusions 
With one exception, all of the studies reported herein found that increased 
rumination was associated with increased suicidality.  The one exception (Lyness et al., 
1997) employed an all-encompassing definition of rumination, which may have 
included individuals with ruminations focused on a positive theme, and this may 
account for the failure to find a relationship between rumination and suicidal thinking.   
Future research should attempt to test the relationship between rumination and 
suicidality using consistent measures of both constructs to facilitate study comparison.  
More longitudinal research in clinical populations is required to examine whether initial 
levels of rumination are predictive of changes in suicidal thinking and behavior over 
time.  Finally, it is of paramount importance that the rumination-suicidality studies are 
placed within a theoretical context as this will facilitate the development of rumination-
based clinical interventions.   
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Table 1.  Cross-sectional and case-control studies included in the systematic review 
Study 
(Country) 
Participants  Gender (Mean Age) Suicidality  
Measure 
Rumination 
Measure 
Design Results 
Ahrens & Linden 
(1996) 
(Germany) 
4303 Psychiatric 
Inpatients 
(2383 schizophrenics 
& 1920 affective 
disorder patients) 
55.66% female 
 
AMDP assessment 
(Guy & Ban, 1982; 
Helmchen, 1985) 
AMDP 
assessment  
(Guy & Ban, 
1982; Helmchen, 
1985)   
Cross-sectional Rumination is predictive of suicidality  
Eshun (2000) 
(USA & Ghana) 
194 College students  51% female 
(21.61 years; range 17-
24 years) 
ASIQ (Reynolds, 1991) RSQ 36-item  
(Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991) 
Cross-sectional Significant positive correlation between 
rumination and ideation in both cultures.  RSQ 
was a significant predictor of ideation in both 
cultures 
 
Lyness, Conwell, 
King, Cox & 
Caine (1997) 
 (USA) 
124 Depressed 
psychiatric inpatients  
Not reported (>50 
years) 
Suicide item from 
Hamilton D (Williams, 
1988) 
Dichotomous 
rating of 
rumination  
(Nelson & 
Mazure, 1985) 
Cross-sectional Chi-square test found no difference in frequency 
of ruminators between suicide ideators and non-
suicide ideators.   
Simon, Pollack 
et al. (2007) 
(USA) 
98 Bipolar patients  57.1% female 
(44.8 years; SD=13.9) 
SBQ 
(Addis & Linehan, 
1989; Linehan & 
Addis, 1990)  
RSQ 22 item 
(Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991) 
Cross-sectional Higher RSQ scores predicted greater SBQ scores.  
.   
 
Fairweather et al. 
(2007) 
(Australia) 
7485 participants 
randomly sampled 
from community  
50.9% female (Three 
age cohorts: 20-24 
years, 40-44 years and 
60-64 years) 
“In the last year, have 
you ever thought about 
taking your own life?” 
(Lindelow et al., 1997) 
RSQ (Nolen-
Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) 
Cross-sectional Rumination is predictive of suicide ideation.   
Barnhofer & 
Williams (2007)  
(UK) Crane 
32 Previously 
depressed community 
volunteers 
 
66% female 
(31.65 years; SD=13, 
range 18-64 years) 
MINI (Sheehan et al., 
1998) 
RSQ 22 item 
(brooding and 
reflection 
considered 
separately) 
Case control (3 
groups:  never 
suicidal (n=11; 
ideators only 
(n=11); previous 
attempters 
(n=10) 
Significantly higher levels of reflection in the 
never suicidal group compared to the previous 
attempters.  No difference in brooding between 
groups.  Never suicidal group endorsed more 
reflective items compared to brooding items – the 
reverse trend was found for the previous suicide 
attempter group.   
Note: AMDP= Association for Methodology and Documentation in Psychiatry; RSQ=Response Styles Questionnaire; SBQ=Suicide Behaviors Questionnaire; ASIQ=Adult 
Suicide Ideation Questionnaire; MINI=Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview
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Table 2.  Longitudinal/prospective studies included in the review 
Study 
(Country) 
Participants  Gender (Mean 
Age) 
Suicidality  
Measure 
Rumination 
Measure 
Design Results 
O’Connor, 
O’Connor & 
Marshall, (2007) 
(UK) 
211 college students 
at T1 
(71.6% at T2) 
73.5% female 
(24.05 years; 
range 17-54 
years) 
Suicide ideation subscale 
of SPS  
(Cull & Gill, 1982) 
RSQ – 5 Brooding 
items 
(Treynor et al., 2003) 
Prospective 
over 8 
weeks 
Brooding rumination significantly positively 
correlated with suicide ideation.  Brooding 
rumination mediated relationship between self-
oriented perfectionism and suicide ideation. 
Smith, Alloy & 
Abramson 
(2006) 
(USA) 
138 (11 excluded 
due to incomplete 
data) college 
students. 
64.1% female 
(20.05 years) 
#9 BDI  
(Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979) 
#15 & #59 Symptom 
Checklist – 90 (Derogatis, 
1977) 
SADS-C diagnostic 
interview 
(Endicott & Spitzer, 
1978) 
RSQ 21 item  
(Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) 
Longitudinal 
over 2.5 
years 
(assessments 
approx. 
every 6 
weeks) 
RSQ predicted self-reported suicide ideation and 
duration of suicide ideation. 
RSQ mediated the relationship between cognitive 
risk and suicide ideation. 
Hopelessness partially mediated the relationship 
between RSQ and suicide ideation & fully mediated 
the relationship between RSQ and suicide ideation 
duration 
RSQ not related to SADS-C measure of suicide 
thinking 
O’Connor & 
Noyce  (2007) 
(UK) 
232 college students 
at T1 (66% at T2) 
73.3% female 
(25.98 years, 
SD=14.36) 
Suicide ideation subscale 
of SPS  
(Cull & Gill, 1982) 
RSQ 22 item 
(brooding and 
reflection considered 
separately) 
Prospective 
over 3 
months 
Brooding, but not reflection, significantly predicted 
suicide ideation.  Brooding fully mediated the self-
criticism – suicide ideation relationship. 
Miranda & 
Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2007) 
(USA) 
Community sample 
of adults (n=1324 at 
T1 and n=1134 at 
T2) 
53.5% female 
(47.8 years, 
SD=15.1, range 
25-82 years) 
SCID (First et al., 1997) 
suicide item on BDI 
(Beck & Beck, 1972) 
RSQ 22 item 
(brooding and 
reflection considered 
separately) 
Longitudinal 
over 1 year 
Brooding and rumination predicted suicide ideation 
at T2.  Depressive symptoms at T2 mediated the 
brooding-suicide ideation relationship. 
Morrison & 
O’Connor (2007) 
(UK) 
81 college students 
at T1 (90.1% at 
follow-up) 
71.6% female 
(22.09 years, 
SD=6.25, range 
16-48 years) 
Suicide ideation subscale 
of SPS  
(Cull & Gill, 1982) 
RSQ Short Form (10 
item) 
Prospective 
over 3 
weeks 
Interaction between rumination and stress predicted 
suicidal ideation 
Note: BDI=Beck Depression Inventory; SADS-C= Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia – Change; RSQ=Response Styles Questionnaire; SPS=Suicide 
Probability Scale; SCID=Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
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Appendix 2 Response Styles Questionnaire 
Instructions: People think and do many different things when they feel sad, blue, or depressed.  Please 
read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do 
each one when you feel sad, down, or depressed.  Please indicate what you generally do, not what you 
think you should do. 
 
Think about how alone you feel Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap 
out of this” 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
1 
Almost Always  
2 
Almost Always  
 
Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness Think about how hard it is to concentrate 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
3 
Almost Always  
4 
Almost Always  
 
Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
5 
Almost Always  
6 
Almost Always  
 
Analyse recent events to try to understand why 
are depressed 
Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything 
anymore 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
7 
Almost Always  
8 
Almost Always  
 
Think “Why can’t I get going?” Think “Why do I always react this way?” 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
9 
Almost Always  
10 
Almost Always  
 
Go away by yourself and think about why you 
feel this way 
Write down what you are thinking and analyse it 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
11 
Almost Always  
12 
Almost Always  
 
Think about a recent situation wishing it had 
gone better 
Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep 
feeling this way” 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
13 
Almost Always  
14 
Almost Always  
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Think “Why do I have problems other people 
don’t have?” 
Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
15 
Almost Always  
16 
Almost Always  
 
Think about how sad you feel Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, 
mistakes 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
17 
Almost Always  
18 
Almost Always  
 
Think about how you don’t feel up to doing 
anything 
Analyse your personality and try to understand why 
you are depressed 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
19 
Almost Always  
20 
Almost Always  
 
Go someplace alone to think about your feelings Think about how angry you are with yourself 
Almost Never  Almost Never  
Sometimes  Sometimes  
Often  Often  
21 
Almost Always  
22 
Almost Always  
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Appendix 3 Multi Dimensional Perfectionism Scale 
Instructions:  Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal characteristics and 
traits. Read each item and decide whether you agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strongly 
agree, circle 7; if you strongly disagree, circle 1; if you feel somewhere in between, circle any one of 
the numbers between 1 and 7. If you feel neutral or undecided, the midpoint is 4. 
                                                                                        
Disagree                      Agree  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 When I am working on something I cannot relax until it is perfect        
2 I am not likely to criticise someone for giving up too easily        
3 It is not important that the people I am close to are successful        
4 I seldom criticise my friends for accepting second best        
5 I find it difficult to meet others’ expectations of me        
6 One of my goals is to be perfect in everything I do        
7 Everything that others do must be of top-notch quality        
8 I never aim for perfection in my work        
9 Those around me readily accept that I can make mistakes too        
10 It doesn’t matter when someone close to me does not do their absolute best        
11 The better I do, the better I am expected to do        
12 I seldom feel the need to be perfect        
13 Anything I do that is less than excellent, will be seen as poor work by those around 
me 
       
14 I strive to be as perfect as I can be        
15 It is very important that I am perfect in everything I attempt        
16 I have high expectations for the people who are important to me        
17 I strive to be the best at everything I do        
18 The people around me expect me to succeed at everything I do        
19 I do not have very high standards for those around me        
20 I demand nothing less than perfection of myself        
21 Others will like me even if I don’t excel at everything        
22 I can’t be bothered with people who won’t strive to better themselves        
23 It makes me uneasy to see an error in my work        
24 I do not expect a lot from my friends        
25 Success means that I must work even harder to please others        
26 If I ask someone to do something, I expect it to be done flawlessly        
27 I cannot stand to see people close to me make mistakes        
28 I am perfectionistic in setting my goals        
29 The people who matter to me should never let me down        
30 Others think I am okay, even when I do not succeed        
31 I feel that people are too demanding of me        
32 I must work to my full potential at all times        
33 Although they may not show it, other people get very upset with me when I slip up        
34 I do not have to be the best at whatever I am doing        
35 My family expects me to be perfect        
36 I do not have very high goals for myself        
37 My parents rarely expected me to excel in all aspects of my life        
38 I respect people who are average        
39 People expect nothing less than perfection from me        
40 I set very high standards for myself        
41 People expect more from me than I am capable of giving        
42 I must always be successful at school or work        
43 It does not matter to me when a close friend does not try their hardest        
44 People around me think I am still competent even if I make a mistake        
45 I seldom expect others to excel at whatever they do        
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Appendix 4 Goal Adjustment Scale 
Instructions:  During their lives people cannot always attain what they want and are sometimes 
forced to stop pursuing the goals they have set.  We are interested in understanding how you usually 
react when this happens to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements, as it usually applies to you. 
 
 If I have to stop pursuing an important 
goal in my life… 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 It's easy for me to reduce my effort 
towards the goal. 
    
2 I convince myself that I have other 
meaningful goals to pursue. 
    
3 I stay committed to the goal for a long 
time; I can't let it go. 
    
4 
I start working on other new goals.     
5 
I think about other new goals to pursue     
6 I find it difficult to stop trying to 
achieve the goal. 
    
7 
I seek other meaningful goals.     
8 It's easy for me to stop thinking about 
the goal and let it go. 
    
9 I tell myself that I have a number of 
other new goals to draw upon. 
    
10 I put effort toward other meaningful 
goals. 
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Appendix 5 Dot Probe Stimuli 
Positive Word Neutral Pairing Negative Word Neutral Pairing 
love vote despair testing 
happy green grief slate 
joy bag sad wit 
tender sooner cry pen 
excited voltage tragic rhythm 
devoted witness suicide nursery 
relieved stimulus guilty impose 
smile uncle rejected moderate 
friendly occasion misery margin 
hopeful shallow upset shove 
amazed expert punish weekly 
proud yield gloom oyster 
enjoying sandwich helpless resident 
faithful gigantic hurt gear 
cheerful sanction ashamed abolish 
humorous wildlife doom hint 
ardent willow hopeless fragment 
eager total failure balance 
lively ladder blame total 
peaceful rational weakness transfer 
pleased academy bad bag 
calm keen grave wrist 
glorious validity ugly tray 
cheer  salad awful solar 
carefree civilian solemn deduct 
pleasant resident bored kitty 
pious maple fault bathe 
bright beauty worse rapid 
sunny juice mistakes youngest 
lucky onion tire pink 
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Appendix 6 Perceived Stress Scale 
Instructions:  Please put an X in the box which indicates how often you have felt or thought a 
certain way since you completed the first part of the experiment (4-6 weeks ago) 
 
 How often have you….. Never Almost  
Never 
Sometimes Fairly  
Often 
 Very  
Often 
1 Been upset because of something that happened 
unexpectedly? 
     
2 Felt that you were unable to control the important 
things in your life? 
     
3 Felt nervous and stressed?      
4 Dealt successfully with irritating life hassles?      
5 Felt that you were effectively coping with important 
changes that were occurring in your life? 
     
6 Felt confident about your ability to handle your 
personal problems? 
     
7 Felt that things were going your way?      
8 Found that you could not cope with all the things you 
had to do? 
     
9 Been able to control irritation in your life?      
10 Felt that you were on top of things?      
11 Been angered because of things that happened that 
were outside of your control? 
     
12 Found yourself thinking about things that you have to 
accomplish? 
     
13 Been able to control the way you spend your time?      
14 Felt difficulties were piling up so high that 
you could not overcome them? 
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Appendix 7 Life Events Scale for Students 
Instructions:  Please put a cross in the appropriate box to indicate whether you have experienced 
any of the following events in the past twelve months 
 
 Yes No 
1 Death of parent    
2 Major personal injury or illness    
3 Major argument with parents    
4 Beginning an undergraduate programme at university    
5 Moving away from home    
6 Getting an unjustified low mark on a test    
7 Failing a number of courses    
8 Minor violation of the law (e.g. speeding ticket)    
9 Getting kicked out of college    
10 Seeking psychological or psychiatric consultation    
11 Vacation alone/with friends    
12 Pregnancy (either yourself or being the father)    
13 Minor car accident    
14 Seriously thinking about dropping college    
15 Getting your own car    
16 Jail term (self)    
17 Moving out of town with parents    
18 Vacation with parents    
19 Establishing new steady relationship with partner    
20 Finding a part-time job    
21 Sex difficulties with boy/girlfriend    
22 Failing a course    
23 Major change of health in close family member    
24 Major car accident (car wrecked, people injured)   
25 Death of your best or very good friend    
26 Family get-togethers    
27 Break-up of parent’s marriage/divorce    
28 Losing a part-time job    
29 Major and/or chronic financial problems    
30 Major argument with boy/girlfriend    
31 Parent losing a job    
32 Switch in program within same college or university    
33 Losing a good friend    
34 Change of job    
35 Break-up with boy/girlfriend    
36 Minor financial problems    
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Appendix 8 Beck Hopelessness Scale 
Instructions:  Please put an X in the box to indicate whether you think each of the following 
statements is TRUE or FALSE for you, at this moment in time. 
 
   True  False 
1 I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm   
2 I might as well give up as I can’t make things better for myself   
3 When things are going badly, I am helped by knowing that they can’t stay that way forever   
4 I can’t imagine what my life would be like in 10 years   
5 I have enough time to accomplish the things I most want to do   
6 In the future I expect to succeed in the things I most want to do   
7 My future seems dark to me   
8 I expect to get more of the good things in life than the average person   
9 I just don’t have good luck and there is no reason to think that I will in the future   
10 My past experiences have prepared me well for my future   
11 All I can see ahead is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness   
12 I don’t expect to get what I really want   
13 When I look ahead to the future, I expect I will be happier than I am now   
14 Things just don’t work out the way I want them to   
15 I have great faith in the future   
16 I never get what I want so its foolish to want anything   
17 It’s very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction in the future   
18 The future seems vague and uncertain to me   
19 I can look forward to more good times than bad times   
20 There’s no use in really trying to get something I want because I probably won’t get it   
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Appendix 9 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
Instructions:  These questions are designed to help identify how you feel.  Read each item and place 
an X opposite the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past few weeks.  
Don’t take too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will probably be more 
accurate than a long thought out response. 
Mark only one answer to each question 
 
1 I feel tense or “wound up”   2 I feel as if I am slowed down   
 Most of the time _____   Nearly all the time _____  
 A lot of the time _____   Very often _____  
 Time to time, occasionally _____   Sometimes _____  
 Not at all _____   Not at all _____  
 
3 I still enjoy the things I used to do   4 I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
butterflies in the stomach 
  
 Definitely as much _____   Not at all _____  
 Not quite so much _____   Occasionally _____  
 Only a little _____   Quite often _____  
 Hardly at all _____   Very often _____  
 
5 I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something awful is about to happen 
  6 I have lost interest in my appearance   
 Very definitely and quite badly _____   Definitely _____  
 Yes, but not too badly _____   I don’t take so much as I should _____  
 A little but it doesn’t worry me _____   I may not take quite as much care _____  
 Not at all _____   I take just as much care as ever _____  
 
7 I can laugh and see the funny side of 
things 
  8 I feel restless as if I have to be on the 
move 
  
 As much as I always could _____   Very much indeed _____  
 Not quite so much now _____   Quite a lot _____  
 Definitely not so much now _____   Not very much _____  
 Not at all _____   Not at all _____  
 
9 Worrying thoughts go through my mind   10 I look forward with enjoyment to 
things 
  
 A great deal of the time _____   As much as I ever did _____  
 A lot of the time _____   Rather less than I used to _____  
 From time to time but not too often _____   Definitely less than I used to _____  
 Not at all _____   Hardly at all _____  
 
11 I feel cheerful   12 I get sudden feelings of panic   
 Not at all _____   Very often indeed _____  
 Not often _____   Quite often  _____  
 Sometimes _____   Not very often _____  
 Most of the time _____   Not at all _____  
 
13 I can sit at ease and feel relaxed   14 I can enjoy a good book or radio or 
TV programme 
  
 Definitely _____   Often _____  
 Usually _____   Sometimes _____  
 Not often _____   Not often _____  
 Not at all _____   Very seldom _____  
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Appendix 10 Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
 
Instructions:  What follows is a list of ways you might have felt or behaved. Please indicate how 
often you have felt this way during the past week. 
 
  Rarely  
(Less than 
1 day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days)  
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the 
time  
(5-7 days) 
1 I was bothered by things that usually don’t 
bother me  
    
2 I did not feel like eating / my appetite was poor      
3 I felt that I could not shake off the blues even 
with help from my family / friends  
    
4 I felt that I was just as good as other people      
5 I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was 
doing  
    
6 I felt depressed      
7 I felt that everything I did was an effort      
8 I felt hopeful about the future      
9 I thought that my life had been a failure      
10 I felt fearful     
11 My sleep was restless     
12 I was happy      
13 I talked less than usual      
14 I felt lonely      
15 People were unfriendly      
16 I enjoyed life      
17 I had crying spells      
18 I felt sad      
19 I felt that people dislike me     
20 I could not get "going"      
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Appendix 11 Suicide Probability Scale 
Instructions: Please read the statements below and indicate how often you they have applied to you 
in the past week 
 None or a little 
of the time 
Some of the 
time 
Good part of 
the time 
Most or all 
of the time 
I think of things too bad to share with others     
In order to punish others, I think of suicide     
I feel I need to punish myself for things I have 
done and thought 
    
I feel the world is not worth continuing to live in     
I feel people would be better off if I were dead     
I feel it would be less painful to die than to keep 
living the way things are 
    
I have thought of how to do myself in     
I think of suicide     
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Appendix 12 Profile of Mood States 
Instructions:  Below is a list of words that describe feelings people have. Please read each one carefully. Then fill in 
ONE circle under the answer to the right which best describes HOW YOU HAVE BEEN FEELING DURING THE 
PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY. The numbers refer to the phrases below. 
 
0 = Not at all 
1 = A little 
2 = Moderately 
3 = Quite a bit 
4 = Extremely 
                                   
1. Friendly 
 
0 1 2 3 4 23. Unworthy 0 1 2 3 4 45. Desperate 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Tense 
 
0 1 2 3 4 24. Spiteful 0 1 2 3 4 46. Sluggish 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Angry 
 
0 1 2 3 4 25. Sympathetic 0 1 2 3 4 47. Rebellious 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Worn out 
 
0 1 2 3 4 26. Uneasy 0 1 2 3 4 48. Helpless 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Unhappy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 27. Restless 0 1 2 3 4 49. Weary 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Clear-
headed 
 
0 1 2 3 4 28. Unable to  
concentrate 
0 1 2 3 4 50. Bewildered 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Lively 
 
0 1 2 3 4 29. Fatigued 0 1 2 3 4 51. Alert 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Confused 
 
0 1 2 3 4 30. Helpful 0 1 2 3 4 52. Deceived 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Sorry for  
things done 
0 1 2 3 4 31. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 53. Furious 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Shaky 
 
0 1 2 3 4 32. Discouraged 0 1 2 3 4 54. Efficient 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Listless 
 
0 1 2 3 4 33. Resentful 0 1 2 3 4 55. Trusting 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Peeved 
 
0 1 2 3 4 34. Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 56. Full of pep 0 1 2 3 4 
13.Considerate 
 
0 1 2 3 4 35. Lonely 0 1 2 3 4 57. Bad-tempered 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Sad 
 
0 1 2 3 4 36. Miserable 0 1 2 3 4 58. Worthless 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Active 
 
0 1 2 3 4 37. Muddled 0 1 2 3 4 59. Forgetful 0 1 2 3 4 
16. On edge 
 
0 1 2 3 4 38. Cheerful 0 1 2 3 4 60. Carefree 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Grouchy 
 
0 1 2 3 4 39. Bitter 0 1 2 3 4 61. Terrified 0 1 2 3 4 
18. Blue 
 
0 1 2 3 4 40. Exhausted 0 1 2 3 4 62. Guilty 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Energetic 
 
0 1 2 3 4 41. Anxious 0 1 2 3 4 63. Vigorous 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Panicky 
 
0 1 2 3 4 42. Ready to 
fight 
0 1 2 3 4 64. Uncertain 
about things 
0 1 2 3 4 
21. Hopeless 
 
0 1 2 3 4 43. Good natured 0 1 2 3 4 65. Bushed 0 1 2 3 4 
22. Relaxed 
 
0 1 2 3 4 44. Gloomy 0 1 2 3 4  
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Appendix 13 Rumination Induction 
Instructions:  For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on 
the following pages. 
Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your imagination and 
concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments visualising and 
concentrating on each item. 
Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
 
Think about: the physical sensations you feel in your body 
Think about: your character and who you strive to be 
Think about: the degree of clarity in your thinking right now 
Think about: why you react the way you do 
Think about: the way you feel inside 
Think about: the possible consequences of your current mental state 
Think about: how similar or different you are relative to other people 
Think about: what it would be like if your present feelings lasted 
Think about: why things turn out the way they do  
Think about: trying to understand your feelings 
Think about: how awake or tired you feel now 
Think about: the amount of tension in your muscles 
Think about: whether you are fulfilled 
Think about: your physical appearance 
Think about: whether you feel stressed right now 
Think about: the long-term goals you have set 
Think about: the amount of certainty you feel  
Think about: your present feelings of fatigue or energy 
Think about: possible explanations for your physical sensations 
Think about: how hopeful or hopeless you are feeling 
Think about: the level of motivation you feel right now 
Think about: the degree of helplessness you feel 
Think about: the degree of calmness or restlessness you feel 
Think about: the possible consequences of the way you feel 
Think about: what your feelings might mean 
Think about: how sad or happy you are feeling 
Think about: the expectations your family has for you 
Think about: why your body feels this way 
Think about: why you get this way sometimes 
Think about: how passive or active you feel 
Think about: what people notice about your personality    
Think about: how optimistic or pessimistic you feel about the future 
Think about: how weak or strong your body feels right now 
Think about: the degree of relaxation or agitation you feel 
Think about: the kind of person you think you should be 
Think about: the degree of control you feel right now 
Think about: what would happen if your current physical state lasted 
Think about: sitting down and analysing your personality 
Think about: why you turned out this way 
Think about: the things that are most important in your life 
Think about: how quick or slow your thinking is right now 
Think about: the degree of decisiveness you feel 
Think about: trying to understand who you are 
Think about: how you feel about your friendships 
Think about: whether you have accomplished a lot so far  
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Appendix 14 Distraction Induction 
Instructions: For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on 
the following pages. 
Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your imagination and 
concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments visualising and 
concentrating on each item. 
Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
 
Think about: and imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic 
Think about: the layout of a typical classroom 
Think about: the shape of a large black umbrella 
Think about: the movement of an electric fan on a warm day  
Think about: raindrops sliding down a window pane 
Think about: a double-decker bus driving down a street  
Think about: and picture a full moon on a clear night 
Think about: clouds forming in the sky 
Think about: the layout of the local shopping centre 
Think about: and imagine a plane flying overhead 
Think about: fire darting round a log in a fire-place  
Think about: and concentrate on the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa 
Think about: the car park at a large supermarket 
Think about: two birds sitting on a tree branch 
Think about: the shadow of a stop sign  
Think about: the layout of the local post office 
Think about: the structure of a high-rise office building 
Think about: and picture the Eiffel Tower 
Think about: and imagine a lorry load of apples 
Think about: the pattern on an Oriental rug 
Think about: the ‘man in the moon’ 
Think about: the shape of the continent of Africa 
Think about: a band playing outside 
Think about: a group of polar bears fishing in a stream 
Think about: the shape of Sydney Opera House  
Think about: the shape of Great Britain 
Think about: the way Stonehenge looks at sunset 
Think about: the outline of the Houses of Parliament  
Think about: a train stopped at a station 
Think about: a lone cactus in the desert 
Think about: the shape of the country Italy 
Think about: a row of shampoo bottles on display 
Think about: a petrol station on a major road 
Think about: the fuzz on the shell of a coconut 
Think about: the queens’ head on a stamp 
Think about: a band playing the National Anthem  
Think about: the shape of a cello 
Think about: the birthmark on Gorbachev’s head 
Think about: the shape of the United States of America  
Think about: the baggage claim area at the airport 
Think about: the size of the Statue of Liberty 
Think about: the shape of a cricket bat 
Think about: a freshly painted door  
Think about: the shiny surface of a trumpet 
Think about: a kettle coming to the boil 
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Appendix 15 Dot Probe Stimuli for first pilot 
Set One Set Two 
Negative 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Positive 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Negative 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Positive 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
suffer parked love vote grave filed humorous wildlife 
wound dried happy green cancer saddle ardent willow 
attacks physics joy bag desperate variables eager total 
victims smelled tender sooner danger league lively ladder 
tease aisle excited voltage defeat museum peaceful rational 
discouraged connections devoted witness shot cars pleased academy 
gloomy pastel relieved stimulus trauma enjoin calm keen 
tormented mythology smile uncle kill shop glorious validity 
panicky clarets friendly occasion worried context cheer  salad 
insecure fetching  hopeful shallow powerless multitude carefree civilian 
horror wagons amazed expert devastated stagecoach pleasant resident 
dead data proud yield angry curve pious maple 
afraid detail enjoying sandwich threat varied bright beauty 
bitter handle faithful gigantic severe recall sunny juice 
evil hill cheerful sanction sinister integral lucky onion 
fright sipped  fun cow assault bottles sexy vest 
disease  remarks win hat lost read kiss taxi 
worthless batteries valentine repentant despised tomatoes sex arm 
rejected quantity affection appliance humiliated waterproof promotion sentiment 
bomb crew music table injury holder triumphant skyscraper 
worst owned joyful kettle intimidated coefficient miracle cabinet 
catastrophe approximate thrill rattle awful tract passion journal 
lethal racket orgasm locker mourn scans delight prairie 
ignored lighted comedy finger scared planet victory passage 
tragic rector terrific mischief conflict detailed success patient 
terror pupils paradise elevator dull flew treasure reverent 
trap tent laughter bathroom murder junior humour engine 
hazard ballot champion medicine agitation fireplace mother street 
hopeless feathers loved truck incurable reclaimed rainbow hairpin 
inadequate transition beach chair stress cities cash tool 
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Appendix 16 Dot Probe Stimuli for second pilot 
 
Set One Set Two 
Negative 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Positive 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Negative 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
Positive 
Word 
Neutral 
Pairing 
paralysis fragrance pillow hammer disaster reserved luxury autumn 
anguished appliance desire favour unhappy passage rescue fabric 
punishment lighthouse trophy banner poverty highway caress golfer 
distressed skyscraper pretty doctor divorce village joyful salute 
unfaithful nonchalant orgasm errand helpless startled thrill rattle 
depression restaurant sunset custom murderer clothing riches invest 
headache mischief truth hotel hostage gymnast beauty column 
sickness kerosene party black leprosy ketchup family church 
terrible busybody music board traitor volcano mother street 
suffocate repentant peace table crucify context honest avenue 
syphilis pancakes proud grass suicide vehicle comedy clouds 
accident  innocent savior option useless stomach humour engine 
dead dark friend chance hate iron christmas leisurely 
pain ship snuggle bandage war cat enjoyment sentiment 
rape vest spring theory hurt foam promotion penthouse 
sad cow ecstasy garment jail bowl acceptance  employment 
debt bake diamond subdued sick milk satisfied orchestra 
hell news rainbow whistle bomb fish vacation windmill 
vomit jelly wedding journal thief ankle handsome kerchief 
loser diver liberty curious grief elbow paradise elevator 
drown quart delight nourish demon salad treasure radiator 
slave swift sunrise reunion upset razor kindness consoled 
ulcer swamp sunlight corridor gloom tower terrific umbrella 
toxic aloof engaged opinion cruel stove romantic curtains 
cancer barrel excellence aggressive morgue limber success quality 
killer sphere confident astronaut abuse  nurse victory machine 
burial violin waterfall sheltered detest garter adorable reverent 
misery tennis valentine obsession devil adult diploma reptile 
hatred humble affection intellect rabies runner passion utensil 
lonely legend progress hospital trauma gender justice natural 
death field pleasure scissors afraid yellow aroused anxious 
betray poster champion contents stench mantel cuddle nipple 
rotten kettle birthday bathroom prison finger miracle lantern 
corpse cannon laughter computer stress window wealthy privacy 
maggot icebox friendly identity pollute glacier admired prairie 
poison coarse graduate nonsense victim butter triumph hydrant 
funeral teacher win hat loneliness inhabitant car boy 
torture agility joke chin toothache headlight fame lamp 
despise trumpet hug nun discomfort astonished sex bar 
fearful cabinet fun odd depressed lightning sexy frog 
assault cottage joy bus terrorist hairdryer kiss lion 
crushed nursery gift dawn humiliate lightbulb god air 
disloyal mushroom free body rejected mountain loved wagon 
failure serious cheer trunk terrified sceptical happy glass 
seasick swimmer lucky stiff troubled medicine honor chair 
mutilate pamphlet merry stool slaughter abundance  baby save 
bankrupt activate  cash tool infection athletics beach coast 
tragedy patient home part nightmare hamburger love wife 
 
